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ABSTRACT 
 
Development of the Fundamental Attributes and Inputs for Proliferation Resistance 
Assessments of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. 
(May 2007) 
Donald D. J. Giannangeli III, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
 
Robust and reliable quantitative proliferation resistance assessment tools are 
critical to a strengthened nonproliferation regime and to the future deployment of 
nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Efforts to quantify proliferation resistance have thus far 
met with limited success due to the inherent subjectivity of the problem and 
interdependencies between attributes that contribute to proliferation resistance. This 
work focuses on the diversion of nuclear material by a state and defers other threats such 
as theft or terrorism to future work. A new approach is presented that assesses the 
problem through four stages of proliferation: the diversion of nuclear material, the 
transportation of nuclear material from an internationally safeguarded nuclear facility to 
an undeclared facility, the transformation of material into a weapons-usable metal, and 
weapon fabrication. A complete and concise set of intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of the 
nation, facility and material that could impede proliferation are identified. Quantifiable 
inputs for each of these attributes are defined. For example, the difficulty of handling the 
diverted material is captured with inputs like mass and bulk, radiation dose, heating rate 
  iv 
and others. Aggregating these measurements into an overall value for proliferation 
resistance can be done in multiple ways based on well-developed decision theory. 
A preliminary aggregation scheme is provided along with results obtained from 
analyzing a small spent fuel reprocessing plant to demonstrate quantification of the 
attributes and inputs. This quantification effort shows that the majority of the inputs 
presented are relatively straightforward to work with while a few are not. These few 
difficult inputs will only be useful in special cases where the analyst has access to 
privileged, detailed or classified information. 
The stages, attributes and inputs of proliferation presented in this work provide a 
foundation for proliferation resistance assessments which may use multiple types of 
aggregation schemes. The overall results of these assessments are useful in comparing 
nuclear technologies and aiding decisions about development and deployment of that 
technology. 
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This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I.A. Motivation and Objectives 
Ever since nuclear weapons were created, some elements of human society have 
been working to prevent their proliferation around the globe. This effort has impacted 
both peaceful and military levels of nuclear technology. It affects global trade in high 
technology and decisions on whether to build nuclear energy systems in certain places 
or, in fact, whether to build them at all. The United States, the world’s largest consumer 
of clean nuclear electricity, avoids recycling its spent fuel because the process was 
considered to be a proliferation risk. But other nuclear energy systems have been built in 
the U.S. Do these systems pose any less of a proliferation risk? How does one quantify 
proliferation risk, or better its inverse, proliferation resistance (PR)? 
Robust and reliable quantitative PR assessment tools are critical to a strengthened 
nonproliferation regime and to the future deployment of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. 
Without such tools, critical vulnerabilities of processes, facilities, and systems are more 
likely to be underestimated, overestimated, or missed altogether. As a result, efforts to 
strengthen the nonproliferation regime through technology development and deployment 
may be seriously misinformed. While significant development has occurred in PR 
assessment in the past decade, current methodologies are still hindered by foundational 
flaws. Some rely too heavily on subjective criteria. Some focus on sets of system or 
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material attributes that are incompatible with other methodologies. Others fail to 
identify, understand, or untangle dependencies between attributes. These flaws limit the 
reproducibility of results and, therefore, the overall utility of these methodologies. 
An important first step in developing a consistent, reproducible PR assessment 
methodology is to identify exactly what it should be capable of doing. Such a 
methodology should: 
1. lend itself readily to sensitivity analysis,  
2. establish independence between the attributes by which it measures PR, 
3. provide a quantitative analysis with a numerical result, 
4. make use of measured parameters from nuclear facilities, 
5. provide an uncertainty or confidence level for results, 
6. produce a time-dependent analysis, 
7. consider the implementation of a nuclear safeguards system, 
8. consider physical protection measures, 
9. consider threat characteristics, 
10. avoid subjective determinations, 
11. have an ability to assess multiple facility types with a consistent set of 
metrics, 
12. consider the transportation of nuclear material, 
13. consider the long-term geological storage of nuclear material, and  
14. allow for discrimination between different facilities and technologies. 
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The objective of this work was to use these criteria as a basis for identifying a 
limited set of critical system and material attributes that rely as little as possible on 
subjective determinations and between which interdependencies are either nonexistent or 
transparent. Each attribute derives from a set of measurable inputs (e.g., mass, heat rate, 
radiation field, material inventory, etc.). A simple PR assessment methodology was then 
conducted as an example of how these attributes might be combined to evaluate the 
proliferation resistance of a given nuclear facility. 
The scope of this work was limited to a specific threat scenario: the diversion of 
nuclear materials from a safeguarded nuclear facility by the government owning that 
facility. The reason for this limited focus was to facilitate learning about how a 
reproducible PR methodology can be created and to demonstrate it with respect to a 
threat that can be well defined. With this first, focused effort completed, other threats 
(e.g., theft by an insider, theft by an invading force, or misuse of a peaceful nuclear 
facility for covert weapons production) can be added on as future work. 
I.B. Previous Efforts 
A number of methods have evolved to quantify the level of proliferation 
resistance (PR) for a nuclear material, system, or fuel cycle. In this section, a brief 
description is given of many of the PR methods developed in the past. 
The “Technological Opportunities to increase the Proliferation resistance of 
global civilian nuclear power Systems” (TOPS) Barrier Method Analysis defines a 
framework (methodology and attributes) that can be applied to compare the relative 
proliferation resistance of “mining-to-disposal” civilian nuclear fuel cycles.1 TOPS is a 
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fairly well-developed approach that lends itself well to supporting tasks such as ranking 
and comparing technologies and identifying research needs. However, because it is built 
on qualitative attribute assessment through expert opinion surveys, reproducibility is 
extremely difficult. In addition, sensitivity analyses and direct comparisons of systems, 
processes and facilities are of only limited value. 
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) (previously Japan Nuclear Cycle 
Development Institute) developed a quantitative assessment methodology for nuclear 
proliferation resistance with the goal of improving the development strategy for 
commercialized fast reactor systems.2 While the method allows users to arrive at a single 
PR value for an entire fuel cycle, it can also be easily broken down to give independent 
values for each stage in a cycle, using the same set of consistent attributes for each. This 
method incorporates measurements of mass, volume, radiation field, isotopic and 
chemical composition into the attributes used, but the quantification scheme involves a 
significant amount of subjectivity. In addition, some attributes are repeated and double-
counted in the method, such as “detectability,” which is listed both as a material barrier 
and a technical barrier to proliferation. This creates many of the same problems 
associated with TOPS. 
Part of the mission of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors 
and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was to “develop the tools to analyze the role and structure of 
Innovative Nuclear energy Systems (INS) required to meet sustainable energy demands 
… and to develop the methodology for assessing INS.3” The resulting methodology 
seeks to avoid attribute correlations and dependencies. For example, the inter-
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dependence of the heating rate in Pu and the concentration of even-numbered Pu 
isotopes is eliminated by measuring the Pu isotopics separately. Unfortunately, this 
effort at attribute independence is undermined by the assignment of qualifiers to 
different value ranges for each attribute, thus reducing the benefit of the initial 
measurements. This methodology can, however, be used to assess each facility and 
process within a given fuel cycle independently. 
Scientists at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developed a Markovian 
probabilistic framework useful for evaluating pathways associated with a specific 
proliferation scenario by representing possible event sequences and characterizing PR on 
the basis of other factors. Events are characterized in terms of transition, detection, and 
failure rates from one state to the next.4 Thus, for application to proliferation resistance, 
requisite analogs to characterize failure rates on the basis of process physical parameters 
must be developed. This methodology assumes that all proliferation activities are 
sequential, which is not consistent with real-world restrictions on proliferation efforts. 
Furthermore, the use of state transition probabilities to represent events makes some 
characteristics difficult to capture. These features limit the fidelity of the model in 
capturing the effects of features in the fuel cycle. 
William S. Charlton of Texas A&M University developed an additive multi-
attribute utility analysis (MAUA) method for proliferation resistance assessment5 for the 
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), a U.S. Department of Energy program to 
improve the U.S. nuclear infrastructure. This methodology yields a numeric PR value on 
a defined scale and all factors contributing to that value are clearly defined, making the 
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methodology applicable to multiple facility types. Each of the attributes in this method 
use clear definitions for their values and weighting factors. The values for several of the 
method’s attributes and their weighting factors use subjective determinations, and 
although the explanation of each attribute’s utility function outlines whether it is 
objective, subjective, or both, there is no way to quantify how much subjectivity is 
involved in the analysis and what impact that has on the results. Measurable (objective) 
quantities also are included in the analysis, and while some of the attributes used are 
fully independent, others may be physically dependent even when measured separately 
(i.e., “heating rate from Pu in material” depends significantly on the “weight fraction of 
even-numbered Pu isotopes” in the material). 
The Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) methodology 
adopts a graded approach based on a decision analysis which depends on the level of 
detail and timeframe that must be supported.6 The methodology establishes a simple 
linear approach with feedback to improve the analysis. In this approach, challenges lead 
to system response, which results in outcomes if undesirable feedback is introduced to 
change the system response. This methodology lacks a way of aggregating the results. 
The current approach is to use “spider graphs” of the attributes, presenting scaling issues 
and uncertainty in interpreting results within the PR context. Furthermore, it is not clear 
if the method could demonstrate the ability to capture the proliferation resistance of a 
fuel cycle over a multi-year time period. While this methodology allows users to asses 
the probability, cost and consequences of diversion, it does not suggest what an 
acceptable PR value might be. 
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Sandia National Laboratory developed the Risk-Informed Probabilistic Analysis 
(RIPA) methodology for proliferation resistance assessment. The goal of RIPA was to 
create a process capable of conducting a dynamic analysis to compare and outline 
probable outcomes of feasible proliferation pathways and forecast those pathways by 
creating likely scenarios.7 This methodology uses quantifiable information for 
considering potential proliferation pathways and introduces deductive reasoning to 
visualize the proliferation process. The result provides a quantitative analysis with 
uncertainties, allowing reviews and reproducibility of the outcomes. However, the 
calculation of consequences is not focused and probabilities are difficult to estimate 
without this focus. Furthermore, due to the aggregation of the data, the probabilities do 
not provide much insight. 
A Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of nuclear 
systems (SAPRA) is being developed by a working group of French institutional and 
industrial experts, including AREVA, Inc., on proliferation resistance and physical 
protection.8 SAPRA is based on the TOPS methodology, with two important 
distinctions: the multiple barriers analysis is extended beyond diversion to the whole 
proliferation pathway and the specific “state characteristics” (e.g., skill level, existing 
facilities, nonproliferation commitments, etc.) are introduced as an important factor in 
the assessment. Like TOPS, however, it suffers from a heavy dependence on expert 
opinion. 
Based on this literature review, it was clear that much diversity exists in experts’ 
ideas on how to assess the proliferation resistance of nuclear systems, but also on exactly 
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what the term “proliferation resistance” means. For the purposes of this work, then, 
proliferation resistance was explicitly defined as “a measure of the relative increase in 
barriers [both intrinsic to the material or process and extrinsic (or engineered)] to impede 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons either by diversion of material by a state in 
possession of a system, misuse of a system to produce undeclared material, or theft of 
material by a terrorist or sub-national group,” which is similar to the definition used in 
the Texas A&M MAUA method.5 By this definition, any attribute which makes 
proliferation more difficult to accomplish results in a higher PR value. Values for 
different systems or scenarios are relative and can be used to compare technology 
options. 
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CHAPTER II 
ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES 
While this work was intended to be a fresh start on PR assessment, it was still 
quite beneficial to develop an understanding of what has been done in the past. This will 
facilitate an incorporation of the strengths of existing methodologies and improvement 
upon their faults. Such an understanding was achieved here by evaluating each method 
against the set of desired characteristics presented in Chapter I. 
II.A. TOPS 
TOPS is an acronym for the Technological Opportunities to Increase the 
Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems. It is a barrier 
analysis method developed by the US Department of Energy’s TOPS Task Force of the 
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) in October 2000. The goal of 
TOPS was to define a framework for PR assessment that could be applied to any system, 
providing an assessment of relative PR values among various systems and options. 
TOPS identifies the intrinsic barriers against proliferation from a given nuclear system, 
attempts to evaluate their effectiveness against potential proliferators and identifies 
where extrinsic barriers need to be added.1 
The TOPS framework includes: identifying the proliferation threats and the 
linkage between fuel-cycle activities and proliferation; identifying various barriers to the 
threats; and for each system or subsystem, outlining the important attributes that 
characterize the effectiveness of the barriers. Barriers are considered as the counters to 
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system or subsystem vulnerabilities. TOPS identifies three main categories of barriers: 
“material barriers” pertaining to the nuclear material itself (isotopic, chemical, 
radiological, mass and bulk), “technical barriers” pertaining to the technology and the 
facility being evaluated (unattractiveness of the facility, access controls, detectability, 
required skills and time), and “institutional barriers” which cover safeguards and other 
extrinsic measures to prevent proliferation. 
Each element of the system or fuel cycle is reviewed against a specific threat to 
determine the important attributes contributing to the effectiveness of the various 
barriers discussed. This approach is tabulated, creating a separate table for each type of 
threat to the system (e.g., covert diversion by a technically advanced, non-nuclear 
weapons state in the mid-21st century). The three types of barriers are listed across the 
top of a matrix, with elements of the fuel cycle listed on the side. Each barrier is divided 
into its most important sub-barriers. A qualitative scale of letters is used to avoid the 
implication that the framework can be used quantitatively. “I” indicates an ineffective 
barrier, “L” a low barrier, “M” a medium barrier, “H” a high barrier, and “VH” a very 
high barrier. This scale is not linear. 
TOPS uses these barriers to identify technology implementations and research 
and development (R&D) opportunities in the short, medium and long term. A table of 
the importance of barriers to different threats serves as a guide for prioritizing the overall 
assessment effort. Initial attention should be given to those barriers considered highly 
important to deterring particular threats and little initial effort should be spent evaluating 
those barriers seen as having little or no importance to a particular threat. 
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TOPS has a variety of strengths to draw upon: it provides clear definitions of 
“threats”, “barriers” and classifications of “attributes”; it presents a framework to 
compare and rank different technologies with respect to PR; it attempts to provide an 
integrated assessment of both technological and institutional measures to bolster PR; it 
allows the analyst to identify barrier weaknesses, R&D needs and potential interactions 
and tradeoffs between barriers; it is useful for prioritizing barriers and R&D needs; it can 
be applied to multiple nuclear systems from mining to disposal; it has the potential to 
produce a time-dependent analysis if the analyst considers the residence time of material 
in each fuel cycle component; and it encourages the development of quantitative 
methodologies for performing comparative assessments of the proliferation aspects of 
different reactor and fuel cycle systems.  
There are also a number of weaknesses to consider with the TOPS framework. 
Barriers are evaluated qualitatively, not quantitatively. There is no attempt to evaluate 
the proliferation resistance of any system, subsystem or option in an absolute sense and 
no use of measured quantities from facilities. The framework is limited to comparisons 
of the effectiveness of each barrier among the civilian nuclear power systems and 
proliferation threat scenarios and it lacks a system to estimate the weight that should be 
attributed to each barrier. The evaluation scale is not comparable among the various 
barriers. In order to use the proposed matrices to compare systems or subsystems for 
their proliferation resistance, the entire fuel cycle must be considered. This greatly 
increases the difficulty of performing a sensitivity analysis. 
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II.B. JAEA Methodology 
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA, formerly the Japan Nuclear Cycle 
Development Institute) developed a more quantitative PR assessment methodology 
based on the TOPS framework. Like TOPS, it utilizes a matrix with barriers listed across 
the top and fuel cycle components down the side. Each barrier is assigned a specific 
weighting factor and the matrix is used as a scorecard that is distributed to a panel of 
nuclear experts. The scorecard is presented in Table I. These experts then grade the 
effectiveness of each barrier on a scale of 1 to 5, corresponding to the qualitative scale of 
“ineffective” to “very high” used in TOPS. The isotopic and radiological material 
barriers (highlighted in blue in Table I.) have a defined method for determining a score, 
but the rest of the barrier scores rely on expert judgment.2, 9 
The JAEA method does not readily lend itself to sensitivity analysis. Due to the 
sheer amount of subjectivity that goes into the assessment, it is not clear that changing 
part of a fuel cycle would have any impact on the result. And even if it does, there is no 
way to know how much of it is due to the experts’ opinions of the change. 
This method does not establish independence between metrics. Some metrics are 
in fact repeated in this method. “Detectability” is listed both as a material barrier metric 
and a technical barrier metric. Also the metrics “Mass & Bulk” and “Inventory 
Quantity” seem to be coupled. 
This method could be considered to provide a quantitative assessment, but that is 
unclear. The end result of the analysis is indeed a number, but it is derived from scores 
assigned to the metrics by experts using a scorecard, and many of those determinations 
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come from opinion rather than fact. This method simply applies numbers to an otherwise 
qualitative high-medium-low type of assessment. 
 
Table I 
JAEA Barrier Scorecard with Example Values Inserted2 
 
 
This method does use measured parameters from facilities. Measurements of 
mass, volume, radiation field, isotopic and chemical composition all feed into the 
metrics used here. 
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This method does not behave properly in limiting cases. Because the method 
adds up the contributions from each metric, it will not, for example, give a PR value of 
zero if no nuclear material is present. 
It is possible for this method to provide an accurate analysis, but that is unclear. 
Although the method does not give the correct result in limiting cases, nor does it 
consider safeguards system implementation, it may behave appropriately in certain cases 
for which we already know what the answer should be. More study is required. 
This method does not provide an uncertainty or confidence level for results. The 
method acknowledges that there is some uncertainty to its values, but no attempt is made 
to quantify those uncertainties. 
It is possible that this method could produce a time-dependent analysis if it is 
properly modified. First, the method would have to be broken down to provide a 
separate PR analysis for each step in a fuel cycle. Then the method would have to be 
applied repeatedly to give discrete PR values for each point along the cycle since each 
result is merely a snapshot in time. 
This method does not consider safeguards system implementation. While this 
was considered in TOPS, it was among the “institutional barriers” which were set 
outside the scope of the JAEA efforts. 
This method does consider physical protection measures. Facility accessibility is 
among the technical barrier metrics, and the method even goes so far as to recognize that 
physical barriers will have differing effectiveness against a covert state proliferator as 
opposed to a sub-national group. 
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This method does consider threat characteristics. It recognizes that some of these 
metrics will be more important to a sub-national proliferator than to a state. For example, 
the mass and bulk of the material is less of a problem for a state actor because they 
would have easier access to heavy-lifting equipment. 
This method does not easily identify objective and subjective determinations. 
The objectivity of some determinations is not really addressed. For example, the method 
claims that a radiation level of 100 Sv/hr provides for perfect proliferation resistance, but 
it gives no justification for that value, beyond claiming that it makes material handling 
“difficult”. 
This method does not avoid the use of subjective determinations. Almost all of 
the metrics are given subjective “scores” on a 1 to 5 scale by “experts” and then tallied 
on a scorecard. This is very much subject to the opinions of those giving the scores and 
it simply applies numbers to an otherwise qualitative high-medium-low type of 
assessment. 
This method does have the ability to assess multiple facility types with a 
consistent set of metrics. It was applied in trial runs to give a single PR value for an 
entire fuel cycle. However, it can be easily broken down to give independent values for 
each step in a cycle, using the same set of metrics for each. 
This method does consider transportation of material. It utilizes the same set of 
metrics to determine the proliferation resistance of material in transit as it does for static 
facilities. Some metrics could have different values depending on the route of transit and 
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time required for the trip. Therefore the method could also be used to evaluate different 
transportation options. 
This method does consider the geological storage of material. A geological 
repository can be assessed just as easily as any other nuclear facility with this method. 
Furthermore, the method gives a decreasing PR result as the material decays and its own 
self-protecting radiation field decreases. 
Finally, this method does discriminate between different facilities and 
technologies. It was applied in trial runs to give a single PR value for an entire fuel 
cycle. However, it can be easily broken down to give independent values for each step in 
a cycle so that the impact of changing those steps can be assessed. 
To summarize, this JAEA method is a slight improvement on TOPS. It does 
provide a numerical result, although it is debatable whether it is truly a quantitative 
method because it really is a numerical version of a qualitative high-medium-low type of 
assessment. It does have the added benefit of actually using measured data from nuclear 
facilities, but it eliminates the consideration of nuclear safeguards that TOPS had 
included. 
II.C. The IAEA’s INPRO Approach 
INPRO is the acronym for the International Project on Innovative Nuclear 
Reactors and Fuel Cycles, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiative “to 
provide a forum where experts and policy makers from industrialized and developing 
countries and discuss … the development and deployment of Innovative Nuclear Energy 
Systems (NIS) in the 21st century.3” In its Phase 1B report on the project, the IAEA 
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provided two basic principles in the area of proliferation resistance to provide high-level 
guidance regarding the deployment of INS. It then set out requirements to live up to 
those principles along with a set of indicators and acceptable limits to gauge compliance 
with each requirement. These are presented in Fig. 1. 
The IAEA itself did not develop a PR assessment method, but the Korea Atomic 
Energy Research Institute (KAERI) did. They performed a case study on the Korean 
DUPIC fuel cycle in which they established setpoint values for each indicator on a 
qualitative scale of “U” for unacceptable, “W” for weak, “M” for moderate, “S” for 
strong and “VS” for very strong. The scope of this work was limited to include only 
URPR1.2 and URPR1.3. 
This method does not readily lend itself to sensitivity analysis.  There are no 
weighting factors assigned to metrics, nor any other way of determining how much 
impact a change in one value would have on results. 
This method does establish independence between metrics.  Each metric appears 
to be independent of the others.  The often-troublesome interdependence of material 
heating rate and the concentration even-numbered Pu isotopes is eliminated by 
measuring the Pu isotopics separately.  
This method does not provide a quantitative analysis.  Quantitative values do get 
assigned to each metric, but then those values are qualitatively assessed with words like 
“moderate” or “unacceptable”. 
This method does use measured parameters from facilities such as material heat 
generation rate, radiation field, and other parameters. However, it assigns qualifiers to 
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different value ranges for each metric, thus eliminating some of the benefit of measuring 
these things in the first place. 
 
 
Fig. 1. INPRO basic principles, user requirements and indicators.10 
 
It is possible that this method could behave appropriately in limiting cases, but 
this difficult to evaluate.  Some metrics behave appropriately in limiting cases and some 
do not.  For example, if no material is present, the material attractiveness metric gives a 
perfect PR result, but the radiation field metric gives a bad result.  Since there is no 
BPR1 Proliferation resistance 
features and measures shall be 
implemented throughout the full 
life cycle for innovative nuclear 
energy systems to help ensure 
that INSs will continue to be an 
unattractive means to acquire 
fissile material for a nuclear 
weapons programme. 
URPR1.1 States’ commitments, obligations and 
policies regarding non-proliferation should be 
adequate. 
IPR1.1.1: States’ commitments, obligations and policies 
IPR1.1.2: Agreements between exporting and importing States 
IPR1.1.3: Commercial, legal or institutional arrangements that 
control access to NM and NES 
IPR1.1.4: IAEA verification and, as appropriate, regional 
bilateral and national measures 
IPR1.1.5: Legal and institutional arrangements to address 
violations of nuclear non-proliferation 
IPR1.2.1: Isotope content 
IPR1.2.2: Chemical form 
IPR1.2.3: Radiation field 
IPR1.2.4: Heat Generation 
IPR1.1.5: Spontaneous neutron generation rate 
URPR1.2 The attractiveness of nuclear material 
in an INS for a nuclear weapons programme 
should be low. This includes the attractiveness of 
undeclared nuclear material that could credibly 
be produced or processed in the INS. 
IPR1.3.1: Difficulty to modify fuel cycle facilities and process 
for undeclared production 
IPR1.3.2: Design features that limit access to NM 
IPR1.3.3: Bulk/mass 
IPR1.3.4: Diversion detectability 
IPR1.3.5: Skills, expertise and knowledge required to divert or 
produce NM and convert it to weapons usable form 
URPR1.3 The diversion of nuclear material 
should be reasonably difficult and detectable. 
Diversion includes the use of an INS facility for 
the introduction, production or processing of 
undeclared nuclear material. 
IPR2.1.1: The extent by which the INS is covered by multiple 
intrinsic features. ‘Extent’ is the fraction of plausible acquisition 
paths. It is understood that each acquisition path is covered by 
appropriate verification measures 
IPR2.1.2: Robustness of barriers covering an acquisition path. 
URPR2.1 Innovative nuclear energy systems 
should incorporate multiple proliferation 
resistance features and measures 
BPR2 Both intrinsic features 
and extrinsic measures are 
essential, and neither shall be 
considered sufficient by itself. 
IPR2.2.1: Cost to incorporate those intrinsic features and 
extrinsic measures, which are required to provide proliferation 
resistance 
IPR2.2.2: Verification approach with a level of extrinsic 
measures agreed to between the verification authority (e.g. 
IAEA, regional safeguards organizations, etc.) and the State. 
URPR2.2 The combination of intrinsic features 
and extrinsic measures, compatible with other 
design considerations, should be optimized (in 
the design/engineering phase) to provide cost-
efficient proliferation resistance. 
Basic Principles User Requirements Indicators 
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defined relationship between metrics to arrive at a total PR value, there is no way to 
interpret these anomalies. 
It is possible that this method could provide an accurate analysis.  There really is 
no way to tell how accurate this method’s results are due to the high amount of 
subjectivity and qualitative assessments it uses. 
This method does not provide an uncertainty or confidence level for results.  The 
method does not provide a numerical result at all, let alone any type of uncertainty or 
confidence level. 
This method does produce a time-dependent analysis.  The method is capable of 
assigning a PR level to each process in a fuel cycle.  These can be shown as a time-scale 
histogram tracing the life cycle of a given element of nuclear material and then can be 
integrated (numerically) with respect to time to get an overall idea of the proliferation 
resistance of the fuel cycle.  Changing the pace at which material moves through a cycle 
would change the integrated result.  Furthermore, the method takes into account the self-
protection of the material’s own radiation field –a metric that changes as a function of 
decay time.  However, the qualitative nature of this method impedes its time-dependent 
quality.   
This method does consider safeguards system implementation.  One of the 
metrics here is whether or not “a state’s commitments, obligations and policies regarding 
nonproliferation are regarded as acceptable by the international community”.  This 
essentially speaks to a country’s relationship and cooperation with the IAEA and implies 
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a consideration of safeguards.  Again, the qualitative nature of this metric clouds its 
results. 
This method does consider physical protection measures.  The method rates the 
difficulty of gaining access to nuclear material on a scale from “very easy” to “very 
difficult” based on what sort of barriers exist between the material and a potential 
proliferator. 
This method does not consider threat characteristics.  No part of the method takes 
into account a knowledge of who the proliferator is.  The result for a given process or 
facility is the same whether one considers proliferation by an inside operative or an 
invading terrorist force. 
This method does not easily identify objective and subjective determinations.  
The objectivity of metrics is not addressed at all. 
This method does not avoid the use of subjective determinations.  Although 
objectivity/subjectivity is not addressed in this method, many of the metrics appear to be 
quite subjective.  There is no justification provided for the cut-off points between 
qualifiers.  For example, the reason why a metric’s value is “unacceptable” instead of 
“weak” on the five-point qualitative scale is not explained. 
This method does have the ability to assess multiple facility types with a 
consistent set of metrics.  The type of facility being considered has no impact on the 
metrics.  Any facility that contains or process that uses nuclear materials will have a 
meaningful result for each metric used in the assessment method. 
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It is possible that this method could consider transportation of material, but that 
is unclear.  Literature on this method does not specifically mention transportation, but 
nearly all of the metrics in this method can be applied to material on a truck or other 
vehicle just as easily as to material in a static facility.  The values of metrics pertaining 
to material accessibility would change during transit depending on the route of travel.  It 
is at least conceivable that the assessment could be performed repeatedly for multiple 
points along the travel route, but some refinement of this idea is clearly needed. 
This method does consider geological storage of material.  A geological 
repository can be assessed just as easily as any other nuclear facility with this method.  
Furthermore, the method gives a decreasing PR result as the material decays and its own 
self-protecting radiation field decreases. 
It is possible that this method could allow for discrimination between different 
facilities/technologies, but that is unclear.  The method can be used to assess each 
facility and process of a fuel cycle independently, but it does not quantify the 
proliferation resistance result.  This makes it difficult to know how changing a facility or 
technology would impact the result. 
In summary, while the INPRO/KAERI methodology, like TOPS and JAEA, still 
does not provide a quantitative result, it does demonstrate how various material and 
facility attributes can be kept independent of one another. In fact this is the only existing 
methodology that performs well in the attribute independence area. It is also one of only 
two existing methods that is truly capable of giving a time-dependent result, if used 
properly. The major deficiency is the fact that the method is entirely qualitative, 
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eliminating the possibility of performing a useful PR comparison between technology 
options or having reproducible results. 
II.D. BNL Markovian Method 
The Application of Probabilistic Methods to Proliferation Resistance (hereafter 
referred to as the BNL method) is a PR assessment methodology developed at 
Brookhaven National Laboratory. It uses Markov models to estimate the probability of 
detecting material diversion from a nuclear fuel cycle facility. The assumed relationship 
is that if detection probability is high, then so is PR. 
The BNL method is a two-fold approach at evaluating PR. It uses intrinsic 
properties of nuclear material and fuel cycle facilities to give probabilities as a function 
of time that a proliferator can successfully divert material out of a given fuel cycle stage. 
It then considers safeguards inspections as the sole extrinsic measure of detecting and 
stopping proliferation. This is expressed as a detection rate for each type of inspection, 
defined as the inverse of the time between inspections plus the time to analyze 
inspection data to detect the diversion and the time required to verify that the diversion 
actually took place and was not a false alarm. These detection rates are then combined 
with the probability density functions to give the overall likelihood that a proliferator 
could successfully divert material from each stage.4 
The analyst has a great deal of freedom in the BNL method to determine paths to 
proliferation, what barriers are important to the proliferator and what the probability of 
success is at each stage. This introduces a good deal of subjectivity into the analysis and 
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makes the analysis impossible to reproduce. The method itself does not consider threat 
characteristics, but rather leaves this to the analyst to define with each scenario. 
It is possible that a sensitivity analysis could be conducted on the detection rate 
portion of this method, but that is unclear. Certainly the subjectivity in the intrinsic 
barrier side of the method would hinder this effort. 
The various intrinsic attributes to be considered are not defined in this 
methodology and any dependencies between them are not defined. The method does 
provide a quantitative analysis and it makes use of measured parameters from facilities, 
but no uncertainty is given for the results. 
The probability of detecting diversion is given as a function of time and it is 
highly dependent on the safeguards system in place. The consideration of physical 
protection measures is entirely up to the analyst here, as it is among the intrinsic barriers 
to proliferation that may or may not be considered in any given scenario. 
Finally, the freedom given to the analyst to define the fuel cycle and attributes 
with each run means that he or she may decide independently whether (1) multiple 
facility types are assessed with a consistent set of metrics or different ones, (2) whether 
transportation of material is considered, and (3) whether geological storage of material is 
considered. This high level of subjectivity makes it entirely unclear whether or not any 
discrimination can be made between different facilities and technologies. 
In summary, the BNL method’s Markovian models provide an excellent way to 
analyze the impact of safeguards on PR and to provide great time-dependence to the 
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result. This could be applied to another methodology in which attributes are explicitly 
defined so that subjectivity is greatly reduced or eliminated. 
II.E. TAMU Additive Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
An additive multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) was developed by Dr. 
William S. Charlton, Ph.D., at Texas A&M University in 2004 which computes PR on a 
scale from 0 for something that is completely vulnerable to proliferation (e.g. an 
assembled nuclear weapon unattended in a public place) to 1 for perfect proliferation 
resistance (e.g. a complete absence of nuclear material). The method defines a set of 
critical material and facility attributes with weighting factors (shown in Table II) and 
gives a utility function for each. The PR value for any given process step, then, is the 
sum of each utility function multiplied by its weighting factor. The utility functions and 
weighting factors were all determined by a panel of nuclear experts. 
The results produced by this method provide a snapshot of the PR performance at 
each facility along a fuel cycle. These can then be plotted on a time scale taking into 
consideration the residence time of material in each facility. Two such plots are shown 
as an example in Fig. 2, where a once-through fuel cycle is analyzed both with (Fig. 2.a) 
and without (Fig. 2.b) standard IAEA safeguards on the uranium enrichment plant. 
This method does readily lend itself to sensitivity analysis.  Each of the metrics 
in this method use clear definitions for their values and weighting factors.  This means 
that changing some attribute of a given fuel cycle has a clearly quantifiable impact on 
the PR value and the weighting factors provide the maximum error in the PR value if the 
value of a given metric were to be incorrect. 
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Table II 
Measures, Attributes and Weights for MAUA 
Measure j Attribute Weight 
1 DOE attractiveness level (IB through IVE) 0.10 
2 Heating rate from Pu in material (Watts/kg) 0.05 
Attractiveness Level 
3 Weight fraction of even Pu isotopes 0.06 
Concentration 4 Concentration (SQs/MT) 0.10 
5 Radiation dose rates (rem/hr at a distance of 1-meter) 0.08 Handling Requirements 
6 Size/weight 0.06 
7 Frequency of measurement 0.09 
8 Measurement uncertainty (SQs per year) 0.10 
9 Separability 0.03 
Type of Accounting 
System 
10 % of processing steps that use item accounting 0.05 
11 Probability of unidentified movement 0.07 
12 Physical barriers 0.10 
13 Inventory (SQs) 0.05 
Accessibility 
14 Fuel load type (Batch or Continuous Reload) 0.06 
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     (a)                                                                           (b) 
Fig. 2. PR value given by MAUA for a once-through PWR fuel cycle. 
(a) with safeguards on the enrichment plant and (b) without. 
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It is possible that this method could establish independence between metrics, but 
that is unclear.  Many of the metrics used are fully independent of one another, but some 
are not.  For example, “heating rate from Pu in material” depends significantly on the 
“weight fraction of even Pu isotopes” in the material.  While these can each be measured 
independently, they are physically dependent on each other. 
This method does provide a quantitative analysis.  The result of this method is a 
numeric PR value on a defined scale, and all factors contributing to the PR value are 
clearly defined.  The analysis avoids using qualifiers like “good” or “bad”. 
This method does use measured parameters from facilities.  Among other things, 
measurable quantities such as heating rate from Pu, weight fraction of Pu isotopes and 
radiation dose rates are included in the analysis.  Furthermore, those measurements are 
directly factored into the analysis, rather than being assigned a qualitative label such as 
“acceptable” or “blatantly horrid”. 
This method does not behave appropriately in limiting cases.  It should give a PR 
value of zero if no nuclear material is present and a value of one if one significant 
quantity (SQ) of material is completely unguarded and unmonitored.  It does neither of 
these. This is due to the fact that the method is additive, so the impact that any one 
attribute can have on the PR value is limited by its weighting factor. In an ideal case, if 
any attribute goes to zero, the entire PR value should be zero. 
It is possible that this method could provide an accurate analysis, but that is 
unclear.  The logic in determining the value of each metric is fairly well defined, 
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however the weighting factors are not completely objective.  Since they were determined 
by issuing written questionnaires to experts in various PR-related fields, their values are 
somewhat subject to current trends in those fields and any personal bias these experts 
might hold. 
This method does not provide an uncertainty or confidence level for results.  The 
uncertainty in measurements taken as part of a fuel cycle’s accounting system is factored 
in as one of the metrics in this method; however the final result does not include an 
uncertainty of its own. 
This method does produce a time-dependent analysis.  The method assigns a PR 
value to each process in a fuel cycle.  These can be plotted on a time scale (as was seen 
in Fig. 2) tracing the life cycle of a given element of nuclear material and then can be 
integrated with respect to time to get an overall PR value for the cycle.  Changing the 
pace at which material moves through a cycle would change the integrated value.  
Furthermore, the method takes into account the self-protection of the material’s own 
radiation field –a metric that changes as a function of decay time. 
This method does consider safeguards system implementation.  Four of the 
method’s 14 metrics are related to the extent and effectiveness of employed safeguards.  
This accounts for 27% of the overall PR value. 
This method does consider physical protection measures.  10% of the PR value is 
derived from the type of physical barriers that exist to prevent proliferation.  However, 
the values assigned to each type of barrier in this metric are somewhat subjective.  
Further refinement of this metric is recommended. 
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This method does not consider threat characteristics.  No part of the PR value is 
derived from knowing who the proliferator is.  The PR value for a given process or 
facility is the same whether one considers proliferation by an inside operative or an 
invading terrorist force. Furthermore, the method is not applicable to the threat of 
covertly misusing a declared facility for weapons material production. 
This method does easily identify objective and subjective determinations.  The 
explanation of each metric’s utility function clearly outlines whether it is objective, 
subjective, or a bit of both.  However, there is no way to quantitatively state how much 
subjectivity there is in any given analysis and how that would impact the result. 
This method does not avoid the use of subjective determinations.  The values for 
several of the method’s metrics use subjective determinations, and the weighting factors 
assigned to these metrics are also somewhat subjective. 
This method does have the ability to assess multiple facility types with a 
consistent set of metrics.  The type of facility being considered has no impact on the PR 
result.  Any facility that contains or process that uses nuclear materials will have a 
meaningful value for each metric used in the assessment method. 
It is possible that this method could consider transportation of material, but that 
is unclear.  Literature on this method does not specifically mention transportation, but 
nearly all of the metrics in this method can be applied to material on a truck or other 
vehicle just as easily as to material in a static facility. The values of metrics pertaining to 
material accessibility would change during transit depending on the route of travel.  It is 
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at least conceivable that the assessment could be performed repeatedly for multiple 
points along the travel route, but some refinement of this idea is clearly needed. 
This method does consider geological storage of material.  A geological 
repository can be assessed just as easily as any other nuclear facility with this method.  
Furthermore, the method gives a decreasing PR value as the material decays and its own 
self-protecting radiation field decreases. 
This method does allow for discrimination between different facilities and 
technologies.  It can be used to assess each facility and process of a fuel cycle 
independently, and the results can be integrated over the complete fuel cycle.  In this 
way, changing a component of the cycle will have a distinguishable impact on the result, 
allowing for a quantitative comparison of different facilities and technologies. 
In summary, the TAMU MAUA method meets a great number of the desired 
characteristics for a PR assessment tool. It establishes one short list of critical attributes 
that can be used to assess any system, facility or vehicle that contains nuclear material 
and it makes excellent progress toward eliminating subjectivity from the analysis, but it 
demonstrates that there may be some attributes that are inherently subjective. The fact 
that it does not behave appropriately in limiting cases could be addressed by making it 
into a multiplicative MAUA, rather than additive, so that if any one attribute falls to 
zero, the overall PR value would be zero. The method could also be made to consider 
threat characteristics by adjusting the weighting factors for each attribute according to 
how they would effect each type of proliferator. 
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II.F. PR & Physical Protection Evaluation of GenIV Nuclear Energy Systems 
An Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection 
of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems (PRPP) was developed by an expert group 
from academia and several US National Laboratories and presented at the Winter 
Meeting of the American Nuclear Society in 2005.6 Overall, the methodology is a 
stepped plan to integrating PR into the design of GenIV systems as they develop, 
beginning with a high-level qualitative analysis for initial design concepts, and 
becoming more detailed and quantitative as those designs develop and greater detail 
about each system is available. So, at its highest level of fidelity, PRPP would be an 
entirely quantitative methodology. 
PRPP defines six measures for PR performance against diversion or facility 
misuse by a state and another six measures for performance against material theft, so the 
characteristics of the threat are considered in the analysis. These measures are still only 
loosely defined so dependencies between them are unclear. It is clear, though, that the 
measures will incorporate measured quantities from facilities. Also, the given measures 
are applicable to any type of nuclear facility, including transportation containers, so all 
of these can be analyzed consistently. 
To date, this method has not been exercised and it is unclear how the values of 
the various measures will be aggregated into a final PR result. The current idea is to use 
“spider graphs”, an approach that greatly suffers from scaling issues, but it is not clear 
what these actually mean in terms of PR. It is intended that uncertainty will be 
incorporated in the analysis, though, and carried through to the final result. 
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One major strength of the method is that it is meant to be useful as a tool for 
evaluating nuclear system designs as they progress. Fig. 3 illustrates the high level steps 
to performing the analysis: identification of challenges, determination of system 
response, and assessment of the outcome from a proliferation attempt. If the outcome is 
unacceptable, the system can be modified and the assessment process repeated until the 
problem is corrected. 
 
Threat Definition Challenges 
System Element Identification 
System 
Response 
Pathway Identification and Refinement 
Target Identification and Categorization 
Estimation of Measures 
 
Outcomes System Assessment 
Pathway Comparison 
 
Fig. 3. PRPP analysis steps. 
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II.G. Risk-Informed Proliferation Analysis 
Risk-Informed Proliferation Analysis (RIPA) is a methodology for determining 
most likely paths to acquiring nuclear weapons along with the cost and time required for 
each. It was developed by Sandia National Laboratories in 2002.7, 11 “The RIPA 
methodology uses deductive reasoning similar to that used for fault tree analysis to 
construct an influence diagram that encompasses all of the major activities a proliferator 
might use to accomplish their objectives11”. An example of this is shown in Fig. 4. The 
shaded regions of Fig. 4 indicate the areas of the influence diagram that are applicable to 
PR analysis of nuclear energy systems. 
In the application of the RIPA methodology, the analyst defines the proliferator 
in terms of what he wants to achieve and what his capabilities are (e.g., technical 
capabilities, know-how, fuel cycle facilities in place, etc.). In that sense, the method does 
consider threat characteristics. The circles in Fig. 4 that are labeled “HE” for highly-
enriched uranium or “RGP” for reactor-grade plutonium represent the fissile material 
that a proliferator would need to obtain from a fuel cycle. This is where the fuel cycle 
details are considered, especially the ways in which the fuel cycle impedes material 
diversion, increasing the time and cost of obtaining material undetected. As fuel cycle 
parameters are changed, the solution of the influence diagram will change, shifting the 
proliferator’s options. Thus, sensitivity analyses can be conducted by making minor 
changes to the fuel cycle parameters and observing the changes to the influence diagram 
solution. 
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The way in which the “HE” and “RGP” nodes will be analyzed is unclear. A 
single set of consistent fuel cycle attributes is not presented, so it is unknown whether 
any independence can be established between them. It is clear from the literature,  
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of a high-level RIPA influence diagram.11 
 
however, that these attributes should use measured parameters from facilities and 
an appropriate set of attributes could be selected such that they can be consistently 
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applied to all facilities. These can and should be made to include safeguards and physical 
protection measures. 
The ability of RIPA to produce a time-dependent analysis is unclear. It does 
consider the impact that added PR would have on the amount of time it takes a 
proliferator to obtain material, but it does not account for changes in the amount of time 
that material spends in any given facility. For example, it is not clear that the length of 
time that nuclear material has been in a geological repository will have any impact on 
the proliferation pathways. 
RIPA is a methodology whose scope is larger than the proliferation resistance of 
fuel cycle facilities. It could make use of another PR assessment tool to provide inputs 
for the material acquisition nodes and then compute how that impacts the most likely 
paths to proliferation. Conceptually, anything that drives the likely paths away from 
planned nuclear energy systems would be considered positive. 
II.H. Simplified Approach for PR Assessment of Nuclear Systems 
The Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of Nuclear 
Systems (SAPRA) is an expansion on the TOPS and JAEA methods and is currently 
under development at AREVA, Inc.8 SAPRA uses a scorecard similar to that used in the 
JAEA method, but it adds extra fidelity to the analysis by considering four different 
stages to the proliferation process: diversion from a declared facility, transportation to a 
covert facility, material conversion to weapons-usable form, and weapon fabrication. 
SAPRA recognizes that a given nuclear material will cause different problems for the 
proliferator at each of these stages and attempts to capture that. It utilizes the same set of 
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attributes for each stage, but allows their values to differ based on what the proliferator 
is trying to do. For example, the heating rate of material will cause different problems 
for the proliferator during transport and during weapon fabrication. 
Because SAPRA is simply a higher-fidelity version of the same method used by 
JAEA, its performance against the desired characteristics is largely the same with two 
differences: the use of measured parameters from facilities and consideration of 
safeguards. 
The use of measured parameters from facilities is not certain with SAPRA as it 
was with JAEA. In the current model, SAPRA tends to make generalizations for a given 
type of material rather than taking measurements. For example, rather than letting the 
mass/bulk attribute value depend on a measurement of mass, it assigns a “high” barrier 
level to natural uranium and a “low” level to plutonium dioxide. 
SAPRA does not eliminate the consideration of extrinsic barriers to proliferation 
as JAEA did. In SAPRA, those are reinserted to include a consideration of safeguards 
system implementation. This is taken as an important barrier in the material diversion 
stage. 
While the fidelity offered by the consideration of four separate proliferation 
stages is a great strength in SAPRA, subjectivity is its greatest weakness. The practice of 
assigning numbers to an otherwise high-medium-low type of qualitative assessment 
makes the method highly dependent upon the opinions of the analyst(s) and eliminates 
reproducibility of results. 
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II.I. Summary 
All of the existing methodologies have been evaluated against the list of desired 
characteristics given in Chapter I. The results are collected in Table III. Inspection of the 
table readily shows that existing methods perform reasonably well with the use of 
measured parameters from facilities, consideration of safeguards, assessing multiple 
facility types with a single set of attributes, consideration of transportation and 
geological storage, and discriminating between different technologies. 
 
Table III 
Summary of Methodology Evaluations 
Desired Characteristics TOPS JAEA INPRO BNL MAUA PRPP RIPA SAPRA 
Readily lends itself to sensitivity 
analysis no no no maybe yes yes yes no 
Establishes independence between 
attributes no no yes no maybe no maybe no 
Provides quantitative analysis no maybe no yes yes yes yes maybe 
Uses measured parameters from 
facilities no yes yes yes yes yes yes maybe 
Provides an uncertainty or confidence 
level for results no no no no no yes yes no 
Produces a time-dependent analysis maybe maybe yes yes yes maybe maybe maybe 
Considers safeguards system 
implementation yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Considers physical protection 
measures 
yes yes yes maybe yes yes yes yes 
Considers threat characteristics yes yes no no no yes yes yes 
Avoids subjective determinations no no no no no maybe no no 
Ability to assess multiple facility types 
with consistent set of metrics yes yes yes maybe yes yes yes yes 
Considers transportation of material yes yes maybe maybe maybe yes yes yes 
Considers geological storage of 
material yes yes yes maybe yes yes yes yes 
Allows for discrimination between 
different facilities/technologies yes yes maybe maybe yes yes yes yes 
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Several common difficulties are also easy to identify. Most methods have 
difficulty with attribute independence and all struggle with subjectivity. Attempts have 
been made to address these issues. Attribute independence is desirable to ensure that 
nothing is being double-counted in an assessment unintentionally. This can be addressed, 
and has been to an extent in the MAUA method, by using very specific definitions of 
each attribute and working to be sure that dependencies are at least transparent if they 
cannot be eliminated. Subjectivity may be impossible to eliminate entirely from PR 
assessment efforts as some critical attributes are inherently subjective. In such cases, the 
solution to date has been to take a sampling of opinions from a large group of experts 
and normalize the results to reduce bias. However, the MAUA method demonstrates that 
some attributes can be quantified objectively with utility functions. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROLIFERATION STAGES AND CRITICAL ATTRIBUTES 
The specific scenario for nuclear weapon proliferation considered here was that 
in which the government of a state chooses to divert nuclear material from a civilian 
facility and use it for the construction of at least one nuclear weapon. Neither the threat 
of material theft (by an insider or an outsider) nor of converting a civilian facility for 
undeclared weapons-usable material production were considered here. Nuclear material 
in a diversion scenario never leaves the control of the state; it is removed from an IAEA 
safeguarded civilian nuclear facility by the government and used in a covert weapons 
program. An example would be taking some 3% enriched UF6 from a civilian 
enrichment plant and sending it to another, secret enrichment plant for further processing 
up to weapons grade, but not using the safeguarded plant itself to produce highly 
enriched uranium (HEU, uranium with  20% U-235). Another example would be 
sending spent power reactor fuel to a covert reprocessing plant to separate plutonium 
from it, but not using a power reactor to irradiate depleted uranium targets to breed 
weapons-grade plutonium. 
State-sponsored nuclear material diversion is a threat that can be fairly well 
defined. Unlike a theft scenario, physical protection does not need to be considered; the 
proliferator has unrestricted access to the source facility and its equipment. Both nuclear 
weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) were considered, as 
defined by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The facility 
where diversion takes place in this scenario was assumed to be one that is subject to 
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some form of international nuclear safeguards (i.e., a safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA) and it was assumed that the diverted material must be processed through some 
secret facility or facilities in order to build a weapon. It was hoped that the critical 
material and system attributes identified in this focused scenario could be applied to 
other threats as well with a limited number of additions. 
In evaluating the proliferation resistance of a given nuclear fuel cycle process, 
the most obvious approach is to measure how difficult it would be to remove material 
from it without detection. However, there are also properties of the material itself which 
could contribute to PR. If the material is particularly nasty (i.e., highly radioactive, 
corrosive, poisonous, hot, combustible or explosive in air, etc.) then it will create added 
difficulty in using it to build a weapon. By this reasoning, one could consider a 
reprocessing plant that never produces separated plutonium (i.e., always keeps it bonded 
to another element) to be more proliferation resistant than one that does. If a fuel 
manufacturer were to use a cladding material that is particularly difficult to dissolve or 
cut, then such fuel would be more proliferation resistant than fuels that are being used in 
most reactors today. Thus, it was useful to consider the entire process of proliferation 
here, from the acquisition of material to the construction of a nuclear explosive device. 
III.A. Stages of Proliferation 
In order to organize and simplify the thought process in developing critical 
attributes for PR, the proliferation process itself was divided into four stages: diversion, 
transportation, transformation and weapon fabrication. An idea taken from the SAPRA8 
method, this separation allows us to capture the fact that a given attribute may cause 
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different types and degrees of difficulty for the proliferator at different stages (and thus, 
different levels of PR). For example, the radiation field emitted by a material will cause 
dose and handling difficulties during the diversion stage. Then, during transportation it 
will make the material more detectable by outsiders and more difficult for the 
proliferator to conceal. Next, it could create a need for extra shielding or special types of 
equipment when the proliferator tries to transform the material into a weapons-usable 
form. Finally, if the transformed material is still very radioactive, it will create the need 
for very specialized design considerations in the weapon fabrication stage. 
These stages had to be explicitly defined in order to avoid ambiguity and to 
promote consistency between PR assessment methods that make use of this work in the 
future. The “diversion stage” is the process of covertly removing nuclear material from 
the declared and IAEA-verified inventory of any given fuel cycle process step (to 
include those in reactors) under international safeguards. The material must be removed 
from an internationally safeguarded controlled area. The “transportation stage” is the 
movement of diverted material (which has formerly been safeguarded) starting from the 
final point of international safeguards control to any location where material 
transformation or weapons fabrication takes place. This could apply to transportation 
between any two stages but is most relevant to the movement from diversion to 
transformation. The “transformation stage” is the conversion of the diverted material to a 
weapons-usable metallic form. This stage does not consider oxides as a final form and it 
assumes that transformation only occurs in un-safeguarded facilities. The “weapon 
fabrication” stage is the design, shaping, casting, and machining of transformed material 
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into a spherical pit or a target and projectile. This stage does not explicitly consider 
assembly of non-nuclear weapon components but it does consider the difficulties 
presented by radiation or heat load from the pit. These stages of proliferation are 
illustrated in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Stages of proliferation. 
 
Regardless of the point from which material in a nuclear fuel cycle is diverted, it 
will have to go through these four stages in sequence in order to be made into a nuclear 
weapon. Each stage will have some unique critical attributes to consider and some may 
use the same attribute in different ways. The stages of proliferation can also be either 
utilized or neglected by the analyst, depending on what he or she is trying to accomplish. 
If the analyst defines the problem such that any successful diversion of material is a 
complete failure of the PR regime, then the diversion stage could be considered by itself 
and the remaining three stages could be left out. Similarly, if the analyst is only 
interested in seeing how changes to the chemical makeup of material impact its 
usefulness in a weapon, then the transformation and fabrication stages can be used and 
DIVERSION 
TRANSPORTATION 
TRANSFORMATION 
WEAPON FABRICATION 
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the diversion and transportation stages neglected. In this way, the use of stages adds both 
fidelity and flexibility to the assessment of PR. 
III.B. Critical Attributes of Systems and Materials 
III.B.1. Attributes of the Diversion Stage 
For a state proliferator, only two things stand in the way of a successful material 
diversion: difficulties with handling the material once it is removed from the source 
system and the risk of the diversion being detected by outsiders. It was assumed that the 
task of gaining access to the material is trivial here as a state proliferator would have free 
access to the entire nuclear facility and the equipment needed to access the system. 
These two obstacles can be represented by three attributes – one for the material and two 
for the safeguards systems in place to detect diversion. These are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Attributes of the diversion stage. 
 
DIVERSION 
• Material handling difficulty during diversion 
• Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system 
• Difficulty of evading detection by the material control system 
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The first attribute is material handling difficulty during diversion, which is a 
function of the material form and properties of the nuclear material. It includes the 
difficulties associated with the weight, volume, physical phase (as it relates to the 
container required), and hazard level of the material. It is likely that handling difficulties 
would be very minor for the state diversion scenario as a state proliferator will have 
unrestricted access to all the facility’s equipment which is designed for handling nuclear 
materials. However, the attribute may have significant importance in the case of theft – 
something to be considered in future work. 
The second attribute in this stage is the difficulty of evading detection by the 
accounting system. Detection through the accounting system is provided through the 
international inspection activities. These activities are used to confirm the adequacy and 
veracity of the State System of Material Accounting and Control (SSAC). Each state 
under IAEA safeguards must implement an SSAC. This system, based upon discrete 
“material balance areas”, makes provision for keeping track of incoming, outgoing, 
produced and destroyed nuclear materials. Declarations of periodic inventories are 
provided to the international inspectors, based upon material measurements that confirm 
that any record imbalances (material unaccounted for, or MUF) meet the required 
safeguards criteria and are within measurement uncertainties. Inspectors must verify the 
validity of these declarations. 
The third and final attribute in the diversion stage is the difficulty of evading 
detection by the material control system. This attribute measures the effectiveness and 
efficiency (timeliness) of the available systems and procedures for evaluating the 
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integrity of safeguards-relevant data and accountancy systems (continuity of knowledge) 
and the physical containment of a facility to detect the undeclared insertion or 
undeclared movement of material. The measures include physical sampling, containment 
and surveillance systems (C/S) and physical inventory verifications. 
III.B.2. Attributes of the Transportation Stage 
The transportation stage again presents two obstacles to the proliferator: material 
handling difficulties and risk of detection. However, these must be considered differently 
from the same obstacles in the diversion stage. During transport, the analyst must 
consider the difficulties in handling the nuclear material as well as the container it is 
being moved in. This will likely add significantly to the mass and bulk that must be dealt 
with and could cause new difficulties such as a need for active heat removal. Also, the 
methods that outsiders would have available to detect transport are different from those 
in the safeguards systems at the source facility. Satellite surveillance and environmental 
sampling will play a bigger role in this stage. These barriers can be addressed with two 
attributes, shown in Fig. 7.  
The first is the difficulty of handling material during transport. This attribute 
considers the physical transportation of a single unit of material from the diversion site 
to the transformation site. A single unit of material could include any of the following 
examples: a single fuel assembly, a can of oxide powder, a 55-gallon drum of plutonium 
nitrate solution containers, a UF6 gas cylinder, etc. The transportation could be via any 
number of modes including motor vehicles, railcars, marine vehicles, aircraft, pedestrian 
transport, etc. Contributing factors influencing this attribute will include mass, 
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Fig. 7. Attributes of the transportation stage. 
 
bulk/volume, specialized container requirement for transportation due to material phase 
(solid, liquid or gas), biological hazard associated with the radiation field from the 
material, required shielding associated with the radiation field from the material, 
chemical reactivity (including corrosiveness, flammability, volatility, explosiveness, 
etc.), and biological hazard associated with the chemical form of the material (inhalation 
toxicity, ingestion hazards, or damage through the skin). 
The second attribute in this stage is the difficulty of evading detection during 
transport. This attribute considers the likelihood that the transportation of material within 
its transportation package can be detected by a concerned third party. It will depend on 
the characteristics of the material being moved and the presence and effectiveness of 
monitoring systems that are not under the control of the proliferant party. These 
monitoring systems could include multi-national environmental sampling (i.e., searching 
for effluents from the material), border monitors (i.e., searching for radiation signatures 
from the material), satellite or aerial detection (i.e., searching for visual, infrared, or 
multi-spectral signature from the material or its container), or physical inspection. 
TRANSPORTATION 
• Material handling difficulty during transport 
• Difficulty of evading detection during transport 
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III.B.3. Attributes of the Transformation Stage 
The transformation stage is the first point in this scenario where a state 
proliferator will begin to encounter significant barriers to the creation of a weapon. 
Material transformation will require facilities, equipment and knowledge that may not 
have been present as part of the country’s civilian nuclear industry. The extent of this 
new infrastructure development will depend greatly on what material was diverted and 
how much work must be done to convert it to a weapons-usable metal. For example, if 
the diverted material is reactor-grade uranium in a fuel bundle, it will first have to be 
chemically separated, then converted to UF6 gas, then re-enriched to weapons-grade and 
converted back to metal. However, if the diverted fuel was HEU metal reactor fuel, it 
would only need to be chemically separated from the fuel matrix to be used in a weapon. 
These barriers can be measured with four attributes, described below and shown in  
Fig. 8. 
The first attribute is a quantification of the facilities and equipment needed to 
process diverted materials. This attribute considers the difficulty inherent to converting a 
diverted material into a weapons-usable form as indicated by the type and quantity of 
equipment and facilities needed to perform the conversion. It does not consider facilities 
and equipment which might be required to evade detection. For example, low enriched 
uranium in the form of UF6 gas would require an enrichment facility (to enrich the 
material to weapons-grade) and a chemical conversion facility to convert the UF6 gas to 
a metallic form. In a different example, metallic plutonium would not require any 
facilities or equipment to convert it as it is already in a weapons-usable form. 
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Fig. 8. Attributes of the transformation stage. 
 
The second attribute is a quantification of the knowledge and skills needed to 
process diverted materials. This attribute considers the difficulty inherent to converting a 
diverted material into a weapons-usable form as indicated by the level of knowledge and 
skills needed to perform the conversion. This could include radiation shielding, radiation 
detection, chemical separation/enrichment, chemical conversion, and metallurgical skills 
depending on the degree of transformation necessary to process the diverted material to a 
weapons-usable form. 
The third attribute in this stage is the workforce required for transformation. This 
attribute recognizes that the size and complexity of the chosen transformation path will 
necessitate different numbers of unskilled, skilled, and highly-skilled workers to 
accomplish the transformation task. The greater the size of this workforce, the greater 
the difficulty presented to the proliferator in finding, recruiting, and paying the workers.  
TRANSFORMATION 
• Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials 
• Knowledge and skills needed to process diverted materials 
• Workforce required for transformation 
• Difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities 
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The fourth and final attribute is the difficulty of evading detection of 
transformation activities. This attribute is a measure of the extent to which the operation 
of a clandestine transformation facility can e remotely detected. Detectable signatures of 
such a facility may include: the presence of radioactive material in the environment, heat 
generation, liquid or gaseous chemical releases, presence of specific infrastructures for 
electricity or water supplies, etc. the primary factor in detectability of these signatures is 
the type of process being implemented. 
III.B.4. Attributes of the Weapon Fabrication Stage 
Weapon fabrication presents different obstacles to the proliferator than the 
material transformation stage. The risk of outsider detection can be neglected here 
because once the material is in a weapons-usable form there is nothing left to detect 
remotely. The radiation field will be considerably lower in this stage as most hot fission 
products will have been removed and the activities of weapon construction (design, 
casting, machining and assembly) are easily concealable in any building. The barriers 
come from the scientific challenge of creating a functional weapon and they can be 
quantified with three attributes, described below and shown in Fig. 9. 
The first is the difficulty associated with design. This attribute considers the 
difficulty in obtaining a nuclear yield from the material in hand as well as the difficulty 
of physically working with the material as indicated by the quantity and severity of the 
difficulties present. This will consider the spontaneous fission rate, heating rate, 
radiation field, phase (for example, α versus δ phases for plutonium), and chemical 
reactivity of the material. This attribute will answer questions such as whether a crude 
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weapon design will suffice or great complexity and precision will be required, whether 
the material can be easily molded into the needed shape or its material properties will 
cause great problems, etc. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Attributes of the weapon fabrication stage. 
 
The second attribute is material handling difficulty during weapon fabrication. 
This attribute is a function of the chemical and radiological properties of the nuclear 
material being used in the weapon core. If the material emits a high radiation field, then 
it could require shielding to protect the weapon scientists. If the material is highly 
radiotoxic, meaning that it presents a great ingestion or inhalation hazard to humans, 
then breathing apparatuses and anti-contamination measures will be needed. Finally, if 
the fissile material is reactive with common substances such as air, then the weapon may 
need to be assembled in an inert atmosphere. 
The third and final attribute in the weapon fabrication stage is a quantification of 
the knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate the weapon. This attribute 
WEAPON FABRICATION 
• Difficulty associated with design 
• Material handling difficulty during weapon fabrication 
• Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate the weapon 
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considers the difficulty in obtaining a nuclear yield from the material in hand as well as 
the difficulty of physically working with the material as indicated by the level of 
knowledge and skills needed to fabricate the weapon. This could include 
hydrodynamics, nuclear physics, neutronics, machining, electronics or high explosives 
skills. 
III.C. Summary 
In this state diversion scenario, PR can be assessed with just 12 critical attributes, 
which meets the goal of keeping the number of attributes low. Each of these attributes 
can be quantified using simple, measurable inputs like mass, volume, radiation field 
strength, frequency of safeguards measurements, and others, likely with known 
uncertainties associated with each measurement. These inputs will be presented in 
Chapter IV. Also still to be considered are the objectivity of and interdependencies 
between these attributes. Those properties cannot be assessed from the definitions 
presented here, but we will look at them closely as the inputs are defined. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MEASURABLE INPUTS 
So far, we have discussed proliferation resistance measures in the abstract. We 
have used overarching ideas (attributes) including the “difficulty of handling material” 
and the “difficulty of evading detection”, and so on. In this chapter, we introduce 
quantities that can be directly measured which tell us something about each attribute. 
These will be the low-level “inputs” for a PR assessment methodology. 
IV.A. Diversion Stage 
IV.A.1. Material Handling 
We begin with the diversion stage and its first attribute: the material handling 
difficulty. There are a number of factors which would make nuclear material difficult to 
handle even for the owner of a nuclear facility. These include the material’s mass, bulk, 
heating rate, radiation dose rate and the hazard it presents to any humans nearby. In all 
there are eight of these factors, or “inputs”, to consider. They are described below and 
shown in Fig. 10, along with the rest of the inputs for the diversion stage. 
The first input is the mass per SQ of nuclear material, measured in units of 
kilograms per SQ. This input considers the mass of the entire diverted object or quantity 
of solution which contains the fissile material of interest. Items or solutions that have a 
higher concentration of fissile material (and thus, a lower mass/SQ) will be more 
attractive to a proliferator since a lower total mass would need to be diverted and 
handled to acquire a useable significant quantity. The input uses the number of 
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kilograms of material diverted to acquire one SQ of fissile material. SQs are defined by 
the IAEA to be 8 kg for Pu, 25 kg for HEU, 75 kg for low-enriched uranium (LEU, 
uranium with < 20% U-235), 10 MT for natural uranium (NatU, uranium with 0.72% U-
235) and 20 MT for Th and depleted uranium (DepU, uranium with < 0.72% U-235). 
The use of SQs here allows us to normalize the input for all materials. As the value of 
this input increases, the proliferator will need to take more time and/or use more 
equipment to move the amount of material needed for a nuclear weapon, thus increasing 
the material handling difficulty. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Inputs for the diversion stage. 
 
DIVERSION 
• Material handling difficulty during diversion 
- Mass per SQ 
- Volume per SQ 
- Number of items per SQ 
- Material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
- Radiation level in terms of dose 
- Chemical reactivity with common substances 
- Temperature of source system 
- Heat load of material 
• Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system 
- Uncertainty in accountancy measurements 
- Expected vs. actual MUF 
- Frequency of measurement 
• Difficulty of evading detection by the material control system 
- Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of material control 
system in place (requires the development of standards and an evaluation 
of how facilities compare) 
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The second input for this attribute is the volume per SQ of nuclear material. This 
is similar to the previous input in that it deals with the concentration of fissile material in 
the item or solution being diverted, but it considers the volume of the diverted item or 
solution (measured in m3/SQ) instead of the mass. For solutions, greater volume will 
necessitate more time and more containers to achieve a diversion of one SQ. For solid 
objects, great volume could require the use of larger cranes and over-sized vehicles. In 
both cases, the difficulty of handling the material increases as the volume per SQ 
increases. Again, the use of SQs normalizes the input so that it can be applied uniformly 
to all fissile materials. 
The third input is the number of items per SQ of nuclear material. The greater the 
number of items that the proliferator must divert to obtain one SQ of fissile material, the 
greater will be the difficulty of handling the material. This is based on the assumption 
that handling a greater number of items is more difficult than handling fewer, if for no 
other reason then because the diversion task will have to be repeated. For example, 
obtaining one SQ of material from the spent fuel of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
would require the diversion of about eight fuel assemblies whereas it would take about 
150,000 fuel pebbles from a pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) to achieve the same 
diversion. The latter would be more difficult to handle than the former.  
The fourth input for material handling difficulty is the material form, that is, 
whether it is a solid, powder, liquid or gas. The assumption here is that each form, 
respectively, is increasingly difficult to contain. A solid object could simply be picked 
up and moved (barring any considerations of heat or radiation). Powder would require 
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some sort of container and probably a lid to keep it from blowing away. Liquid would 
require an impermeable container or a tank. Gas is the most complicated because it 
would require a tank that could be pressurized as well as a sealed transfer mechanism. 
The fifth input is the radiation level in terms of dose for the unshielded material, 
measured in Sieverts per hour per SQ. Again, SQs are used to normalize this input over 
all fissile materials. This input considers the acute biological effects of whole-body 
radiation dose to the proliferator. High dose rate materials would be hazardous to handle 
and may require the use of expensive and unique equipment. Extremely high dose rate 
materials would also provide a danger to the physical well-being of the proliferator 
especially if acute effects incapacitated the proliferator in a short time frame. Thus, 
radiation has a direct effect on the difficulty of handling a diverted material, increasing 
the difficulty with rising dose rates. 
The sixth input for material handling difficulty is the chemical reactivity of the 
diverted material with common substances like air, water, steels and plastics. Some 
substances will combust if they come in contact with water or air. Some will oxidize 
slowly. Others could have chemical interactions with the steel or plastic that is used to 
make containers. Material handling difficulty increases with the number of these 
chemical reaction issues that exist. Also, reactions that occur quickly will have a greater 
impact on handling difficulty than those that occur slowly. 
The seventh input is the temperature of the system from which material is being 
diverted. In general, wherever nuclear material is intended to be handled by workers on a 
regular basis, it exists in a system that is relatively cool. However, if the proliferator 
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chooses to divert material from some other, unusual location, it may be that the system 
temperature is higher. If it is hot enough, it may begin to limit the number of tools that 
can be used (because they might melt) and the amount of time that people can spend 
working on the diversion. For that reason, handling difficulty will increase with 
temperature. 
The eighth and final input for the material handling difficulty attribute is the heat 
load of the diverted material itself, measured in thermal Watts per cubic centimeter of 
material. Rather than focusing on the temperature of the system, as the previous input 
does, this is a measure of the rate at which the material itself generates heat, such as 
from the decay of radioactive isotopes. If this heat load is high enough, it will need to be 
mitigated with some kind of heat removal technique which must be applied during 
diversion. Also, increasing heat load will create a need for increasingly complex or large 
heat removal equipment. 
IV.A.2. Evading the Accountancy System 
The accountancy portion of the safeguards system is intended to perform periodic 
inspections of facility inventories with comparisons to facility records in order to detect 
if any material has gone missing for any reason, malicious or otherwise. There are three 
characteristics that can be used to gauge the strength of this system and, hence, the 
difficulty for the proliferator to divert material undetected. 
The first input is the uncertainty in the accountancy measurements, measured in 
units of SQs per year. This is obtained by multiplying the measurement uncertainty 
value (a percentage) by the number of SQs of fissile material processed through the 
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facility in one year. The assumption is that if this value is greater than one SQ, then the 
proliferator could have diverted enough material for one weapon without causing a 
statistically meaningful change in value for the accountancy system measurements. As 
this input value decreases, it causes greater difficulty for the proliferator to divert 
material undetected and increases PR. 
The second input is the difference between the amount of actual (measured) and 
expected material unaccounted for (MUF) in a facility, given in SQs. Any facility will 
have a certain amount of MUF due to hold-up in pipes, broken fuel rods that have fallen 
underneath the racks of a spent fuel pool, etc. These things become part of the facility’s 
inventory record and can be verified through periodic measurement of the material on-
site. If the difference between actual and expected MUF is consistently large for a given 
facility, then the accountancy system would not be effective and it would be easy to hide 
a material diversion. However, if the difference is consistently low, then the likelihood 
of detecting a diversion is better. Therefore, there will be an inverse relationship between 
this input and the difficulty of evading detection of diversion activities. 
The third and final input is the frequency of accountancy measurements, given as 
a number per unit time. In an ideal, perfectly proliferation-resistant situation, 
accountancy measurements would be done continuously and in real-time so that any 
change in inventory is instantly detected. By contrast, material accounting on an annual 
basis (or never) would be the worst scenario. In this case, a potential proliferator would 
have ample time between measurements to get away with a quantity of nuclear material 
and fabricate a weapon before its absence is detected. In some cases, a material is 
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considered to be under continuous measurement when its diversion would be 
immediately recognized (i.e., fuel under irradiation in a PWR). So, the greater the 
frequency of measurement, the greater the difficulty of diverting material undetected. 
IV.A.3. Evading the Material Control System 
The material control portion of the safeguards system is based on surveillance 
and is meant to detect the unauthorized movement of nuclear materials. Tools in use for 
this include video surveillance, radiation monitors, seals and RFID tags. The 
effectiveness of material control and, thus, the difficulty of removing material 
undetected, is a function of the vulnerability of the system in place. Evaluating the 
probability that the control system will detect unauthorized movement requires the 
development of standards and an assessment of how facilities compare. This would 
require a detailed vulnerability assessment for the material in a facility. For many 
hypothetical cases, there may not be sufficient information to generate this assessment. 
In these cases, it is suggested that this input be neglected. 
IV.B. Transportation Stage 
IV.B.1. Material Handling 
The material handling difficulty in transporting nuclear material has many 
similarities to the same attribute from the diversion stage, but also some key differences. 
The mass and volume of the material must be considered again, but for transportation 
there is likely a sizeable container that must also be considered. Detectability remains an 
issue, but the means of detection here are different. Also, the people involved in this 
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stage of proliferation will likely be spending more time in close proximity to the material 
than in the diversion stage, so other hazards must be considered. There are again eight 
inputs in all to be considered for material handling. These are described below and 
shown in Fig. 11, along with the rest of the inputs for the transportation stage. 
The first input for material handling during transport is the mass per SQ of 
nuclear material. Here, the mass of both the diverted item(s) and their transport container 
must be considered and the mass must be sufficient to account for at least one SQ of 
weapons-usable material. Greater mass causes greater handling difficulties as hoisting 
equipment and more heavy-duty transport vehicles become necessary, so there is a direct 
relationship between this input and the material handling attribute. 
The second input is the volume of material per SQ. This is similar to the volume 
input in the diversion stage, except that it must now include the volume of the transport 
container as well, so its value will be higher. Greater volume causes greater handling 
difficulties as larger vehicles and more complex rigging become necessary for transport. 
This could even limit the available routes of movement, especially over land as some 
roads are too small to accommodate large trucks. 
The third input here is the form of the diverted material, that is, whether it is a 
solid, powder, liquid or gas. This property of the material could necessitate the use of 
special containers. This generally does not apply to solids, but liquids and gases would 
require tanks and/or high-pressure bottles. These are not items that one could simply 
place in the back of a car or pick-up truck, so it would make handling the material 
somewhat more difficult than if it were a small solid piece of metal. 
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Fig. 11. Inputs for the transportation stage. 
 
The fourth input is the radiation level in terms of dose of the unshielded material. 
This is not the radiation signature on the outside of the transport container. This input 
will dictate what that container needs to be made of in order to protect nearby people 
(truck driver, barge pilot, etc.) from exposure. Greater radiation coming from the 
materials will create greater handling difficulties by necessitating shielding (requiring 
knowledge of shield physics and increasing the mass being transported) or regulated 
exposure time for individuals conducting the transport. This input will be a measure of 
the exposure rate at a distance of one meter from the source, in units of Sv/hr. 
TRANSPORTATION 
• Material handling difficulty during transport 
- Mass per SQ 
- Volume per SQ 
- Material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
- Radiation level in terms of dose 
- Heat load of material 
- Chemical reactivity with common substances 
- Immediate chemical toxicity 
- Time-averaged chemical toxicity 
• Difficulty of evading detection during transport 
- Mass of material and transportation container 
- Volume of material and transportation container 
- Number of satellite images analyzed by IAEA per unit time 
- Heat load of material 
- Amount of shielding needed to conceal radiation 
- Host country size (land area) 
- Number of declared nuclear facilities 
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The fifth input for material handling difficulty during transport is the heat load of 
the material and it is identical to the heat load input mentioned in the diversion stage. 
Many nuclear materials generate heat and require active cooling to prevent damage and 
material release. The greater this heat load, the greater the complexity of the portable 
cooling system that will be needed for transport. This input will be measured in thermal 
Watts emitted per SQ of weapons material. 
The sixth input is the chemical reactivity of the diverted material with common 
substances like water, air, steels and plastics, and it is identical to the reactivity input in 
the diversion stage. The seventh input is the immediate chemical toxicity (hazard to 
humans) and the eighth is the time-averaged toxicity. Much like the radiation dose input 
above, if the material is chemically toxic to humans, measures must be taken to protect 
those conducting the transport. The greater those measures, the greater the difficulty in 
handling the material. This consideration is separated into two inputs because chemical 
toxicity can be measured in two distinctly different ways. One is the Immediately 
Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) concentration of a material, as established by the 
US Center for Disease Control (CDC). This deals with a substance’s ability to rapidly 
incapacitate an individual. The lower the IDLH concentration is for a material, the more 
difficult it will be to handle safely. The other way to measure toxicity is a Time-
Weighted Average (TWA) concentration which, if exceeded for a length of time, would 
pose health risks. TWA toxicity, then, deals with long-term health effects and would be 
of little concern if the transportation stage does not take much time. However, if the 
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transport takes very long, then measures will be needed to mitigate the risk and the 
difficulty will increase as the TWA concentration decreases. 
IV.B.2. Evading Detection 
Once nuclear material has been moved out of a safeguarded facility, the tools 
available for detecting it change drastically. At this stage, the material is out in the open 
where it can be picked up by overhead surveillance (satellite and aircraft). If the material 
and its container are very massive or bulky, then they will require a large vehicle to 
move which can be more easily spotted on imagery. This gives rise to the first two of 
seven inputs for the detection attribute: mass and volume of the material and its 
container. As both of these inputs increase, the transport becomes easier to detect and so 
the difficulty of evading detection increases. However, just because a transport is easier 
to see does not necessarily mean that it will be detected. Someone has to be looking for 
it. The third input for this attribute accounts for this. It is the number of satellite images 
of the host country analyzed by the IAEA per unit time. This input gives an indication of 
the level of scrutiny that a country is under by the international community (imagery 
from national technical means not considered here). Greater scrutiny results in a greater 
chance of detection. Therefore, the higher this rate is, the more difficult it will be for the 
proliferator to avoid detection. 
The fourth input here is the heat load of the material. This is the same input that 
we have seen twice before in this chapter. It is used here to account for the fact that heat 
is a signature of nuclear material that can be detected remotely. As the heating rate 
increases, the transport vehicle will show up more and more brightly on infrared images 
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and become more noticeable. This will make it more difficult for the proliferator to 
move the material undetected. 
The fifth input for this attribute is the amount of shielding needed to conceal the 
radioactive signature of the material from radiation monitors. This will be taken as the 
thickness of shielding that would reduce the exposure rate to 10 mR/hr at the shield outer 
surface. 
The last two inputs for this attribute have to do with the ability to distinguish the 
unauthorized movement of diverted nuclear material from other legitimate activities. The 
larger a country is and the greater the number of nuclear facilities it has, the more 
difficult it will be for the international community to make this distinction. This is 
captured by using as inputs the size of a country (km2 of land and water, since transport 
can also be by boat) and the number of declared nuclear facilities that it has in operation. 
If a country has many nuclear facilities and material is routinely moved between them, 
then a proliferator could more easily hide an illegal transport among the rest. 
IV.C. Transformation Stage 
IV.C.1. Facilities and Equipment 
As stated in Chapter III, the amount of facilities and equipment needed to process 
diverted material serves as a barrier to proliferation. The more of these things that are 
needed, the higher the barrier. This can be characterized by determining how much work 
needs to be done to the diverted material to make it weapons-usable and what the 
proliferator needs to complete that work. This can be captured with three inputs, 
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described below and shown in Fig. 12 along with the rest of the inputs for the 
transformation stage. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Inputs for the transformation stage. 
 
TRANSFORMATION 
• Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials 
- Number of process steps to metallic form 
- Number of different types of export controlled equipment/materials 
- Electrical requirement 
• Knowledge and skills needed to process diverted materials 
- Number of process steps to metallic form 
- Radiation shielding requirement 
- Degree of remote manipulation required 
- Radiation effect on materials and components used in process 
- Heat load 
- Treatment requirement for gaseous byproducts 
- Treatment requirement for liquid byproducts 
- Advanced actinide chemistry skills needed 
• Workforce required for transformation 
- Number of unskilled workers required 
- Number of skilled workers required 
- Number of experts (designers, etc.) needed 
• Difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities 
- Is the Additional Protocol in force in this state? 
- Frequency of environmental sampling measurement 
- Number of declared nuclear facilities 
- Isotopic signature 
- Facility size 
- Heat load 
- Sonic load 
- Radiation load 
- Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted 
- Undiluted volume of liquid emissions 
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The first input is the number of process steps required to convert the diverted 
material to a weapons-usable metallic form. Each process step (dissolving, chemical 
separation, re-enrichment, etc.) requires its own set of equipment. The more steps there 
are then the more equipment that is needed. In the application of this input, the list of 
possible process steps must be clearly defined in a table such that all users will consider 
the same series of process steps. Such a table is provided here in Table IV. 
The second input is the number of different types of export-controlled equipment 
and materials that the proliferator would need to complete the transformation of material 
from its diverted state to a weapons-usable form. The presence of export controls will 
make a piece of equipment/material more difficult to obtain. PR will rise with this 
number. This input only considers the difficulty of acquiring the first of a kind of 
technology/material. The difficulty associated with replication of that technology should 
be considered in country-specific profiles and scenarios, not included here. 
The third and final input for this attribute is the electrical requirement of the 
material conversion process. Great electrical needs for transformation could present 
great difficulties for the proliferating state. It would require great resources to generate 
and it would make covert operation of a transformation facility more difficult. This input 
will be a measure of the electric demand of the transformation facility or facilities, in 
units of kilowatts. 
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Table IV 
Process Steps to Weapons-Usable Metal 
Plutonium Process Route Uranium Process Route 
Conversion to metallic form Conversion to metallic form 
Plutonium purification Uranium enrichment to > 80 wt% 
Plutonium/uranium conversion Uranium enrichment to > 20 wt% 
Fission product extraction Uranium enrichment to > 8 wt% 
Fuel dissolution Uranium enrichment to > 4 wt% 
Chop/shear Uranium enrichment to > 2 wt% 
Spent fuel cooling Uranium enrichment to > 1 wt% 
Fuel irradiation Uranium conversion to UF6 
Fuel fabrication Uranium milling 
Uranium conversion  
Uranium milling  
 
IV.C.2. Knowledge and Skills 
The knowledge and skills attribute of the transformation stage uses many of the 
same inputs as previous attributes because all of the difficulties discussed thus far can be 
overcome with the proper expertise. For example, a proliferator might not care how 
many different chemical procedures must be done to transform the diverted material if 
he has scientists who know how to perform each step well. Also, most radiation fields 
can be shielded if one knows how. Still, gaining this knowledge is not trivial and the 
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more of it the proliferator needs, the greater will be his difficulty in building a weapon 
from the material in hand. This difficulty can be measured with the following inputs. 
The first is the number of process steps to metallic form, repeated from above 
and outlined in Table IV. Each process step requires its own set of skills and specific 
knowledge. The more steps there are, the more types of expertise that are needed. This 
input will be a measure of the number of different chemical procedures that must be 
performed on a material to transform it from its diverted form into a weapons-usable 
metal. 
The second input is the radiation shielding requirement and its value is binary. If 
we assume that the knowledge and skill necessary to design a radiation shield is the 
same, regardless of the strength of the field, then this input is indeed binary; either a 
shield needs to be designed or it does not. The value could depend on whether the 
exposure rate is above or below some set value, such as 100 mSv/hr at 1 m, for example. 
The third input is the degree of remote manipulation that will be required to work 
with the material. Any material that is radioactive enough to harm a person quickly will 
need to be kept behind a thick shield (such as in a hot cell) and manipulated by robotic 
means. The intricacy of the work that needs to be done on the material will dictate the 
sophistication of the robotics. Any need for the use of remote manipulation equipment 
requires the acquisition of such technology and learning how to use it effectively, which 
is not trivial. This input would best be represented by a sliding scale of difficulty. 
The fourth input is the radiation effect on materials and components being used 
to process the diverted nuclear material. Radiation dose will cause damage to tools, and 
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equipment and could activate metals and chemicals being used as well. Knowledge of 
these effects and how to mitigate them will be required. 
The next two inputs are similar to each other. They are the treatment 
requirements for gaseous and liquid byproducts before release to the environment. The 
two are kept separate because the methods for dealing with them are different. The 
knowledge and skills required to treat byproducts before release to the environment is 
the same, regardless of how much byproduct must be treated. Only the amount/size of 
the treatment equipment will change. Therefore, both of these inputs will be binary; 
either treatment is needed (input value is 1) or it is not (input value is 0). 
The seventh and final input for this attribute is the level of advanced actinide 
chemistry skills that will be needed. Fissile materials can be ordered based on how 
difficult they are to work with chemically. U is the simplest, Pu and Np are a bit more 
complicated, and Am is even more complex. So, one possible scale for this input could 
be U=0, Pu/Np=1, Am=2, etc. 
IV.C.3. Workforce 
As stated in Chapter III, the amount of work that needs to be done to transform 
diverted nuclear material into a weapons-usable form is not trivial and it will require a 
certain work force of unskilled, skilled and expert individuals. Finding, recruiting and 
paying these people will not be a trivial task for the proliferator so the size of this work 
force does serve as a barrier to proliferation. This attribute can be broken down into 
three inputs: the number of unskilled workers needed, the number of skilled workers 
needed, and the number of experts needed to get the job done. These numbers of people 
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are not something that a PR analyst could quantify directly, because they really depend 
on how quickly the proliferator wants to complete the work. If he needs it done very 
quickly, he would need a work force on the order of that at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. However, if he is patient, it can be done with a much smaller group. What 
the analyst can quantify directly is the workforce needed in terms of person-years, 
because this is a measure of the amount of work to be done. So, these three inputs will 
be given in person-years.  
IV.C.4. Evading Detection 
Finally, if the proliferator is able to obtain or build all the necessary equipment 
and facilities and assemble an adequate work force, the work must still be performed 
without being detected. There are a number of factors that will impact the proliferator’s 
ability to avoid detection of his material transformation activities. First is the Additional 
Protocol which allows the IAEA to conduct snap inspections of declared and undeclared 
sites. This is an optional addendum to a state’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA and 
it serves as a binary input to this PR attribute. Either a state has signed the Additional 
Protocol and brought it into force (input = 1) or it has not (input = 0). If the Additional 
Protocol is in place, it will greatly erode the proliferator’s ability to evade detection. 
The next two inputs are repeated from the detection attribute in the transportation 
stage: the frequency with which environmental samples are taken and the number of 
declared nuclear facilities. Environmental samples will alert inspectors to covert nuclear 
activity if they detect radioactive signatures that are unexpected, either by virtue of their 
location or isotopics. An unexpected location would indicate a covert processing facility 
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and unexpected isotopics at a declared facility would indicate that undeclared activities 
are being undertaken somewhere on site where inspectors do not routinely go. The 
greater the frequency of these environmental samples, the more difficult it will be for the 
proliferator to evade detection. The number of declared facilities is used, again, to 
normalize this value between countries that have nuclear industries of different sizes. 
The fourth input is the isotopic signature of the various compounds and processes 
used in transformation. These are the signatures that could be picked up by 
environmental samples or even radiation monitors. There are specific signatures that will 
serve as concrete evidence that nuclear material is being transformed for non-peaceful 
purposes. The more of these there are in a proliferator’s transformation process, the 
harder it will be to conceal them all and avoid detection. 
The fifth input is facility size and it deals with the ability of the international 
community to spot a nuclear facility on overhead imagery. Simply put, the larger a 
facility is, the more noticeable it will be and the more difficult it will be to hide. Size 
alone is not a sufficient indicator though. A facility may have distinctive shapes that give 
it away (long canyons for a reprocessing facility, cooling towers for a reactor) but aside 
from that, a large building is just a large building and a photograph may not be able to 
distinguish a large warehouse from an enrichment plant. Other signatures must be 
considered, which gives rise to the remainder of the inputs for this attribute. 
The sixth input is the heat load at a facility, measured in thermal Watts. 
Whatever heat is generated at a transformation facility must be dissipated somewhere, 
and this can be detected with infrared scans. The difficulty of evading detection will 
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increase with increasing heat load. The seventh input is sonic load of a facility, including 
noise level in decibels and the frequency of the sound. The latter is especially revealing 
with centrifuge enrichment plants which give off characteristic vibrations that can be 
identified. These sonic problems can be dealt with using dampening techniques, but they 
do create difficulty for the proliferator. 
The eighth input here is the radiation load at a transformation facility, given in 
Sv/hr. The greater the radiation field for the entire process, the more shielding that will 
be required to contain and conceal it. While this can be done in theory, the shielding will 
be expensive and bulky and it could get in the way of individuals trying to do the work 
of transforming the material. So, high radiation fields will create difficulty for the 
proliferator in evading detection. 
The final two inputs for this attribute have to do with the gaseous and liquid 
wastes that a transformation facility releases to the environment. Any substance that is 
not naturally-occurring in the surrounding environment can show up in environmental 
samples if its concentration is above detection thresholds. The more of these emissions a 
facility makes, the higher those concentrations will be, increasing the chance of 
detection. So the ninth and tenth inputs are the volume of unnatural gas and liquid 
emissions from the facility, respectively. 
IV.D. Weapon Fabrication Stage 
Once the weapon fabrication stage is reached, the proliferator already has enough 
fissile material for at least one weapon and it is in the appropriate chemical form. All 
that remains is to machine or cast the metal into the appropriate shape and assemble the 
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non-nuclear components of the bomb. Put that way, it sounds like the weapon fabrication 
stage is easy, but there are still a number of barriers that could prevent a proliferator 
from succeeding. 
IV.D.1. Weapon Design 
There are five factors that will impact the difficulty of designing a weapon that 
will actually produce a nuclear yield from the fissile material the proliferator has 
obtained. These are shown in Fig. 13 along with the rest of the inputs for the weapon 
fabrication stage. The first of these is the spontaneous fission neutron production rate in 
the weapon material, given in units of neutrons per second per SQ. Neutron emissions 
within the core will reduce the weapon’s ability to produce a nuclear yield because they 
have the ability to initiate the fission reaction too early and cause a “fizzle” before 
maximum compression is achieved. The greater the neutron production rate is, the 
higher the probability of pre-initiation and the more difficult the weapon design will be. 
The second input is the radiation exposure rate in air at a distance of one meter 
from the un-shielded weapon core, given in units of Roentgens per hour. Radiation 
exposure will have a detrimental impact on the non-nuclear components of the weapon, 
causing structural damage and charge deposition in the materials. This will have to be 
mitigated by careful selection of materials for those components, or by shielding them 
from the radiation. Either way, the difficulty will be directly proportional to the exposure 
rate. 
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Fig. 13. Inputs for the weapon fabrication stage. 
 
The third input is the heating rate of the fissile material, given in W/SQ. Heat 
will have an impact on weapon components and must be dissipated for the weapon to 
remain functional. The greater the heating rate, the greater the effort required to dissipate 
it and hence, the greater the design difficulty. The fourth input is a question of whether 
or not the weapon can function using ballistic (gun-type) assembly methods. If the 
answer is “yes”, the design will be easier because no special shaping of the explosive 
force will be required. However, if the answer is “no”, then the difficulty of designing 
the weapon is greatly increased by adding the need for explosive lenses and very high-
precision electronic timing for the detonators. 
The fifth and final input for the design difficulty attribute is the solid phase 
stability of the weapons material. Radioactive decay and spontaneous fission of the 
WEAPON FABRICATION 
• Difficulty associated with design 
- Spontaneous fission neutron production rate in weapons material 
- Radiation exposure at one meter 
- Heating rate of weapons material 
- Can use ballistic assembly methods? 
- Phase stability of weapons material 
• Material handling difficulty during weapon fabrication 
- Radiation level in terms of dose 
- Chemical reactivity with common substances 
- Radiotoxicity 
• Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate the weapon 
- Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type alternatives (direct input 
from a priori calculations) 
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nuclear materials will result in product atoms interspersed throughout the metal. These 
will interrupt the crystalline structure of the material and cause non-uniform 
compression during detonation. Phase stability is a measure of this effect. Less stability 
will cause greater design difficulty. This input will use a measure of the number of 
known solid phases (i.e.,  phase,  phase, etc.) for the weapons material. An alternative 
input could make use of more complicated knowledge of the material phases such as the 
minimum entropy change between any two phases or the maximum volume change 
between any two phases. 
IV.D.2. Material Handling 
In addition to the design difficulties, there may be hazards in simply working 
with the material. Three inputs sum up these difficulties. The first is the radiation 
emitted by the weapons material in terms of dose, given in Sv/hr. Higher radiation fields 
will cause greater handling difficulties by necessitating shielding (requiring knowledge 
of shield physics and possibly getting in the way of those building the weapon) or 
regulated exposure time. So, the higher the dose rate, the greater the difficulty of 
working with the material. 
The second input is the chemical reactivity of the weapons material with 
common substances like water, air or plastics. This input is identical to the chemical 
reactivity inputs used in previous stages. Here, explosion and fire is not as much of a 
concern because the proliferator is probably dealing with pure U or Pu, but these 
materials do oxidize quickly in air and will need to be protected from that. The need to 
keep air away from the material will make it very difficult to work with. 
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The third and final input for material handling difficulty is radiotoxicity, that is, 
the ingestion/inhalation hazard the material poses to humans.  While the external 
radiation dose from the material may be low,  radiation poses a deadly threat to the 
internal organs if any small particles of the material are inhaled or ingested. In order to 
protect themselves, workers will have to use vacuum hoods and/or respirators and use 
tight contamination controls. These things will increase the difficulty of handling the 
material. 
IV.D.3. Knowledge and Skills 
The knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate a nuclear weapon are 
highly dependent on what type of weapon is desired. This, in turn, depends on the 
material available, any size or weight constraints, and many other factors. This will need 
to be assessed as a direct input from a priori calculations for alternative weapon types. 
These calculations will need to be based on several factors. First is the level of 
machining skills that will be needed. Implosion weapons require more precision than 
those that use ballistic-assembly methods. In addition, some advanced materials (Am, 
for instance) may be more difficult to machine than others. Second is the level of casting 
and metallurgy skills that will be needed and third is the level of skill needed with 
criticality and radiation transport calculations. Both of these will depend on the 
properties of the fissile material being used. 
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IV.E. Summary 
This concludes the work of explicitly defining each stage of proliferation and all 
the critical attributes and inputs for each. These are the building blocks upon which PR 
assessment methods can be based so that, regardless of the methodology used 
(probabilistic risk assessment, multi-attribute utility analysis, game theory, etc.), some 
consistency can be expected in the results. It will be up to the creators of these 
methodologies to decide exactly how the values of the inputs presented here should be 
rolled up into a score for each attribute and finally for the overall nuclear system to be 
analyzed. One suggestion for such a methodology is presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
QUANTIFYING AND AGGREGATING INFORMATION 
Chapter III presented a set of system and material attributes that can contribute to 
PR. Chapter IV gave a set of measurable inputs that each tell the analyst something 
about an attribute. One question remains. How does one take the data from these inputs 
and use it to come up with PR scores for a set of systems? This is the end goal of any PR 
analysis, to obtain scores that one can use to compare technology options and discover 
which is more proliferation resistant and by how much. This information helps decision 
makers to answer questions such as which of two options is safest to deploy in a given 
country, or which option provides the most PR for the money. 
There are two steps to obtaining such a score. The first is to quantify the input 
data in terms of PR. For example, take the very first input in the diversion stage: the 
mass of material needed to obtain one SQ. The raw input data could be 1 MT ± 0.5 %. 
This data is already a quantity, but to quantify it “in terms of PR” means to determine 
how good or bad it is for PR. Would 500 kg be better for PR, or worse? The second task 
is to aggregate all of these quantities into a final answer. With the system of inputs and 
attributes presented here, aggregation is actually performed twice. As shown in Fig. 14, 
the inputs are first aggregated into their respective attributes, and then the PR assessment 
methodology combines those into a final PR score. There are a number of aggregation 
methods available and of those presented in Chapter II, multi-attribute utility analysis 
seems to be the most viable option for the type of data used in PR assessment. MAUA is 
a simple and intuitive procedure to use. Utility functions can be used to convert the 
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various types of data we have into a consistent form. Also, the issues noted in Chapter II 
with the current MAUA-based PR assessment method have all been at least partially 
addressed by the new input/attribute scheme presented in this work. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Graphical representation of methodology elements. 
 
V.A. MAUA Theory 
Utility theory, as described in Clemen & Reilly (2001)12 and Keeney & Raiffa 
(1976)13, provides a logical method for making choices based on multiple factors. In this 
case, we are trying to choose the nuclear technology option that provides the best 
proliferation resistance based on the attributes presented in Chapter III. One fundamental 
premise of utility theory is that each attribute must be “utility independent” of all the 
others. This means that if all other attributes are held constant, regardless of their value, 
an increase (or decrease) in the value of attribute X will cause an increase (or decrease, 
METHODOLOGY 
Process of combining attributes to draw analytic conclusions about a nuclear fuel 
cycle system or process 
ATTRIBUTE A 
ATTRIBUTES 
INPUTS 
ATTRIBUTE B ATTRIBUTE C 
INPUT A INPUT B INPUT C INPUT D INPUT E 
Aggregation Aggregation Aggregation 
  78 
 
respectively) in the overall utility value. This is true of the attributes and inputs 
presented in this work; an increase in one attribute increases PR, regardless of the value 
of the other attributes. 
The general form of the multi-attribute utility function is  
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where the functions ui are utility functions for the individual attributes, normalized to a 
scale from 0 to 1, the constants ki are weighting factors for each attribute which indicate 
an attribute’s importance relative to the others, and the constant k is a scaling parameter 
that is a solution to 
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When the sum of all the individual weighting factors ki is equal to unity, then the scaling 
parameter k = 0 and Eq. 1 reduces to the additive utility function: 
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However, when the sum of the weighting factors ki is not unity, then k  0 and we can 
multiply each side of Eq. 1 by k, add one to each and factor to obtain the multiplicative 
utility function: 
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The additive utility function works out to be a weighted average of all the 
individual attributes. Each attribute has a utility value ui(xi) between 0 and 1 and their 
weighting factors ki are also between 0 and 1. In order for Eq. 3 to yield a high value for 
PR (i.e. u(x) close to unity), most of the attributes must have a high value. This is 
beneficial if the analyst’s goal is to find a system that performs well against as many 
measures of PR as possible. However, this method also limits the influence of any one 
attribute to the value of its weight. This means that the method will not perform correctly 
in limiting cases. For example, one could consider U ore to be perfectly proliferation 
resistant because it is the least concentrated form of fissile material on Earth. But, if the 
weighting factor on the mass/SQ attribute is 0.1, then this fact will only add 10% to the 
overall PR of U ore. 
The multiplicative utility function works differently. Its result is still a PR value 
between 0 and 1, but it allows for extreme values to affect the result more heavily. In Eq. 
4, if any attribute’s utility value ui(xi) goes to unity, it will drive the overall PR value to 
unity. This demonstrates correct behavior in limiting cases. The drawback is that the 
equation is somewhat less sensitive to changes in intermediate values. However, it will 
still serve adequately in comparing two technology options against one another. 
Therefore, this is the aggregation method that we will use to demonstrate the use of the 
attributes and inputs proposed in this work. 
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V.B. Example PR Analysis 
V.B.1. Utility Functions 
In order to perform a multi-attribute utility analysis of proliferation resistance, 
we must assign a utility function to each input from Chapter IV. These functions are 
presented for reference in Appendix Table A-I. The material that follows in this 
subsection details how each utility function was established. In each case, the utility 
value u(x) represents the measure of PR from a given input on a scale of 0 for no 
proliferation resistance to 1 for perfect (or the best possible) proliferation resistance. 
We begin with the first attribute of the diversion stage: material handling 
difficulty during diversion. The first input is the mass per SQ of diverted material. The 
measured quantity here is the mass of material, in units of kg, which must be diverted to 
obtain 1 SQ of fissile material. The utility function is 
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where x is the mass of the diverted object(s)/material containing 1 SQ and xmin is the 
minimum possible mass that could contain 1 SQ. This function is plotted in Fig. 15. The 
minimum possible mass was calculated assuming that the material was pure Pu metal (or 
xmin = 8 kg/SQ). The utility function is a fit based on a set of points for which the utility 
value is essentially known. There is no difficulty in handling one SQ of pure metallic 
weapons-grade Pu or U, so their PR values are essentially zero. The forms in which one 
finds the most mass per SQ for these materials would be spent PWR fuel assemblies or 
natural U ore, so the PR values for these are essentially unity. To correlate these to 
  81 
 
mass/SQ values, we recognize that spent PWR fuel contains about 1.0% Pu or 10 kg per 
ton, so 1 SQ Pu corresponds to about 1 ton of material. The input value for natural U ore 
would be much higher as U makes up only about 1.8 g per ton of ore. We know that 
handling a single PWR fuel assembly is a complicated and time-consuming task 
(requires the use of a large crane & cask), so its utility value should be close to unity. 
This suggests a gentle slope to the utility function for large mass/SQ. For small 
mass/SQ, the slope should be steep as small changes in mass will greatly increase 
difficulty as more people and heavier equipment are needed (forklifts of increasing size, 
followed by cranes and larger trucks, etc.). The utility function given in Eq. 5 is a fit to 
these “known” values. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Mass of Diverted Material (kg)
PR
 
Va
lu
e
 
Fig. 15. Utility function for mass/SQ. 
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The second input is the volume per SQ of diverted material. The measured 
quantity here is the volume, measured in units of m3, which must be diverted to obtain 1 
SQ of fissile material. The utility function is 
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where x is the volume of the diverted object(s)/material containing 1 SQ and xmin is the 
minimum possible volume that could contain 1 SQ. This utility function is plotted in Fig. 
16. The minimum possible volume was calculated assuming that the material was pure 
plutonium metal (or xmin = 0.000404 m3/SQ based on a density of 19.8 g/cc and 8 
kg/SQ). Similar to the previous mass/SQ input, this utility function will be gently 
sloping for high volume/SQ and steep for small values. One SQ of weapons grade 
metallic Pu or U represents a small enough volume to be carried by hand and thus very 
little handling difficulty, so the PR values for these are essentially zero. The opposite 
end of the spectrum would be natural U ore at 400,000 m3/SQ, with a PR value of unity. 
The constant 2,000 and exponent 0.33 in this utility function make the transition from 
steep to shallow slopes less sharp, so we see a distinction between the difficulty in 
handling low-enriched UF6 gas at 0.5 m3/SQ (u = 0.366), unenriched UF6 at 2.2 m3/SQ 
(u = 0.537) and reprocessing solution from a dissolver tank at 16 m3/SQ (u = 0.725). 
The third input is the number of items per SQ of diverted material. The measured 
quantity here is the number of individual items which must be diverted to obtain 1 SQ of 
fissile material. The utility function is 
 ( )0.443 3 3( ) 1 exp 0.1u x x= − −  (7) 
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where x is the number of items that need to be diverted to acquire 1 SQ of material. This 
utility function is plotted in Fig. 17 and it is a fit to a set of points for which the PR value 
is essentially known. These points are PR = 0.1 for 1 item of reprocessing solution, PR = 
0.25 for 11 Pu-bearing fast reactor fuel pins, PR = 0.5 for approximately 88 CANDU 
fuel bundles, PR = 0.8 for approximately 550 MAGNOX fuel rods, and PR = 1.0 for 
approximately 150,000 PBMR fuel pebbles. Each of the aforementioned quantities 
corresponds to 1 SQ of fissile material. 
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Fig. 16. Utility function for volume/SQ. 
 
The fourth input is the physical form of the diverted material, that is, whether the 
material is a solid, powder, liquid or gas. The utility function is  
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 ( )
4
4
4 4
4
4
0.1 for "solid"
0.5 for "powder"
0.7 for "liquid"
1.0 for "gas"
x
x
u x
x
x
=

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= 
=
 =
 (8) 
This is a discrete scale based on increasing handing difficulty as better containment is 
needed. Solids generally do not require a container to move, but powders will. Liquids 
must be transferred to a tank via pipes or careful pouring and gas must be pumped and 
pressurized. Clearly, this input is not as readily quantifiable as the previous three, but it 
can be done. The order of the physical forms is logical, but different analysts may 
disagree on the specific PR values for each one. 
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Fig. 17. Utility function for number of items per SQ. 
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The utility function for the next input, radiation level in terms of dose, is given 
by 
 ( )
5
5 5
5 5 5 5
5 5
5
0 for 0.002
5.20833 0.010416 for 0.002 0.05
0.35714 0.232143 for 0.05 0.75
0.095238 0.428571 for 0.75 6
1 for 6
x
x x
u x x x
x x
x
≤

− < ≤
= + < ≤
 + < ≤

>
 (9) 
where x is the dose rate concentration in Sv/hr/SQ at a distance of 1 m for the unshielded 
material. This utility function is plotted in Fig. 18 and it was developed based on acute 
biological effects of whole-body radiation dose to the potential proliferator. High dose  
rate materials would be hazardous to handle and may require the use of expensive and 
unique equipment. Extremely high dose rate materials would also provide a danger to 
the physical well-being of the proliferator especially if acute effects incapacitated the 
proliferator in a short time frame. Thus, this input combines a small effect on PR for 
lower dose rates (above a threshold of 2 mSv/hr/SQ) for the costs of specialized 
equipment and a larger effect on proliferation resistance for high dose rates which would 
quickly incapacitate a proliferator. It is assumed that above a threshold of 6 Sv/hr/SQ, 
there is no continued increase in proliferation resistance since death is certain in all 
cases.  
The sixth input is the chemical reactivity of the diverted material with common 
substances such as air, water, steels and plastics. If the material has rapid reactions with 
air, then it must be kept in an inert atmosphere as it is removed from a system and if it 
reacts quickly with water, that atmosphere will need to be dry. These create significant 
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Fig. 18. Utility function for radiation dose rate. 
 
handling difficulties. Rapid reactions with steels or plastics will severely limit the 
options the proliferator has for container materials, creating moderate difficulties. 
Finally, if the material has slow reactions (i.e. corrosion, etc.) with steels and plastics it 
will limit the amount of time available for transport in such containers, a smaller 
difficulty. This input can be subjectively quantified according to Table V. The value for 
u(x) is obtained by adding the results from each row together with the following 
exceptions: if the answer is “yes” for both rows 3 and 5, only row 3 is used and likewise 
for rows 4 and 6. 
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Table V 
Utility Values for Chemical Reactivity 
   ( )6 6u x  
 Reacts with Reaction Rate Yes No 
1. Air Fast 0.3 0.0 
2. Water Fast 0.3 0.0 
3. Steel Fast 0.2 0.0 
4. Plastic Fast 0.2 0.0 
5. Steel Slow 0.1 0.0 
6. Plastic Slow 0.1 0.0 
 
The seventh input is the temperature of the process from which material is being 
diverted. Two extreme values can be readily identified. Anything that is running at room 
temperature and below (x < 20 °C, neglecting cryogenic temperatures) is easy to handle 
and would have a PR of zero. An operating PWR is regarded as one of the most hostile 
environments on Earth. The temperature of that system, 1600 °C, is one factor 
contributing to its hostility, so we will set any temperature above 1600 °C to a PR of 
unity. At this point, there is no reason to use anything other than a straight line to 
represent the utility function between these two extremes. However, since the extremes 
vary by several orders of magnitude, we will use a straight line on a logarithmic scale. 
The utility function, then, is 
 ( ) ( )
7
7 7 7 7
7
0.0 for 20
0.2282ln 0.6836 for 20 1600
1.0 for 1600
x
u x x x
x
<

= − ≤ ≤
 >
 (10) 
The final input to this attribute is the heat load of the diverted material, measured 
in thermal Watts per cc. For a minimum value, we can use a standard 100-W household 
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light bulb which, based on its volume, emits about 0.5 W/cc of heat. Since these light 
bulbs can be cooled simply by natural convection in air, its PR value is set to zero. The 
heating rates of reactor grade Pu (0.25 W/cc) and PWR SNF (0.33 W/cc) fall below the 
0.5 W/cc minimum, so their PR values are also zero. Operating reactors require the 
greatest cooling effort in the nuclear industry, usually with forced convection in water. 
An operating pressurized heavy-water reactor (PHWR) such as a CANDU produces 33 
W/cc, so we will set this as the maximum value above which PR is equal to unity. An 
operating PWR produces more heat (330 W/cc) so its PR value is also unity. An 
intermediate value could be that for SNF in wet storage, because it can be cooled with 
natural convection in water. This material produces 3.3 W/cc of heat. This value is 
halfway between SNF dry storage and an operating PHWR on a logrithmic scale, so its 
PR value will be set to 0.5. Another intermediate example would be an operating high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) at 8 W/cc which must be cooled by forced 
convection in air. We will set this PR value to 0.75. The utility function which best fits 
these “known” values is given in Eq. 11. 
 ( ) ( )
8
8 8 8 8
8
0.0 for 0.33
0.2171ln 0.2407 for 0.33 33
1.0 for 33
x
u x x x
x
<

= + ≤ ≤
 >
 (11) 
Putting this all together in a multiplicative MAUA, the overall PR value for the 
material handling difficulty attribute of the diversion stage is 
 ( )81
1
1 1 1i i i
i
PR kk u x
k k
=
= − + +  ∏  (12) 
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The attribute PR values will be expressed similarly for all other attributes, changing the 
indices to match their respective inputs. 
Continuing with the diversion stage, the next attribute is the difficulty of evading 
detection by the material accounting system. The first input is the uncertainty in the 
accountancy system measurements, given in units of SQ per year. The utility function is 
 ( ) 99 9
9 9
0.0 for 1.0
1.0 for 1.0
x
u x
x x
>
= 
− ≤
 (13) 
where x is the measurement uncertainty in SQ/yr. To obtain this quantity, the 
measurement uncertainty (in percentage) is multiplied by the bulk throughput of material 
in the facility (in SQ/yr). The assumption here is that if uncertainty is greater than 1 SQ, 
then the proliferator could divert a weapon’s worth of material without causing a 
statistically meaningful change in results of the accountancy system measurements. Such 
an accountancy system does not contribute at all to proliferation resistance, so the PR 
value is zero. As uncertainty gets smaller below 1 SQ, proliferation resistance gets better 
as the system is able to detect smaller and smaller material diversions. Thus, below an 
uncertainty of 1 SQ, the utility function is inversely related to uncertainty. 
The second input is the difference between the actual and expected MUF for a 
facility, measured in SQ. The utility function for this input is given by 
  ( )
10 10
10 10
10 10
10 10
10
0.0333 1.0 for 3
0.1 1.2 for 3 9
0.01818 0.4636 for 9 20
0.1 for 20
x x
x x
u x
x x
x
− + ≤

− + < ≤
= 
− + < ≤
 <
 (14) 
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where x is the difference between actual and expected MUF for a facility (in SQ), with a 
maximum of 20 SQ difference. This utility function is plotted in Fig. 19. The maximum 
possible MUF difference is an arbitrary value. It is possible (even reasonable) for a 
facility to have a larger difference than this; thus, it was necessary to include the upper-
bound condition on the utility function. The turning points in this utility function 
correspond to a 97% confidence level in measurements (3 standard deviations). 
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Fig. 19. Utility function for actual vs. expected MUF. 
 
The third input captures the frequency with which material inventory in the 
facility is measured. This utility function is a constructed scale shown in Table VI. The 
scale was chosen to reflect a decrease in proliferation resistance as the frequency of 
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measurement decreases. Continuous monitoring of the material of concern, albeit 
difficult to achieve, would be the ideal situation. Material accounting on an annual basis 
(or never) would be the worst scenario. In this case, a potential proliferator would have 
ample time between measurements to get away with a quantity of nuclear material and 
fabricate a weapon before its absence is detected. In some cases, a material is considered 
under continuous measurement when its diversion would be immediately recognized (for 
instance, fuel under irradiation in a PWR).  
 
Table VI 
Utility Values for Frequency of Measurement 
Frequency of 
Measurement ( )11x  
Utility Function Value 
( )11 11u x  
Continuous 1.0 
Hourly 0.95 
Daily 0.85 
Weekly 0.75 
Monthly 0.5 
Quarterly 0.25 
Annually 0.1 
Never 0.0 
 
Completing the diversion stage, the final attribute is the difficulty of evading 
detection by the material control system. This input will rely upon a detailed 
vulnerability analysis of the material control system in place. This would require the 
development of standards and an evaluation of how different facilities compare. Such an 
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analysis is beyond the scope of this work, so this attribute will be excluded from the 
aggregation example. 
The material handling difficulty attribute of the transportation stage has six 
inputs (out of eight total) in common with its counterpart from the diversion stage. The 
mass/SQ input is identical, so its utility function will be that shown in Eq. 5. Volume/SQ 
is given in Eq. 6, material form in Eq. 8, radiation dose rate in Eq. 9, and heat load in Eq. 
11. The chemical reactivity input is also identical and its utility values can be found in 
Table V. 
The next input captures the immediate effect of a substance’s chemical toxicity 
on human health. The CDC maintains a list of air concentrations of compounds that 
would be “immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)”.14 The smaller this 
concentration is, the more toxic the compound and exposure to a concentration above the 
IDLH value could instantly incapacitate a person. Although other countries may have 
different standards than the US, this list (reproduced in Table A-II) provides a good 
ranking of chemicals from most to least toxic due to acute exposure. The smallest 
concentration on this list (indicating the most toxic compound and a PR utility value of 
1.0) is 1 ppm and the largest concentration (indicating the least toxic compound and a 
PR utility value of 0.0) is 10,000 ppm. The utility function is then a straight line on a 
logarithmic scale between these two extremes. 
 ( ) ( )
19
19 19 19 19
19
0.0 for 10,000
0.1086ln 1.0 for 1 10,000
1.0 for 1
x
u x x x
x
>

= − + ≤ ≤
 <
 (15) 
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The final input for this attribute captures the long-term effect of a substance’s 
chemical toxicity on human health. The US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) maintains a list of time-weighted average air concentrations of 
compounds that a worker should not be exposed to over the course of an 8-hour work 
shift.15 Violation of this average limit could result in long-term health effects. Although 
other countries may have different standards than the US, this list (reproduced in Table 
A-III) provides a good ranking of chemicals from most to least toxic due to chronic 
exposure. The smallest average concentration on this list (indicating the most toxic 
compound and a PR utility value of 1.0) is 0.001 ppm over 8 hours and the largest 
average concentration (indicating the least toxic compound and a PR utility value of 0.0) 
is 1,000 ppm over 8 hours. The utility function is then a straight line on a log scale 
between these two extremes. Both for this input and the previous IDLH toxicity input, if 
a compound is not found on the lists, we will assume that it is not toxic and assign a PR 
value of zero. 
 ( ) ( )
20
20 20 20 20
20
0.0 for 1,000
0.0724ln 0.5 for 0.001 1,000
1.0 for 0.001
x
u x x x
x
>

= − + ≤ ≤
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 (16) 
The second attribute of the transportation stage is the difficulty of evading 
detection. The first input is the mass of both the diverted material and its container (if a 
container is used). This will require the analyst to include specifications of the 
transportation container in the scenario definition. In many cases, the analyst could 
simply specify that the container is a standard SNF transport cask for truck or rail 
transport. For the mass input, the measured quantity is the combined mass of the 
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diverted material and transport container in units of kg. We can say that a person (about 
100 kg) is fairly easy to transport so the PR value for a mass of 100 kg or less will be 
zero. The upper extreme would be an SNF transport cask that must be transported by 
rail. In the US, a standard fully-loaded cask of this type weighs 100 short tons (about 
90,000 kg), so we will set this and all greater masses to a PR value of unity. Connecting 
these two extremes with a straight line on a logarithmic scale yields the utility function 
given in Eq. 17. An intermediate value of mass would be that of a fully-loaded road-
legal SNF cask in the US, which weighs 25 short tons (about 22,500 kg). Using the 
given logarithmic utility function, such a cask would have a PR value of 0.8. This is a 
good value because such a cask still requires a crane and rigging to load and unload, but 
its PR should be less than a rail cask because it can make use of most highways and 
surface streets instead of just rail lines. The greater number of route options will make 
the transport slightly more difficult to detect and thus, easier to hide. 
 ( ) ( )
21
21 21 21 21
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0.0 for 100
0.147 ln 0.677 for 100 90,000
1.0 for 90,000
x
u x x x
x
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 (17) 
The next input is the combined volume of the material and transportation 
container (if a container is used). Any object that is the size of a person (about 1 m3) or 
smaller is fairly easy to conceal, so these will have PR values of zero. On the opposite 
end of the spectrum would be something like a PWR steam generator at about 700 m3. 
Anything this size or larger will have a PR value of unity. We connect the two extremes 
with a straight line on a logarithmic scale to arrive at the utility function given in Eq. 18. 
Again, a straight line is used because there really is no reason to use anything else, and a 
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logarithmic scale is used because of the multiple order of magnitude difference in the 
endpoints. This function gives appropriate values for several intermediate points: PR = 
0.95 for a BWR pressure vessel at about 550 m3, PR = 0.85 for a mobile home at about 
300 m3, PR = 0.6 for an LWR reactor core at about 50 m3 (cylinder 4 m high and 4 m 
wide), and PR = 0.2 for a road-legal SNF cask at about 4 m3. 
 ( ) ( )
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 (18) 
The third input, heat load, is the same as the heat load input used twice before. Its 
utility function is given in Eq. 11. The fourth input is the amount of shielding that the 
transport container would need in order to reduce the radiation exposure rate at the outer 
surface to 10 mR/hr or less. The input is given as the thickness of the required shielding 
(assume lead) in units of m. Assuming a standard-size truck is used for transport to avoid 
attracting attention, maximum shield thickness to fit on board would be about 2 m, so we 
will take x  2 m to have a PR value of unity and use a linear relationship for thicknesses 
between 0 and 2 m. 
 ( ) 24 2424 24
24
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 (19) 
The next input is the size of the host country, measured in km2 of land and water 
area combined. As stated in Chapter IV, the premise behind this input is that it is more 
difficult to evade detection of nuclear material transport in a small country than it is in a 
very large one. For extreme values in land area, we can use Luxembourg as a small 
country with 2,500 km2 and Russia as the largest country with over 17 million km2 of 
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space. We connect these two extremes with a straight line on a logarithmic scale to 
obtain 
 ( ) ( )
25
25 25 25 25
25
0.0 for 17,000,000
0.1133ln 1.8862 for 2,500 17,000,000
1.0 for 2,500
x
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x
>

= − + ≤ ≤
 <
 (20) 
The sixth input here is the number of declared nuclear facilities in the host 
country. The premise is that a large number of facilities is bad for PR because it is easier 
for the proliferator to hide an illicit nuclear materials shipment among many legitimate 
ones. For extreme values, we can use a country with only one declared facility (i.e. 
Vietnam) for a PR of unity and NPT Nuclear Weapons States all with more than about 
100 facilities for a PR value of zero. We can connect these extremes with a linear 
function as in Eq. 21. Using this utility function, a country like India with about 50 
declared nuclear facilities would have a PR value of 0.5. Countries with no nuclear 
facilities not considered because there would not be any detection capability in place.  
 ( ) 2626 26
26 21
0.0 for 100
0.01 1.01 for 1 100
x
u x
x x
>
= 
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 (21) 
Completing the transportation stage, the final input for the detection attribute is 
the number of satellite images of the host country that the IAEA analyzes per month. 
Unfortunately, this input will not be quantifiable in most cases. This data will likely be 
safeguards-confidential and not available to PR analysts outside of the IAEA. However, 
the analyst can create values for this input to evaluate the PR effect of higher/lower 
scrutiny on a country. This would allow for conditional deployment of a system (e.g. we 
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can give this system to Country X as long as we analyze Y images per month for as long 
as the facility is there). 
We begin the transformation stage with the attribute concerning the amount of 
facilities and equipment that the proliferator will need to process the diverted material 
into a weapons-usable metal. The first input is the number of process steps that need to 
be completed to obtain a weapons-usable metal from the form in which the material was 
diverted. Table VII below gives a list of these processes for both U and Pu. The U 
portion of this table is different from that presented in Chapter IV. The U enrichment 
process is reduced to one step because U can typically be enriched all the way from 
natural to weapons-grade in a single facility. The analyst counts the number of processes 
needed from this table and obtains the corresponding PR value from Table VIII. The 
utility function values in Table VIII were chosen to represent a direct relationship 
between the number of process steps to metallic form and the difficulty in completing 
the material transformation. 
The second input is the number of different types of export controlled equipment 
and materials that the proliferator needs to complete the transformation process. UN 
INFCIRC/254 parts 1 and 2 give a combined list of 178 different types of equipment, 
tools, materials, software, and complete facilities that could make a significant 
contribution to a nuclear explosive program, undeclared fuel cycle facility or nuclear 
terrorism. Export of these items is restricted. The more of these things that a proliferator 
needs to build a weapon out of the diverted material, the greater will be his difficulty in 
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achieving his goal. The utility function will be a linear relationship between PR and the 
number of items from the list that are needed. See Eq. 22. 
 
Table VII 
Process Steps to Metallic Form (related to facilities) 
Plutonium Process Route Uranium Process Route 
Conversion to metallic form Conversion to metallic form 
Plutonium purification Uranium enrichment to >80 w/o 
Plutonium/uranium conversion Uranium conversion to UF6 
Fission product extraction Uranium milling 
Fuel dissolution - 
Chop/shear - 
Spent fuel cooling - 
Fuel irradiation - 
Fuel fabrication - 
Uranium conversion - 
Uranium milling - 
  
Table VIII 
Utility Value for Number of Process Steps to Metallic Form 
Number of Steps to 
Metal ( )27x  
Utility Function Value 
( )27 27u x  
1 0.09 
2 0.18 
3 0.27 
4 0.36 
5 0.45 
6 0.54 
7 0.63 
8 0.72 
9 0.81 
10 0.90 
11 1.00 
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 (22) 
The next input is the minimum amount of electricity that the proliferator’s 
transformation facility will need to function. Again, this input can be quantified starting 
with extreme values. The most electrically demanding nuclear facility in the world is 
France’s EURODIF gaseous diffusion plant, which is powered by four 915-MW nuclear 
reactors. This power requirement of 3,660 MW will be the upper bound on the utility 
function and set to a PR of unity. A state proliferator can choose to build a power plant 
to support a nuclear weapons program, so simply needing to do so (i.e. having a power 
requirement of hundreds or thousands of MW) does not necessarily indicate a PR value 
of unity in all cases. We will set a lower bound of 0 MW for a utility value of zero and 
connect the two endpoints with a logarithmic function. 
 ( ) ( )29 2929 29
29
0.1219ln for 0 3,360
1.0 for 3,360
x x
u x
x
 ≤ ≤
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 (23) 
The second attribute of the transformation stage is a measure of the knowledge 
and skills needed to process the diverted materials. The first input is again the number of 
process steps to metallic form, but it is slightly different from its counterpart in the 
facilities attribute. Here, we once again divide the U enrichment process up into several 
enrichment levels to reflect the inherent additional skill needed to avoid criticality 
accidents when producing HEU. Therefore we use the process step list in Table IV of 
Chapter IV. Again, the analyst will count the number of process steps needed from that 
list and obtain the corresponding utility value from Table VIII above. The utility 
function values were chosen to represent a direct relationship between the number of 
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process steps to metallic form and the difficulty in completing the material 
transformation. 
The next input is the radiation shielding requirement for the material as it is 
being processed. If the material gives off enough radiation that the surrounding space 
would be a “high radiation area” by international standards (i.e. dose rates higher than 1 
mSv/hr at a distance of 30 cm), then shielding is required and the PR value is unity. 
Otherwise, PR is zero. The utility function is then 
 ( ) 3131 31
31
0.0 for 1.0
1.0 for 1.0
x
u x
x
<
=  ≥
 (24) 
where the input value x is the radiation dose rate at 30 cm in units of mSv/hr. 
The third input here is the degree of remote manipulation that will be required 
during the transformation process. The knowledge and skills required here will depend 
on the complexity and precision of tasks that will need to be performed with the remote 
manipulators. This is inherently subjective, but can be quantified according to Table IX. 
The next input is the radiation effect on the equipment and materials that are used in the 
transformation process. Radiation dose to equipment and chemicals will cause 
degradation and eventual failure. Some effects include embrittlement of metals, 
darkening of fiber-optics, stiffening of lubricants, decomposition of chemicals, etc. This 
damage is gradual and will require components to be replaced regularly. The greater the 
radiation exposure rate, the more frequent these replacements will need to be. Avoiding 
this (either by knowledgeable design of the system or experienced maintenance) will 
require a specific knowledge of radiation dose effects on equipment and materials and is 
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proportional to the radioactivity of the material. Low activity material requires little to 
no knowledge of radiation effects.  High activity material requires sophisticated 
knowledge of radiation effects. The input value x is specific activity, in units of Ci/cc. 
 
Table IX 
Utility Values for Remote Manipulation Requirement 
Remote Manipulation Requirement ( )32x  Utility Value ( )32 32u x  
None 0 
Movement of objects 0.2 
Opening/closing containers 0.4 
Mixing materials 0.6 
Decontamination 0.8 
Cutting/welding 1.0 
 
 ( )
33
33 33 33 33
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x
u x x x
x
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
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 (25) 
The fifth input is the heat load of the material being processed, in units of W/cc. 
This is the same as the head load inputs used in previous attributes and its utility 
function is defined in Eq. 11. The next two inputs are similar to each other: the 
requirement to treat gaseous and liquid byproducts before they are released to the 
environment. The utility functions for each are binary. If treatment is required, then PR = 
1 and if not then PR = 0. A binary function can be used here because the knowledge and 
skills needed to treat effluents does not change based on the volume of gas or liquid to 
be treated. These two inputs are subjective, however, because it is not clear by what 
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measure the analyst will determine whether treatment is needed or not. It could be 
related to the local environmental regulations or simply the proliferator’s desire to keep 
emissions below levels which could be detected by outsiders. 
The eighth and final input here is the level of advanced actinide chemistry skills 
that will be needed in the transformation process. This input is very difficult to quantify, 
but a discrete scale could be used to differentiate between the most important elements. 
U is easier to work with than Pu. Pu and Np are roughly equally as difficult to work with 
and Am is more difficult than both of those. Based on this reasoning, we can use the 
utility values shown in Eq. 28. 
 ( )37 37
0.0 for U
0.5 for Np or Pu
1.0 for Am and higher actinides
u x


= 


 (26) 
The next attribute of the transformation stage captures the size of the workforce 
required to complete the transformation. It is divided into three similar inputs: the 
number of person-years of work needed from unskilled, skilled and expert laborers. The 
Manhattan Project in the US employed 129,000 people for almost three years to produce 
just three nuclear weapons. This will be taken as the upper bound on the workforce 
requirement (to be conservative we will assume an upper bound of 100,000 person-years 
ignoring the three years required in the Manhattan Project). We can estimate that about 
1,000 of these were experts, 28,000 skilled and the remainder unskilled (due to the vast 
amount of facility construction). Lower bounds will be 1 person-year in each category 
and the utility functions will be logarithmic. For unskilled workers: 
 
  103 
 
 ( ) ( )38 3838 38
38
0.0869ln for 1 100,000
1.0 for 100,000
x x
u x
x
 ≤ ≤
= 
>
 (27) 
For skilled workers: 
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For experts: 
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In each of these three functions, x is the number of person-years of work needed. 
The final attribute of the transformation stage is the difficulty of evading 
detection of transformation activities. The first input is a simple question: Is the 
Additional Protocol in force in this state? The Additional Protocol is a supplement to a 
country’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA that allows inspectors to visit undeclared 
sites with short notice. It greatly increases the Agency’s ability to uncover covert nuclear 
activities, so it benefits PR. The utility function is binary. If the Additional Protocol is in 
place, then PR = 1 and if not, PR = 0. 
The second input is the quantity of third-party environmental samples taken per 
month per declared nuclear facility. This is another indicator of the level of scrutiny that 
a country is under. About 100 samples were taken per facility per month in Iraq 
immediately after Operation Desert Storm. This is an example of the highest level of 
scrutiny to date. We can take this as an upper limit to the utility function and draw a 
linear relationship down to a zero sampling rate. 
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The number of declared nuclear facilities is used here as a normalization factor between 
countries with large and small commercial nuclear programs, and it is the next input for 
this attribute. This input is identical to its counterpart used in the transportation stage, 
and its utility function is given in Eq. 21. 
The fourth input counts the number of different isotopic signatures that, if 
emitted into the environment, would be direct indicators of a covert nuclear weapons 
program. These are listed in Table X. Any of these signatures would provide a “smoking 
gun” 
 
Table X 
Signatures Indicating a Weapons Program 
Fission gases in large quantities 
Plutonium 
Depleted uranium 
Low-enriched uranium 
High-enriched uranium 
 
 
for inspectors conducting environmental samples in the country. The more of these 
signatures that are produced by the proliferator’s transformation work, the more likely 
that one or more of them will be detected. To obtain the utility value, the analyst adds up 
the number of signatures from the list that are present and multiplies by 0.2. 
 ( )44 44 440.2u x x=  (31) 
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where x the number of signatures from Table X that are present in the transformation 
process. 
The fifth input is the size of the facility or facilities used in the transformation 
process. The premise is that larger facilities are easier to find on overhead imagery, 
which increases the proliferator’s difficulty of evading detection. As an upper limit for 
the utility function, we can use Iran’s underground Natanz U enrichment facility which 
includes 60,000 m2 of centrifuge halls. This facility is fairly apparent in overhead 
imagery (provided one knows where to look), so any facility of this size or larger will 
correspond do a PR of unity for this input. On the opposite end of the spectrum we can 
use a small house at about 100 m2. Any building smaller than this will have a PR value 
of zero and we can connect these two extremes with a straight line on a logarithmic 
scale. The utility function is 
 ( ) ( )
45
45 45 45 45
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 (32) 
where x is the area covered by the transformation facility or facilities in square meters. 
The next input is the heat load of the transformation process. This is the heat that 
must be dissipated from the transformation facility, measured in thermal megawatts. 
Heat dissipation from a power plant (~2500 MW) is easy to detect with infrared scans, 
so its utility value will be unity. The utility function will decrease logarithmically from 
there to a value of 0 at 100 W, the heat output of an average person at rest. The utility 
function is 
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where x is the thermal output of the transformation process in MW. 
The seventh input is the sonic load of the transformation facility. This is the 
acoustic signature coming from the facility, measured as sound level in dB. This will be 
difficult to calculate for a hypothetical facility, but could possibly be measured in an 
existing facility. Either way, the input is difficult to quantify. One option would be to 
take the OSHA noise limit for worker safety of 140 dB as the upper limit to the acoustic 
signature and draw a linear utility function from there down to 0 dB. This utility function 
is defined in Eq.34. 
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The ninth input here is the radiation load of the transformation facility. This is 
measured as the maximum radiation dose rate in the facility in units of R/hr at a distance 
of 1 m. The R/hr units are the best expression for radiation when detection is the primary 
concern. Here, we will set 10 mR/hr as the minimum detectable dose rate and 1000 R/hr 
as the rate at which shielding difficulties level off (i.e. above 1000 R/hr, one high 
radiation field is much the same as another). We can use a logarithmic relationship 
between these two extremes to obtain 
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where x is exposure rate in air at 1 m distance, measured in R/hr. 
The next input is the volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted from the 
transformation facility. We can use emissions from France’s La Hague reprocessing 
plant as an upper limit for this input as it is the largest such plant currently in 
commercial operation. The most significant gaseous effluents from the plant are noble 
gases. La Hague released 301 PBq = 8.135 MCi of radioactive noble gases into the air in 
2005. We can set this as an upper bound for noble gas emissions per year from a 
transformation facility, use 1 Ci per year for a lower bound, and connect the endpoints 
with a straight line on a logarithmic scale. The utility function is then 
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 (36) 
where x is given in Ci/yr. Obviously this is not directly an expression of volume, which 
is what the name of the input would imply. Instead, we use activity of noble gases 
because reference values for this are readily available to the public. It is important to 
note that these two emission inputs, as quantified here, do not consider the release of 
non-radioactive wastes to the environment. Alternate quantifications could be devised 
which do capture these other chemicals, such as nitrogen oxides released from 
reprocessing plants. 
The final input, the undiluted volume of liquid emissions is very similar to the 
previous input, except that it considers liquids instead of gases. Again, we can use 
emissions from France’s La Hague reprocessing plant as an upper limit for this input as 
it is the largest such plant currently in commercial operation. The most significant liquid 
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effluent from the plant is tritium. La Hague released 13.5 PBq = 0.365 MCi of 
radioactive tritium to the ocean in 2005. We can set this as an upper bound for tritium 
emissions per year from a transformation facility, use 1 Ci per year for a lower bound, 
and connect the endpoints with a straight line on a logarithmic scale. The utility function 
is then 
 ( ) ( )
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 (37) 
where x is the activity of tritium released in liquid emissions in units of Ci/yr. Again, we 
use activity instead of volume because reference values for radioactive emissions are 
more readily available. 
Finally, we arrive at the weapons fabrication stage and its first attribute, the 
difficulty associated with designing a weapon using the nuclear material at hand. The 
first input here is the spontaneous fission neutron production rate of the weapons 
material, measured in neutrons per second per gram. The production of neutrons from 
spontaneous fission (especially 240Pu and 238Pu) can complicate the construction of a 
nuclear explosive. 240Pu has a high rate of spontaneous fission and can significantly 
increase the probability of pre-initiation in a nuclear explosive device. The utility 
function for this metric is as follows: 
 ( )
1.8
51
51 51
51,max
1 exp 3.5 xu x
x
  
 	= − − 
 
  	  
 (38) 
where x is the neutron production rate from spontaneous fission for the weapons-useable 
material (in n/s/g) and xmax is the maximum possible spontaneous fission neutron 
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production rate (set to be 2,700 n/s/g which is the spontaneous fission neutron 
production rate of pure 238Pu).  
The next input is the radiation exposure rate at a distance of 1 m, measured in 
R/hr. Design difficulty increases with exposure rate, but the effect levels off at for high 
radiation fields. This input can make use of the same formula as the radiation load input 
in the transformation stage (see Eq. 35).The third input is the heating rate of the weapons 
material, given in units of W/SQ. This input accounts for the increased difficulty of 
designing an explosive device with a high heat source at the center. This could include 
the requirement for careful management of heat in the device (such as channels through 
the high explosive to allow for heat removal). The utility function for this input is as 
follows: 
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 (39) 
where x is the heating rate from the weapons-useable component of the material. This 
heating rate is measured in W/SQ of weapons-useable material and xmax is the maximum 
possible heating rate (set to be 171 Watts/SQ which is the heating rate of RGPu).  
The fourth input here is a simple question: Can the weapon utilize ballistic 
assembly methods? This input is binary. Ballistic assembly refers to a gun-type weapon 
like the Little Boy device used by the US in World War II. This is the simplest nuclear 
weapon design, so if ballistic assembly methods can be used, then PR for this input is 
zero. For materials with higher spontaneous fission rates like Pu, an implosion design 
will be required and PR for this input will be unity. 
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The final input for this attribute captures the phase stability of weapons material 
(i.e. the number of solid phases in the phase diagram). When attempting to implode a 
nuclear weapon core at high velocity (or even assemble by ballistic methods), varying 
densities in the metal will cause non-uniform compression and increase the likelihood of 
pre-initiation. Also, phases can shift locally within the core due to self-inflicted radiation 
damage. This phenomenon is a large part of what makes Pu so difficult to work with. Its 
phase diagram includes seven distinct solid phases, so we will take this as the upper limit 
for this input and draw a linear utility function from there down to one phase. The utility 
function is then 
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 (40) 
The next attribute for the weapons fabrication stage captures the handling 
difficulties for the fissile materials. The first input is the radiation level in terms of dose, 
given in units of Sv/hr. This is the same as the radiation dose inputs seen in previous 
stages and its utility function is given in Eq. 9. The next input the chemical reactivity of 
the weapons material with common substances such as water, air, steels, or plastics. This 
input is also repeated from previous stages and its utility values can be found in Table V. 
The third input to this attribute is the radiotoxicity of the fissile material (i.e., the 
ingestion/inhalation hazard it poses to humans). This input requires a knowledge or 
prediction of the isotopic composition of the weapons-usable material produced in the 
transformation stage. Carter (1993)16 classifies radionuclides are into four levels of 
radiotoxicity: “very high”, “high”, “moderate” and “low”. Carter’s table of nuclide 
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classifications is reproduced in Table A-IV. We will assign weighting factors of 1, 0.75, 
0.5 and 0.25 to each of these classifications, respectively. We then take the mass of each 
nuclide in the fissile material, multiply it by the appropriate weighting factor, add these 
all together and divide by the total mass of material. The result is the utility value for this 
input and it will fall between zero and one. 
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 (41) 
The final attribute of the entire proliferation process captures the knowledge and 
skills needed to design and fabricate a weapon. This will have to be quantified using a-
priori calculations for different weapon type alternatives. These calculations are 
excluded here to avoid any reference to possible classified information. 
V.B.2. Weighting Factors 
The weighting factors ki in Eqs. 1-4 are the means by which the analyst may 
tailor the PR assessment to a specific threat. If the threat is material diversion by the 
state which hosts the facility, then material property and international safeguards inputs 
will be more important and physical security less important because the facility owner 
can easily bypass his own security measures. In the case of material threat by an 
outsider, the weighting factors would be reversed. Guards, guns and gates would be 
large obstacles to the thief, but he would likely be happy with whatever nuclear material 
he was able to obtain. In addition, fine-tuning of the weighing factors would allow the 
analyst to focus in on attributes and inputs that he or she is most interested in at the time. 
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In this work, our focus is on defining attributes and inputs and demonstrating 
how these can be quantified in terms of PR. We do not have any reason to weigh any one 
attribute or input more heavily than another, so we will hold the weighting factors ki 
constant. However, some thought must still go into choosing what that constant will be. 
Since we wish to use the multiplicative utility function (Eq. 4), the weighting factors 
must meet two requirements. First, the sum of all the weighting factors must not be 
exactly 1.0, because that would reduce the equation to the additive utility function. Also, 
the weighting factors cannot each be equal to 1.0. If they were, then the only solutions to 
Eq. 2 would be k = -1 and k = 0, neither of which are valid. Keeney (1976)13 states that 
the solution must lie on -1 < k < 0 when 
1
1I ii k= > . For these reasons, we will choose 
all ki such that they sum to 2.0 so that the scaling constant k is always between -1 and 0. 
V.C. Example Case: Small SNF Reprocessing Plant 
In order to demonstrate the quantification of these attributes and inputs, we will 
define a hypothetical proliferation scenario and perform a PR assessment on the source 
facility using multiplicative MAUA. In this scenario, the proliferator is the government 
of a nation which possesses a commercial safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle including a 
small PUREX reprocessing plant. This nation has signed and ratified the Additional 
Protocol. The country’s goal is to produce one Pu-based nuclear weapon by diverting 
material from the reprocessing plant just after fission products have been removed. At 
this point in the process stream, the material exists as both UO2 and Pu in nitric acid 
solution, and we will assume that all fission products have been successfully removed 
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(for simplicity – fission product separation is not, in fact, perfect). The feed material for 
the reprocessing plant is PWR spent fuel burned to 50,000 MWd/MTU. The proliferator 
will use concrete-lined 55-gallon drums to transport the material. 
This scenario definition is sufficient to begin quantifying the inputs to the PR 
assessment. Once the proliferator diverts enough solution to obtain 8 kg of Pu, he will 
also have 523.2 kg of U and 1,278.1 kg of nitrate, nitrogen oxides and water. These 
masses add up to 1,809 kg of total material diverted. This solution has a density of about 
3 g/cc, so the diverted fluid will have a volume of 0.60 m3. The proliferator will need 
three 55-gallon drums to accommodate that volume, so the number of items per SQ is 
three. The material form is liquid. With all the fission products removed, the radiation 
dose rate at a distance of one meter from this material is 1.109 Sv/hr. Nitric acid will 
have a slow chemical reaction with air and plastic. The flow stream at this point in a 
PUREX plant is at a temperature of 130 °C. Finally, the heating rate of this material, 
which comes entirely from the Pu, is 172 W. When we divide this by the volume of 0.6 
m
3
, we find that the specific thermal power is 0.0003 W/cc. These values complete the 
inputs for the material handling attribute of the diversion stage.  
For detection by the accountancy system, if we assume that the reprocessing 
plant in question has a capacity of 300 MT of SNF per year (consistent with a “small” 
reprocessing plant), then the uncertainty in accountancy measurements will be 1.068 SQ 
per year. Also, because this facility produces separated Pu, a nuclear weapons direct-use 
unirradiated material, the measurement frequency for material accountancy will be 
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monthly. However, the difference between expected and actual MUF is not quantifiable 
because that number would only be known to the facility operator and the IAEA.  
The difficulty of evading detection by the material control system is not easy to 
quantify. Since this is a hypothetical scenario, we do not have a real material control 
system to perform a vulnerability analysis on. In a situation like this, the analyst could 
use this input as a variable parameter, noting the effect on PR of a better or worse 
control system. One good use for this input is that the analyst can see how effective the 
material control system needs to be in order to achieve a certain PR level. For our 
purposes, we will assume that our hypothetical control system will detect material 
movement 80% of the time. 
In the transportation stage, the first six inputs of the material handling attribute 
are repeated from the diversion stage. The last two are the immediate and time-averaged 
chemical toxicities of the material. Looking up nitric acid on Tables A-II and A-III 
shows that its IDLH concentration in air is 25 ppm and the TWA exposure limit is 2 ppm 
over 8 hours. 
For the next attribute, the difficulty of evading detection during transport, we 
must begin to consider the transportation container. The container given in the scenario 
definition was a 55-gallon drum lined with concrete. We know from the volume of 
material that the proliferator will need three of them. Empty, these drums weigh 180 lbs 
or 81.6 kg. If we assume that these are encased in concrete to conceal the radiation 
signature from detection, then we can estimate that the concrete will be about 4 in or 
0.1016 m thick. To encase three 55-gallon drums in a 4”-thick shell would require 320.3 
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kg of concrete. Adding these masses to the mass of the material yields a total mass of 
material and containers of 2,210.9 kg and a volume of 0.733 m3. This exercise highlights 
several inputs that could be dependent upon one another: mass of material and container, 
volume of material and container, and shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr. 
These three, in turn, could be affected by the radiation field produced by the material. 
On the other hand, if the container is more explicitly defined in the scenario, then these 
dependencies can be eliminated. Continuing with this attribute, we do not wish to name 
any specific countries here so we will use a fictitious nation with a land area of 
1,700,000 km2 and a nuclear industry consisting of 20 declared facilities. The IAEA 
imagery analysis rate for the country is not quantifiable because the information would 
be safeguards-confidential and only available to an IAEA analyst. 
For the facilities and equipment attribute of the transformation stage, we see that 
there are three process steps needed to produce a weapons-usable Pu metal from the 
diverted material: U/Pu separation, Pu purification, and conversion to metallic form. In 
order to do this work, the proliferator will need only a small laboratory with a hot cell. 
Such a facility would require only seven items from the export control list: solvent 
extractors, chemical holding tanks, especially designed systems for production of Pu 
metal, high-density radiation shielding windows, radiation-hardened cameras, robots, 
and remote manipulators. Also, we can estimate a laboratory of this type and size to have 
an electrical demand of about 2 MWe. 
For the knowledge and skills attribute, the number of steps to metallic form is 
again three. This input is only different from the one above in the case of a U weapon. 
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Radiation shielding will be required because the radiation dose rate from the material is 
far greater than the threshold value of 1.0 mSv/hr. All of the transformation work will 
have to be conducted in a hot cell due to the high radiotoxicity of the Pu in the material. 
The degree of remote manipulation required is 0.6 for the need to mix materials in the 
hot cell (see Table IX). The knowledge needed to deal with the radiation effect on 
materials and equipment is dictated by the specific activity of the material, which is 1.03 
Ci/cc. The heat load of the material during the transformation process is unchanged from 
above, standing at 0.000287 W/cc. The answer to the next two inputs, treatment 
requirements for gaseous and liquid byproducts, is “yes”. The Pu extraction and 
conversion process will produce both gaseous and liquid wastes that would be both 
hazardous and detectable if released untreated. Finally, the input for advanced actinide 
skills is simply the text string “Pu” because that is the primary actinide being dealt with 
in this process. The U in the diverted solution is depleted and will be treated as a waste 
material here. 
The workforce requirement is difficult to quantify, but it can be estimated. The 
work of separating Pu out of the diverted reprocessing solution should take about a 
month. The small laboratory needed to do this can be run by one expert (1/12 person-
years) and half a dozen skilled staff members (6/12 person-years). Unskilled workers 
would mostly be needed to construct the laboratory and we can estimate that a group of 
40 could do it in about 6 months (20 person years). 
The scenario definition states that the Additional Protocol is in force in this 
country. This is the first input of the detection attribute for the transformation stage. We 
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will assume then that the IAEA is looking for covert nuclear facilities which would place 
the country under a moderate level of scrutiny. To reflect this, we will estimate that the 
IAEA is collecting 50 environmental samples per month and per declared nuclear 
facility. The number of declared nuclear facilities (20) is an input that is repeated from 
above. There will only be two isotopic signatures from Table X present in this 
transformation process: Pu and depleted U. Since the proliferator diverted the 
reprocessing solution after fission product extraction, there will not be any fission gases 
released from this process. Also, there was no enriched uranium present in the 
reprocessing solution due to the high burnup of the SNF fed into the reprocessing plant.  
The laboratory in which this transformation is done does not need to be large, as 
stated previously. It will only require one hot cell and some supporting equipment. A 
laboratory of approximately 1,000 m2 should be sufficient. The heat load of the 
transformation process will be miniscule in terms of MWth. In fact, it will not be much 
higher than the heating rate of the Pu itself, on the order of hundreds of Watts. So, the 
heat load input can be set to zero. This is also true of the sonic load, as there will be no 
large fast-moving parts or high gas flow rates which typically are the cause of high noise 
levels at industrial sites. The radiation load of the transformation process is the highest 
exposure rate in air at a distance of 1 m from the material. The highest value would be 
that for the material as diverted, before the Pu is extracted. This can be computed from 
the previously given dose equivalent rate of 1.109 Sv/hr = 115.5 R/hr (using a quality 
factor of 1 for gamma radiation). Finally, if we assume that the proliferator is skilled at 
extracting Pu efficiently (a good assumption, considering the presence of a commercial 
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reprocessing plant in the country), then there will be no appreciable gaseous or liquid 
emissions from the transformation process. The amount of byproduct produced from 
separating 1 SQ of Pu can be stored inside the hot cell long enough for the weapon to be 
fabricated. 
At the weapons fabrication stage, the proliferator has obtained pure metallic Pu 
from the diverted material. In this scenario the Pu is reactor-grade, which will cause 
some design difficulties. The neutron production rate from spontaneous fission in this 
material is 453 neutrons per second per gram. The radiation exposure rate is 
considerably lower than that in the transformation stage (since radioactive Am has now 
been removed), but it is still at 6.724 R/hr. The heating rate of the weapon core is the 
total thermal power of 8 kg of this reactor-grade Pu, which is 171 W. The high neutron 
production rate of this material makes ballistic assembly methods impossible; it will 
have to be an implosion-type weapon. For the final input in the design difficulty 
attribute, metallic Pu has seven known solid phases. 
In the handling difficulty attribute, the radiation dose rate is 0.06455 Sv/hr. 
Again, this is lower than the dose rate in the transformation stage because Am has been 
removed. The only chemical reactivity issue for metallic Pu will be slow oxidation in air. 
Finally, the radiotoxicity input requires a knowledge of the isotopic composition of the 
material. The composition of this RGPu in terms of weight fractions is 3.239% 238Pu, 
50.712% 239Pu, 23.664% 240Pu, 14.729% 241Pu and 7.665% 242Pu.  Of these isotopes, the 
238 and 240 mass-numbers are in the Very High Hazard group of Table A-IV and the 
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remainder are in the High Hazard group. And finally, the knowledge and skills attribute 
is not quantifiable here due to classification concerns. 
All of the values discussed above are the raw data for use in the utility functions 
for each input, i.e. the x values in Eqs. 5-41. Using those equations, we can compute the 
utility value for each input u(x). These values are given in Table XII over the next 
several pages. Using these values, we can apply the multiplicative MAUA (Eqs. 2 and 4) 
to all the inputs in each stage to aggregate them into PR values for each stage. Then, we 
can repeat the process to aggregate the stage PR values into an overall scenario score. 
Recall that the weighting factors are set in each case such that they sum to 2.0 and the 
scaling constant falls between -1 and 0. The results are given in Table XI, below. 
 
Table XI 
Aggregation Results for Each Stage and Complete Scenario 
Stage No. of Inputs ki k u(x) 
Diversion 11 0.18182 -0.83752 0.61 
Transportation 14 0.14286 -0.82861 0.58 
Transformation 24 0.08333 -0.81518 0.57 
Fabrication 8 0.25000 -0.85333 0.68 
TOTAL 4 (stages) 0.50000 -0.91262 0.80 
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Table XII 
Example Inputs and Corresponding Utility Values 
  INPUT UNIT x u(x) 
1. Diversion Stage    
1.1. Material handling difficulty during diversion    
 1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  (kg/SQ) 1809 0.90 
 1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  (m3/SQ) 0.6 0.38 
 1.1.3. Number of items/SQ (count) 3 0.15 
 1.1.4. Material Form  (solid, powder, liquid, gas) liquid 0.70 
 1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose  (Sv/hr @ 1 m) 1.109 0.53 
 1.1.6. Chemical reactivity  (fast/slow for air, water, steel, plastic) slow for air, plastic 0.10 
 1.1.7. Temperature of Source Process  (°C) 130 0.43 
 1.1.8. Heat load of material  (W/cc) 0.000287 0.00 
1.2. Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system    
 1.2.1. Uncertainty in accountancy measurements  (SQ/yr) 1.068 0.00 
 1.2.2. Expected vs. Actual MUF (SQ) n/a n/a 
 1.2.3. Frequency of measurement (hourly, daily, etc.) monthly 0.50 
1.3. Difficulty of evading detection by the material control system    
 1.3.1. Probability of detection (probability) 0.8 0.80 
2. Transportation Stage    
2.1. Material handling difficulty during transportation    
 2.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material (kg/SQ) 1809 0.90 
 2.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material (m3/SQ) 0.6 0.38 
 2.1.3. Material Form  (solid/powder/liquid/gas) liquid 0.70 
Table XI, continued.   
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  INPUT UNIT x u(x) 
 2.1.4. Radiation level in terms of dose (Sv/hr) 1.109 0.53 
 2.1.5. Heat load of material (W/cc) 0.000287 0.00 
 2.1.6. Chemical reactivity (fast/slow for air, water, steel, plastic) slow for air, plastic 0.10 
 2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity  (ppm) 25 0.65 
 2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity (ppm) 2 0.45 
2.2. Difficulty of evading detection during transport    
 2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container (kg) 2210.9 0.46 
 2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container (m3) 0.733 0.00 
 2.2.3. Heat load of material (W/cc) 0.000287 0.00 
 2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr  (m) 0.1016 0.05 
 2.2.5. Host country size (km2) 1700000 0.26 
 2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities (count) 20 0.81 
 2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate (count/month) n/a n/a 
3. Transformation Stage    
3.1. Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials   
 3.1.1. Number of process steps to metallic form (count - table) 3 0.27 
 3.1.2. Number of export controlled/equipment/materials (count) 7 0.04 
 3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement (MWe) 2 0.08 
3.2. Knowledge and skills needed to process diverted materials   
 3.2.1. Number of process steps to metallic form (count - table) 3 0.27 
 3.2.2. Radiation shielding requirement (yes/no) yes 1.00 
 3.2.3. Degree of remote manipulation required (table) mixing 0.60 
 3.2.4. Radiation effect on materials/components (Ci/cc) 1.03 0.03 
 3.2.5. Heat load of material (W/cc) 0.000287 0.00 
Table XI, continued.   
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 3.2.6. Treatment requirement for gaseous byproducts (yes/no) yes 1.00 
  INPUT UNIT x u(x) 
 3.2.7. Treatment requirement for liquid by products  (yes/no) yes 1.00 
 3.2.8. Advanced actinide chemistry skills needed (U or Pu/Np or higher?) Pu 0.50 
3.3. Workforce required for transformation    
 3.3.1. Number of unskilled workers required  (person years) 20 0.26 
 3.3.2. Number of skilled workers required (person years) 0.5 0.00 
 3.3.3. Number of experts (designers, etc.) needed  (person years) 0.083333333 0.00 
3.4. Difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities   
 3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force? (yes/no) yes 1.00 
 3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate (count/month/facility) 50 0.50 
 3.4.3. Number of declared nuclear facilities (count) 20 0.81 
 3.4.4. Isotopic signatures  (count - table) 2 0.40 
 3.4.5. Facility size  (m2) 1000 0.36 
 3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process (MWth) 0 0.00 
 3.4.7. Sonic load (dB) 0 0.00 
 3.4.8. Radiation load (R/hr) 115.5 0.81 
 3.4.9. Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted  (Ci/yr) 0 0.00 
 3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions (Ci/yr) 0 0.00 
4. Weapons Fabrication Stage    
4.1. Difficulty associated with design    
 4.1.1. Spont. fission n prod. Rate (n/s/g) 453 0.13 
 4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter  (R/hr) 6.724 0.57 
 4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material  (W/kg) 171 0.95 
 4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly methods? (yes/no) no 0.00 
Table XI, continued.   
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 4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram (count) 7 1.00 
  INPUT UNIT x u(x) 
4.2. Handling difficulties    
 4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose  (Sv/hr) 0.06455 0.26 
 4.2.2. Chemical reactivity  (fast/slow in water, air, steels, plastics) slow for air 0.00 
 4.2.3. Radiotoxicity (isotopic composition) 26.903% Grp I, 73.097% Grp II 0.82 
4.3. Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate    
 4.3.1. Knowledge & skill level for weapon alternatives  (direct input from a priori calculations) n/a n/a 
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V.D. Discussion 
The scenario used in this example case was specifically chosen to exercise as 
many of the inputs as possible. This choice, combined with the choice to make all 
weighting factors equal, caused the PR result for all the stages to be very similar. Upon 
closer inspection of Table XII in the previous section, we can see that several inputs 
stand out. The mass per SQ of nuclear material was the biggest barrier to proliferation 
with a utility value of 0.90; only the binary inputs had higher value. We can also see a 
number of inputs whose utility values were zero in this case, indicating the weak points 
in the proliferation resistance of reprocessing solution. The most notable of these is that 
the material does not generate much heat once the fission products have been removed, 
the difficulty in measuring nuclear materials at a reprocessing plant causes large 
uncertainties in which a diversion can be hidden, and the transportation of this material 
could be difficult to detect. Finally, we notice that there were a few inputs for which 
values were not available. These inputs are complex and some analysts may wish to 
exclude them. These are further discussed in Chapter VI. 
125 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The example PR assessment given in Chapter V is very revealing of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the attributes and inputs developed in this work. The most prominent 
of these is the varying level of success at quantifying the inputs. Some, such as mass, 
volume, heat rate, radiation dose rate and others, are easy to quantify. In order to obtain 
these values, all that the analyst needs to know was exactly what is being diverted. These 
are easy to quantify because the properties of nuclear material at each point in a fuel 
cycle are well known. Also easy to quantify are the binary inputs since these are simple 
answers to “yes or no” questions. 
Other inputs, while still quantifiable, are relatively more difficult to quantify. 
This is the largest group of inputs and it is comprised of two types. One type consists of 
those inputs for which we can define extreme values, but have no reason to use a utility 
function other than a straight line in between them. Examples include inputs like the 
IDLH chemical toxicity level or the size of a country. The other type of these “medium” 
inputs is made up of those inputs that are defined on a sliding scale, such as the number 
of process steps to metallic form, or the level of knowledge and skills needed for remote 
manipulation of materials. 
These easy and “medium” inputs make up 50 of the 60 inputs defined in Chapter 
V. The remaining 10 are quite complex for different reasons. There are four types of 
these. Complex inputs of Type I are those that require detailed facility knowledge in 
order to implement. These are the IAEA imagery analysis rate, expected versus actual 
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MUF, and the probability of detection by the material control system. This information 
is not openly available; it will either be safeguards-confidential or proprietary. 
Therefore, these inputs will only be useful to analysts within the IAEA or employees of 
the company which owns the facility being analyzed. 
The Type II complex input (there is only one) is the a priori calculation of the 
knowledge and skills needed to design a weapon. This input is complex because it 
requires classified information about weapon designs in order to implement. An analyst 
who has the proper clearances could perform these calculations and produce a set of 
utility values, but there would be no transparency as to how those numbers were 
obtained. This would lead to a loss of confidence in the assessment for most users. 
Complex inputs of Type III are those that are highly dependent on the scenario 
definition. These are the inputs dealing with the mass and volume of the transportation 
container and the size of the workforce needed for transformation. It is entirely the 
choice of the proliferator as to what type of container to use and whom to employ in the 
transformation process. He could disregard the safety of the people transporting the 
material and use a small light-weight container that has no radiation shielding, or he 
could use some standard container purchased from a nuclear supplier. With regard to the 
work force, he could decide to hire many less skilled people and allow them time to 
learn how to do the work, or he could hire a few experienced scientists and get the job 
done faster. These things can all be taken from sufficiently detailed scenario definition, 
but this will increase the number of scenarios that must be analyzed in order to find the 
most conservative PR result. Such a task would be expensive, but some decision-makers 
127 
 
may find it to be a worthwhile endeavor. Others may choose to exclude these inputs (or 
entire stages) and focus on those derived from material and declared-facility parameters. 
The final complex input falls into Type IV – the sonic load of the transformation 
facility. In the example case given in Chapter V, it just so happened that the value for 
this input was known to be zero because chemically separating plutonium from a nitric 
acid solution is not a noisy process. However, in most cases, this number would not be 
available to any analyst. It is very dependent on how well the equipment in a facility is 
cared for. If it is well lubricated and in good repair, it will make less noise. For these 
reasons, we recommend that the sonic load input be excluded from PR assessments. This 
input was originally included because sonic signals can be used to identify what is being 
done inside a known uranium enrichment plant. 
Another notable feature of these attributes and inputs is the fact that some are 
repeated. We see the same input appear for multiple attributes and we also see very 
similar attributes appearing in multiple stages, for example, the mass per SQ of material 
and the material handling difficulty. Does this constitute double-counting of material and 
facility characteristics in the PR assessment? The answer depends on how the analyst 
looks at the problem. Inputs are repeated because they affect different attributes in 
different ways. For example, the mass of the diverted material will create different 
problems for the proliferator during diversion at the source facility than it will during 
transport to the covert transformation facility. During diversion, the mass will dictate the 
need for special lifting equipment, crane operators and other personnel. During transport, 
it will dictate the type and size of the vehicle as well as the available routes of travel. 
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The same number has different meaning depending on the context. This is also true of 
attributes that seem to be repeated among the various stages. They are very similar with 
only a few changes in their inputs. This is something that can be dealt with in the 
development of a PR assessment methodology. One option would be, for an MAUA, to 
aggregate all the inputs in a single utility function (rather than stage-by-stage) and 
simply give larger weighting factors to inputs that were repeated. In this work, the 
repetitions were helpful in highlighting interdependencies so that they can be better 
understood in future PR assessment methods. This was the primary purpose in dividing 
the problem into four stages of proliferation – to add fidelity to the analysis and learn 
about the interdependencies that do exist. 
One clear example of interdependence between inputs is found in the 
transformation stage. The treatment requirement for gaseous and liquid byproducts 
(under the knowledge and skills attribute) and the volume of non-naturally occurring gas 
and liquid emissions (under the detection attribute) are related to one another. The 
analyst could decide (i.e. write into the scenario definition) that liquid and gaseous 
byproducts do not need to be treated before environmental release. In this case, the 
volume of unnatural gas and liquid emissions will increase. The opposite is also true. If 
the proliferator is efficient enough with treating byproducts, then there could be zero 
emissions to the environment. Both inputs are important and valid to the PR assessment, 
but the analyst will need to take care that they do not cancel each other out. 
As one reads through the list of inputs (given most concisely in Table XII), one 
can see that almost all of them are objective and quantitative and their values can be 
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obtained either by measurement or calculation. Even qualitative and subjective ideas 
such as the level of international scrutiny on a country are captured in a quantitative way 
(e.g., imagery analysis rate). Subjective inputs are isolated to the workforce attribute of 
the transformation stage and the knowledge and skills attribute of the fabrication stage. 
This is not to say, however, that subjectivity has been entirely eliminated from any input 
or attribute. It has simply been transferred to the work of determining exactly what each 
input means in terms of PR. A good example of this is the mass of diverted material. It is 
clear that material with a mass of 1,000 kg is more proliferation resistant than material 
with a mass of 500 kg. But how much more proliferation resistant is it? Is it twice as 
resistant? Why or why not? Not everyone will have the same answers to these questions. 
The utility functions presented in Chapter V make an attempt to justify the particular 
quantification of inputs in terms of PR. Some do this well, for example, the radiation 
dose rate input bases its quantifications on the thresholds of various acute radiation 
health effects. However, some are still very subjective, for example, the degree of 
remote manipulation required. A method of dealing with this issue is to identify an array 
of input values and fit a utility curve to them, as was done with the heat rate and volume 
inputs. Further study is needed to apply this method to the remainder of the inputs, such 
as those for which only extreme values were established. 
The list of inputs developed here is complete. They are almost entirely 
independent of one another, with the one exception noted above (regarding liquid & gas 
byproducts). It is possible to use them to obtain a PR score with a confidence level as 
errors in measurements and calculations can be propagated throughout. There is some 
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repetition of inputs among the various attributes, but these demonstrate the various ways 
that a single factor can impact proliferation resistance. This understanding will help in 
developing appropriate weighting factors for each input in a PR assessment 
methodology. These inputs can be applied to other threats beyond host state diversion, 
most likely by simply modifying weighting factors as certain barriers will be more or 
less important to a thief than the facility operator. These inputs can be utilized in 
multiple types of assessment methods from MAUA to probabilistic methods and 
decision trees. Use of these inputs consistently will enhance the foundation of PR 
assessment and allow for clear comparisons between nuclear technology options. 
Finally, there is a clear path forward to continue this work. The very next step 
would be for an analyst to define his own goals for PR assessment and go through the 
process of computing real weighting factors, as defined by Clemen and Keeney.12, 13 
Next, the method should be further exercised using data from an array of real facilities in 
order to learn more about the “medium” inputs and find some intermediate values upon 
which to build more robust utility functions. As these exercises are done, they should 
eventually include measurement uncertainties and work should be done to propagate 
those through the analysis to the final result. Finally, a sensitivity analysis should be 
performed to develop an understanding of how each input effects the result and to make 
sure that none of the weighting factors are so small that they render an input 
meaningless. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-I 
Utility Function Summary 
 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
1. Diversion Stage   
1.1. Material handling difficulty during diversion  
1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  (kg/SQ) 1,min1 1 1,min
1
( ) exp 25 ,  8xu x x
x
  
= − = 	
 
  
 
1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  (m3/SQ) 2,min2 2 2,min0.33
2
( ) exp 2000 ,  0.000404( )
x
u x x
x
  
= − = 	
 
  
 
1.1.3. Number of items/SQ (count) ( )0.443 3 3( ) 1 exp 0.1u x x= − −  
1.1.4. Material Form  (solid, powder, liquid, gas) ( )
4
4
4 4
4
4
0.1 for "solid"
0.5 for "powder"
0.7 for "liquid"
1.0 for "gas"
x
x
u x
x
x
=

=
= 
=
 =
 
1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose  (Sv/hr) ( )
5
5 5
5 5 5 5
5 5
5
0 for 0.002
5.20833 0.010416 for 0.002 0.05
0.35714 0.232143 for 0.05 0.75
0.095238 0.428571 for 0.75 6
1 for 6
x
x x
u x x x
x x
x
≤

− < ≤
= + < ≤
 + < ≤

>
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 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
2.1.5. Heat load of material (W/cc) ( ) ( )
17
17 17 17 17
17
0.0 for 0.33
0.2171ln 0.2407 for 0.33 33
1.0 for 33
x
u x x x
x
<

= + ≤ ≤
 >
 
2.1.6. Chemical reactivity 
(fast/slow in 
water, air, steels, 
plastics) 
See Table V. 
2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity  
(chemical 
formula – Table 
A-II) 
( ) ( )
19
19 19 19 19
19
0.0 for 10,000
0.1086ln 1.0 for 1 10,000
1.0 for 1
x
u x x x
x
>

= − + ≤ ≤
 <
. 
2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity 
(chemical 
formula – Table 
A-III) 
( ) ( )
20
20 20 20 20
20
0.0 for 1,000
0.0724ln 0.5 for 0.001 1,000
1.0 for 0.001
x
u x x x
x
>

= − + ≤ ≤
 <
 
2.2. Difficulty of evading detection during transport 
2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container (kg) ( ) ( )
21
21 21 21 21
21
0.0 for 100
0.147 ln 0.677 for 100 90,000
1.0 for 90,000
x
u x x x
x
<

= − ≤ ≤
 >
 
2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container (m
3) ( ) ( )
22
22 22 22 22
22
0.0 for 1
0.1526ln for 1 700
1.0 for 700
x
u x x x
x
<

= ≤ ≤
 >
 
2.2.3. Heat load of material (W/cc) ( ) ( )
23
23 23 23 23
23
0.0 for 0.33
0.2171ln 0.2407 for 0.33 33
1.0 for 33
x
u x x x
x
<

= + ≤ ≤
 >
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 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce 
radiation to 10 mR/hr  (m) ( ) 24 2424 24 24
0.5 for 0 2.0
1.0 for 2.0
x x
u x
x
≤ <
=  ≥
 
2.2.5. Host country size (km2) ( ) ( )
25
25 25 25 25
25
0.0 for 17,000,000
0.1133ln 1.8862 for 2,500 17,000,000
1.0 for 2,500
x
u x x x
x
>

= − + ≤ ≤
 <
 
2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities (count) ( )
26
26 26
26 26
0.0 for 100
0.01 1.01 for 1 100
x
u x
x x
>
= 
− + ≤ ≤
 
2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate (no. per mo.) Not quantifiable; data not available. 
3. Transformation Stage   
3.1. Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials 
3.1.1. Number of process steps to 
metallic form (count - table) See Tables VI and VII. 
3.1.2. Number of export 
controlled/equipment/materials (count) ( )
28 28
28 28
28
0.0056 for 0 178
1.0 for 178
x x
u x
x
≤ ≤
= 
>
 
3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement (MWe) ( ) ( )29 2929 29
29
0.1219ln for 0 3,360
1.0 for 3,360
x x
u x
x
 ≤ ≤
=  ≥
 
3.2. Knowledge and skills needed to process diverted materials 
3.2.1. Number of process steps to 
metallic form (count - table) See Tables III and VII. 
3.2.2. Radiation shielding requirement (mSv @ 30 cm) ( ) 3131 31
31
0.0 for 1.0
1.0 for 1.0
x
u x
x
<
=  ≥
 
3.2.3. Degree of remote manipulation 
required (table) See Table IX. 
Table A-1, continued.   
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 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
3.2.4. Radiation effect on 
materials/components (Ci/cc) ( )
33
33 33 33 33
33
0.0 for 0.1
0.0334 0.0033 for 0.1 30
1.0 for 30
x
u x x x
x
<

= − ≤ ≤
 >
 
3.2.5. Heat load of material (W/cc) ( ) ( )
34
34 34 34 34
34
0.0 for 0.33
0.2171ln 0.2407 for 0.33 33
1.0 for 33
x
u x x x
x
<

= + ≤ ≤
 >
 
3.2.6. Treatment requirement for gaseous byproducts (yes/no) ( ) ( )35 35"yes" 1.0; "no" 0.0u u= =  
3.2.7. Treatment requirement for liquid by products  (yes/no) ( ) ( )36 36"yes" 1.0; "no" 0.0u u= =  
3.2.8. Advanced actinide chemistry skills 
needed (text string) ( )37 37
0.0 for U
0.5 for Np or Pu
1.0 for Am and higher actinides
u x


= 


 
3.3. Workforce required for transformation 
3.3.1. Number of unskilled workers 
required  (person years) ( )
( )38 38
38 38
38
0.0869ln for 1 100,000
1.0 for 100,000
x x
u x
x
 ≤ ≤
= 
>
 
3.3.2. Number of skilled workers 
required (person years) ( )
( )39 39
39 39
39
0.0977 ln for 1 28,000
1.0 for 28,000
x x
u x
x
 ≤ ≤
= 
>
 
3.3.3. Number of experts (designers, 
etc.) needed  (person years) ( )
( )40 40
40 40
40
0.1448ln for 1 1,000
1.0 for 1,000
x x
u x
x
 ≤ ≤
= 
>
 
3.4. Difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities 
3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force? (yes/no) ( ) ( )41 41"yes" 1.0; "no" 0.0u u= =  
Table A-1, continued.   
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 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate (no. per mo. per facility) ( ) 42 4242 42 42
0.01 for 0 100
1.0 for 100
x x
u x
x
≤ ≤
= 
>
 
3.4.3. Number of declared nuclear facilities (count) ( )
43
43 43
43 43
0.0 for 100
0.01 1.01 for 1 100
x
u x
x x
>
= 
− + ≤ ≤
 
3.4.4. Isotopic signatures  (count - table) ( )44 44 440.2u x x= . See Table X. 
3.4.5. Facility size  (m2) ( ) ( )
45
45 45 45 45
45
0.0 for 100
0.1563ln 0.7199 for 100 60,000
1.0 for 60,000
x
u x x x
x
<

= − ≤ ≤
 >
 
3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process (MWth) ( ) ( )
46
46 46 46 46
46
0.0 for 0.0001
0.1563ln 0.7199 for 0.0001 2,500
1.0 for 2,500
x
u x x x
x
<

= − ≤ ≤
 >
 
3.4.7. Sonic load (dB) ( ) 47 4747 47
47
0.0071 for 0 140
1.0 for 140
x x
u x
x
≤ ≤
= 
>
 
3.4.8. Radiation load (R/hr) ( ) ( )
48
48 48 48 48
48
0.0 for 0.01
0.08686ln 0.4 for 0.01 1,000
1.0 for 1,000
x
u x x x
x
<

= + ≤ ≤
 >
 
3.4.9. Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted  (Ci/yr) ( ) ( )
6
49
6 6
49 49 49 49
6
49
0.0 for 10
0.0337 ln 0.465 for 10 8 10
1.0 for 8 10
x
u x x x
x
−
−
 <

= + ≤ ≤ ×
 > ×
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 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions (Ci/yr) ( ) ( )
6
50
6 5
50 50 50 50
5
50
0.0 for 10
0.0376ln 0.5189 for 10 3.65 10
1.0 for 3.65 10
x
u x x x
x
−
−
 <

= + ≤ ≤ ×
 > ×
 
4. Weapons Fabrication Stage   
4.1. Difficulty associated with design   
4.1.1. Spontaneous fission neutron production rate (n/s/g) ( )
1.8
51
51 51 51,max
51,max
1 exp 3.5 ,  2,700xu x x
x
  
 	= − − =
 
  	  
 
4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter  (R/hr) ( ) ( )
52
52 52 52 52
52
0.0 for 0.01
0.08686ln 0.4 for 0.01 1,000
1.0 for 1,000
x
u x x x
x
<

= + ≤ ≤
 >
 
4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material  (W/SQ) ( )
0.8
53
53 53 53,max
53,max
1 exp 3 ,  171xu x x
x
  
 	= − − =
 
  	  
 
4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly 
methods? (yes/no) ( ) ( )54 54"no" 1.0; "yes" 0.0u u= =  
4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram (count) ( ) 55 5555 55 55
0.1667 0.1667 1 7
1.0 7
x x
u x
x
− ≤ ≤
= 
>
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 INPUT UNIT UTILITY FUNCTION 
4.2. Handling difficulties   
4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose  (Sv/hr) ( )
56
56 56
56 56 56 56
56 56
56
0 for 0.002
5.20833 0.010416 for 0.002 0.05
0.35714 0.232143 for 0.05 0.75
0.095238 0.428571 for 0.75 6
1 for 6
x
x x
u x x x
x x
x
≤

− < ≤
= + < ≤
 + < ≤

>
 
4.2.2. Chemical reactivity  
(fast/slow in 
water, air, steels, 
plastics) 
See Table V. 
4.2.3. Radiotoxicity (isotopic 
composition) ( ) 5858 58 581 ; 
I
i i
i tot
x
x m w u x
m
=
= = . See Table A-IV. 
4.3. Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate 
4.3.1. Knowledge and skill level for 
material/weapon type alternatives  
(direct input 
from a priori 
calculations) 
N/A 
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Table A-II 
IDLH Chemical Concentrations in Air14 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Acetaldehyde  10,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Acetic acid 1,000 ppm 50 ppm 
Acetic anhydride 1,000 ppm 200 ppm 
Acetone 20,000 ppm 2,500 ppm [LEL] 
Acetonitrile 4,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Acetylene tetrabromide 10 ppm 8 ppm 
Acrolein 5 ppm 2 ppm 
Acrylamide Unknown 60 mg/m3 
Acrylonitrile 500 ppm 85 ppm 
Aldrin 100 mg/m3 25 mg/m3 
Allyl alcohol 150 ppm 20 ppm 
Allyl chloride 300 ppm 250 ppm 
Allyl glycidyl ether 270 ppm 50 ppm  
2 Aminopyridine 5 ppm 5 ppm [Unch] 
Ammonia 500 ppm 300 ppm 
Ammonium sulfamate 5,000 mg/m3 1,500 mg/m3 
n-Amyl acetate 4,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
sec-Amyl acetate 9,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
Aniline 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
o-Anisidine 50 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 [Unch] 
p-Anisidine 50 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Antimony compounds (as Sb) 80 mg Sb/m3 50 mg Sb/m3 
ANTU 100 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Arsenic (inorganic compounds, as As) 100 mg As/m3 5 mg As/m3 
Arsine 6 ppm 3 ppm 
Azinphosmethyl 20 mg/m3 10 mg/m3 
Barium (soluble compounds, as Ba) 1,100 mg Ba/m3 50 mg Ba/m3 
Benzene 3,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Benzoyl peroxide 7,000 mg/m3 1,500 mg/m3 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Benzyl chloride 10 ppm 10 ppm [Unch] 
Beryllium compounds (as Be) 10 mg Be/m3 4 mg Be/m3 
Boron oxide N.E. 2,000 mg/m3 
Boron trifluoride 100 ppm 25 ppm 
Bromine 10 ppm 3 ppm 
Bromoform Unknown 850 ppm 
1,3-Butadiene 20,000 ppm [LEL] 2,000 ppm [LEL] 
2-Butanone 3,000 ppm 3,000 ppm [Unch] 
2-Butoxyethanol 700 ppm 700 ppm [Unch] 
n-Butyl acetate 10,000 ppm 1,700 ppm [LEL] 
sec-Butyl acetate 10,000 ppm 1,700 ppm [LEL] 
tert-Butyl acetate 10,000 ppm 1,500 ppm [LEL] 
n-Butyl alcohol 8,000 ppm 1,400 ppm [LEL] 
sec-Butyl alcohol 10,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
tert-Butyl alcohol 8,000 ppm 1,600 ppm 
n-Butylamine 2,000 ppm 300 ppm 
tert-Butyl chromate 30 mg/m
3
 (as 
CrO3) 15 mg Cr(VI)/m
3
 
n-Butyl glycidyl ether 3,500 ppm 250 ppm 
n-Butyl mercaptan 2,500 ppm 500 ppm 
p-tert-Butyltoluene 1,000 ppm 100 ppm 
Cadmium dust (as Cd) 50 mg Cd/m3 9 mg Cd/m3 
Cadmium fume (as Cd) 9 mg Cd/m3 9 mg Cd/m3[Unc h] 
Calcium arsenate (as As) 100 mg As/m3 5 mg As/m3 
Calcium oxide Unknown 25 mg/m3 
Camphor (synthetic) 200 mg/m3 200 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Carbaryl 600 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Carbon black N.E. 1,750 mg/m3 
Carbon dioxide 50,000 ppm 40,000 ppm 
Carbon disulfide 500 ppm 500 ppm [Unch] 
Carbon monoxide 1,500 ppm 1,200 ppm 
Carbon tetrachloride 300 ppm 200 ppm 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Chlordane 500 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Chlorinated camphene 200 mg/m3 200 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Chlorinated diphenyl oxide Unknown 5 mg/m3 
Chlorine 30 ppm 10 ppm 
Chlorine dioxide 10 ppm 5 ppm 
Chlorine trifluoride 20 ppm 20 ppm [Unch] 
Chloroacetaldehyde 100 ppm 45 ppm 
alpha-Chloroacetophenone 100 mg/m3 15 mg/m3 
Chlorobenzene 2,400 ppm 1,000 ppm 
o-Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile 2 mg/m3 2 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Chlorobromomethane 5,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Chlorodiphenyl (42% chlorine) 10 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 
Chlorodiphenyl (54% chlorine) 5 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Chloroform 1,000 ppm 500 ppm 
1-Chloro-1-nitropropane 2,000 ppm 100 ppm 
Chloropicrin 4 ppm 2 ppm 
beta-Chloroprene 400 ppm 300 ppm 
Chromic acid and chromates 30 mg/m
3
 (as 
CrO3) 15 mg Cr(VI)/m
3
 
Chromium (II) compounds [as Cr(II)] N.E. 250 mg Cr(II)/m3 
Chromium (III) compounds [as Cr(III)] N.E. 25 mg Cr(III)/m3 
Chromium metal (as Cr) N.E. 250 mg Cr/m3 
Coal tar pitch volatiles 700 mg/m3 80 mg/m3 
Cobalt metal, dust and fume (as Co) 20 mg Co/m3 20 mg Co/m3 [Unch] 
Copper (dusts and mists, as Cu) N.E. 100 mg Cu/m3 
Copper fume (as Cu) N.E. 100 mg Cu/m3 
Cotton dust (raw) N.E. 100 mg/m3 
Crag (r) herbicide  5,000 mg/m3 500 mg/m3 
Cresol (o, m, p isomers) 250 ppm 250 ppm [Unch] 
Crotonaldehyde 400 ppm 50 ppm 
Cumene 8,000 ppm 900 ppm [LEL] 
Cyanides (as CN) 50 mg/m3 (as CN) 25 mg/m3 (as CN) 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Cyclohexane 10,000 ppm 1,300 ppm [LEL] 
Cyclohexanol 3,500 ppm 400 ppm 
Cyclohexanone 5,000 ppm 700 ppm 
Cyclohexene 10,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Cyclopentadiene 2,000 ppm 750 ppm 
2,4-D 500 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
DDT N.E. 500 mg/m3 
Decaborane 100 mg/m3 15 mg/m3 
Demeton 20 mg/m3 10 mg/m3 
Diacetone alcohol 2,100 ppm 1,800 ppm [LEL] 
Diazomethane 2 ppm 2 ppm [Unch] 
Diborane 40 ppm 15 ppm 
Dibutyl phosphate 125 ppm 30 ppm 
Dibutyl phthalate 9,300 mg/m3 4,000 mg/m3 
o-Dichlorobenzene 1,000 ppm 200 ppm 
p-Dichlorobenzene 1,000 ppm 150 ppm 
Dichlorodifluoromethane 50,000 ppm 15,000 ppm 
1,3-Dichloro 5,5-dimethylhydantoin Unknown 5 mg/m3 
1,1-Dichloroethane 4,000 ppm 3,000 ppm 
1,2-Dichloroethylene 4,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
Dichloroethyl ether 250 ppm 100 ppm 
Dichloromonofluoromethane 50,000 ppm 5,000 ppm 
1,1-Dichloro 1-nitroethane 150 ppm 25 ppm 
Dichlorotetrafluoroethane 50,000 ppm 15,000 ppm 
Dichlorvos 200 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Dieldrin 450 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 
Diethylamine 2,000 ppm 200 ppm 
2-Diethylaminoethanol 500 ppm 100 ppm 
Difluorodibromomethane 2,500 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Diglycidyl ether 25 ppm 10 ppm 
Diisobutyl ketone 2,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Diisopropylamine 1,000 ppm 200 ppm 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Dimethyl acetamide 400 ppm 300 ppm 
Dimethylamine 2,000 ppm 500 ppm 
N,N-Dimethylaniline 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
Dimethyl 1,2-dibromo 2,2-dichlorethyl 
phosphate 1,800 mg/m
3
 200 mg/m3 
Dimethylformamide 3,500 ppm 500 ppm 
1,1-Dimethylhydrazine 50 ppm 15 ppm 
Dimethylphthalate 9,300 mg/m3 2,000 mg/m3 
Dimethyl sulfate 10 ppm 7 ppm 
Dinitrobenzene (o, m, p isomers) 200 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 
Dinitroocresol 5 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Dinitrotoluene 200 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 
Di sec-octyl phthalate Unknown 5,000 mg/m3 
Dioxane 2,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Diphenyl 300 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Dipropylene glycol methyl ether Unknown 600 ppm 
Endrin 2,000 mg/m3 2 mg/m3 
Epichlorohydrin 250 ppm 75 ppm 
EPN 50 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 
Ethanolamine 1,000 ppm 30 ppm 
2-Ethoxyethanol 6,000 ppm 500 ppm 
2-Ethoxyethyl acetate 2,500 ppm 500 ppm 
Ethyl acetate 10,000 ppm 2,000 ppm [LEL] 
Ethyl acrylate 2,000 ppm 300 ppm 
Ethyl alcohol 15,000 ppm 3,300 ppm [LEL] 
Ethylamine 4,000 ppm 600 ppm 
Ethyl benzene 2,000 ppm 800 ppm [LEL] 
Ethyl bromide 3,500 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Ethyl butyl ketone 3,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
Ethyl chloride 20,000 ppm 3,800 ppm [LEL] 
Ethylene chlorohydrin 10 ppm 7 ppm 
Ethylenediamine 2,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Ethylene dibromide 400 ppm 100 ppm 
Ethylene dichloride 1,000 ppm 50 ppm 
Ethylene glycol dinitrate 500 mg/m3 75 mg/m3 
Ethyleneimine 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
Ethylene oxide 800 ppm 800 ppm [Unch] 
Ethyl ether 19,000 ppm [LEL] 1,900 ppm [LEL] 
Ethyl formate 8,000 ppm 1,500 ppm 
Ethyl mercaptan 2,500 ppm 500 ppm 
N-Ethylmorpholine 2,000 ppm 100 ppm 
Ethyl silicate 1,000 ppm 700 ppm 
Ferbam N.E. 800 mg/m3 
Ferrovanadium dust N.E. 500 mg/m3 
Fluorides (as F) 500 mg F/m3 250 mg F/m3 
Fluorine 25 ppm 25 ppm [Unch] 
Fluorotrichloromethane 10,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Formaldehyde 30 ppm 20 ppm 
Formic acid 30 ppm 30 ppm [Unch] 
Furfural 250 ppm 100 ppm 
Furfuryl alcohol 250 ppm 75 ppm 
Glycidol 500 ppm 150 ppm 
Graphite (natural) N.E. 1,250 mg/m3 
Hafnium compounds (as Hf) Unknown 50 mg Hf/m3 
Heptachlor 700 mg/m3 35 mg/m3 
n-Heptane 5,000 ppm 750 ppm 
Hexachloroethane 300 ppm 300 ppm [Unch] 
Hexachloronaphthalene 2 mg/m3 2 mg/m3 [Unch] 
n-Hexane 5,000 ppm 1,100 ppm [LEL] 
2-Hexanone 5,000 ppm 1,600 ppm 
Hexone 3,000 ppm 500 ppm 
sec Hexyl acetate 4,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Hydrazine 80 ppm 50 ppm 
Hydrogen bromide 50 ppm 30 ppm 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Hydrogen chloride 100 ppm 50 ppm 
Hydrogen cyanide 50 ppm 50 ppm [Unch] 
Hydrogen fluoride (as F) 30 ppm 30 ppm [Unch] 
Hydrogen peroxide 75 ppm 75 ppm [Unch] 
Hydrogen selenide (as Se) 2 ppm 1 ppm 
Hydrogen sulfide 300 ppm 100 ppm 
Hydroquinone Unknown 50 mg/m3 
Iodine 10 ppm 2 ppm 
Iron oxide dust and fume (as Fe) N.E. 2,500 mg Fe/m3 
Isoamyl acetate 3,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
Isoamyl alcohol (primary and secondary) 10,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Isobutyl acetate 7,500 ppm 1,300 ppm [LEL] 
Isobutyl alcohol 8,000 ppm 1,600 ppm 
Isophorone 800 ppm 200 ppm 
Isopropyl acetate 16,000 ppm 1,800 ppm 
Isopropyl alcohol 12,000 ppm 2,000 ppm [LEL] 
Isopropylamine 4,000 ppm 750 ppm 
Isopropyl ether 10,000 ppm 1,400 ppm [LEL] 
Isopropyl glycidyl ether 1,000 ppm 400 ppm 
Ketene Unknown 5 ppm 
Lead compounds (as Pb) 700 mg Pb/m3 100 mg Pb/m3 
Lindane 1,000 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 
Lithium hydride 55 mg/m3 0.5 mg/m3 
L.P.G. 19,000 ppm [LEL] 2,000 ppm [LEL] 
Magnesium oxide fume N.E. 750 mg/m3 
Malathion 5,000 mg/m3 250 mg/m3 
Maleic anhydride Unknown 10 mg/m3 
Manganese compounds (as Mn) N.E. 500 mg Mn/m3 
Mercury compounds [except (organo) alkyls, 
as Hg] 28 mg Hg/m
3
 10 mg Hg/m3 
Mercury (organo) alkyl compounds(as Hg) 10 mg Hg/m3 2 mg Hg/m3 
Mesityl oxide 5,000 ppm 1,400 ppm [LEL] 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Methoxychlor N.E. 5,000 mg/m3 
Methyl acetate 10,000 ppm 3,100 ppm [LEL] 
Methyl acetylene 15,000 ppm [LEL] 1,700 ppm [LEL] 
Methyl acetylenepropadiene mixture 15,000 ppm 3,400 ppm [LEL] 
Methyl acrylate 1,000 ppm 250 ppm 
Methylal 15,000 ppm [LEL] 2,200 ppm [LEL] 
Methyl alcohol 25,000 ppm 6,000 ppm 
Methylamine 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
Methyl (namyl) ketone 4,000 ppm 800 ppm 
Methyl bromide 2,000 ppm 250 ppm 
Methyl Cellosolve (r) 2,000 ppm 200 ppm 
Methyl Cellosolve (r) acetate 4,000 ppm 200 ppm 
Methyl chloride 10,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Methyl chloroform 1,000 ppm 700 ppm 
Methylcyclohexane 10,000 ppm 1,200 ppm [LEL] 
Methylcyclohexanol 10,000 ppm 500 ppm 
o-Methylcyclohexanone 2,500 ppm 600 ppm 
Methylene bisphenyl isocyanate 100 mg/m3 75 mg/m3 
Methylene chloride 5,000 ppm 2,300 ppm 
Methyl formate 5,000 ppm 4,500 ppm 
5-Methyl 3-heptanone 3,000 ppm 100 ppm 
Methyl hydrazine 50 ppm 20 ppm 
Methyl iodide 800 ppm 100 ppm 
Methyl isobutyl carbinol 2,000 ppm 400 ppm 
Methyl isocyanate 20 ppm 3 ppm 
Methyl mercaptan 400 ppm 150 ppm 
Methyl methacrylate 4,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
Methyl styrene 5,000 ppm 700 ppm 
Mica N.E. 1,500 mg/m3 
Molybdenum (insoluble compounds, as Mo) N.E. 5,000 mg Mo/m3 
Molybdenum (soluble compounds, as Mo) N.E. 1,000 mg Mo/m3 
Monomethyl aniline 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Morpholine 8,000 ppm 1,400 ppm [LEL] 
Naphtha (coal tar) 10,000 ppm [LEL] 1,000 ppm [LEL] 
Naphthalene 500 ppm 250 ppm 
Nickel carbonyl (as Ni) 7 ppm 2 ppm 
Nickel metal and other compounds (as Ni) N.E. 10 mg Ni/m3 
Nicotine 35 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 
Nitric acid 100 ppm 25 ppm 
Nitric oxide 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
p-Nitroaniline 300 mg/m3 300 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Nitrobenzene 200 ppm 200 ppm [Unch] 
p-Nitrochlorobenzene 1,000 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Nitroethane 1,000 ppm 1,000 ppm [Unch] 
Nitrogen dioxide 50 ppm 20 ppm 
Nitrogen trifluoride 2,000 ppm 1,000 ppm 
Nitroglycerine 500 mg/m3 75 mg/m3 
Nitromethane 1,000 ppm 750 ppm 
1-Nitropropane 2,300 ppm 1,000 ppm 
2-Nitropropane 2,300 ppm 100 ppm 
Nitrotoluene (o, m, p isomers) 200 ppm 200 ppm [Unch] 
Octachloronaphthalene Unknown Unknown [Unch] 
Octane 5,000 ppm 1,000 ppm [LEL] 
Oil mist (mineral) N.E. 2,500 mg/m3 
Osmium tetroxide (as Os) 1 mg Os/m3 1 mg Os/m3 [Unch] 
Oxalic acid 500 mg/m3 500 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Oxygen difluoride 0.5 ppm 0.5 ppm [Unch] 
Ozone 10 ppm 5 ppm 
Paraquat 1.5 mg/m3 1 mg/m3 
Parathion 20 mg/m3 10 mg/m3 
Pentaborane 3 ppm 1 ppm 
Pentachloronaphthalene Unknown Unknown [Unch] 
Pentachlorophenol 150 mg/m3 2.5 mg/m3 
n-Pentane 15,000 ppm [LEL] 1,500 ppm [LEL] 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
2-Pentanone 5,000 ppm 1,500 ppm 
Perchloromethyl mercaptan 10 ppm 10 ppm [Unch] 
Perchloryl fluoride 385 ppm 100 ppm 
Petroleum distillates (naphtha) 10,000 ppm 1,100 ppm [LEL] 
Phenol 250 ppm 250 ppm [Unch] 
p-Phenylene diamine Unknown 25 mg/m3 
Phenyl ether (vapor) N.E. 100 ppm 
Phenyl etherbiphenyl mixture (vapor) N.E. 10 ppm 
Phenyl glycidyl ether Unknown 100 ppm 
Phenylhydrazine 295 ppm 15 ppm 
Phosdrin 4 ppm 4 ppm [Unch] 
Phosgene 2 ppm 2 ppm [Unch] 
Phosphine 200 ppm 50 ppm 
Phosphoric acid 10,000 mg/m3 1,000 mg/m3 
Phosphorus (yellow) N.E. 5 mg/m3 
Phosphorus pentachloride 200 mg/m3 70 mg/m3 
Phosphorus pentasulfide 750 mg/m3 250 mg/m3 
Phosphorus trichloride 50 ppm 25 ppm 
Phthalic anhydride 10,000 mg/m3 60 mg/m3 
Picric acid 100 mg/m3 75 mg/m3 
Pindone 200 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Platinum (soluble salts, as Pt) N.E. 4 mg Pt/m3 
Portland cement N.E. 5,000 mg/m3 
Propane 20,000 ppm [LEL] 2,100 ppm [LEL] 
n-Propyl acetate 8,000 ppm 1,700 ppm 
n-Propyl alcohol 4,000 ppm 800 ppm 
Propylene dichloride 2,000 ppm 400 ppm 
Propylene imine 500 ppm 100 ppm 
Propylene oxide 2,000 ppm 400 ppm 
n-Propyl nitrate 2,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Pyrethrum 5,000 mg/m3 5,000 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Pyridine 3,600 ppm 1,000 ppm 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Quinone 300 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Rhodium (metal fume and insoluble 
compounds, as Rh) N.E. 100 mg Rh/m
3
 
Rhodium (soluble compounds, as Rh) N.E. 2 mg Rh/m3 
Ronnel 5,000 mg/m3 300 mg/m3 
Rotenone Unknown 2,500 mg/m3 
Selenium compounds (as Se) Unknown 1 mg Se/m3 
Selenium hexafluoride 5 ppm 2 ppm 
Silica, amorphous N.E. 3,000 mg/m3 
Silica, crystalline (respirable dust) N.E.   
cristobalite/tridymite:   25 mg/m3 
quartz/tripoli:   50 mg/m3 
Silver (metal dust and soluble compounds, as 
Ag) N.E. 10 mg Ag/m
3
 
Soapstone N.E. 3,000 mg/m3 
Sodium fluoroacetate 5 mg/m3 2.5 mg/m3 
Sodium hydroxide 250 mg/m3 10 mg/m3 
Stibine 40 ppm 5 ppm 
Stoddard solvent 29,500 mg/m3 20,000 mg/m3 
Strychnine 3 mg/m3 3 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Styrene 5,000 ppm 700 ppm 
Sulfur dioxide 100 ppm 100 ppm [Unch] 
Sulfuric acid 80 mg/m3 15 mg/m3 
Sulfur monochloride 10 ppm 5 ppm 
Sulfur pentafluoride 1 ppm 1 ppm [Unch] 
Sulfuryl fluoride 1,000 ppm 200 ppm 
2,4,5-T Unknown 250 mg/m3 
Talc N.E. 1,000 mg/m3 
Tantalum (metal and oxide dust, as Ta) N.E. 2,500 mg Ta/m3 
TEDP 35 mg/m3 10 mg/m3 
Tellurium compounds (as Te) N.E. 25 mg Te/m3 
Tellurium hexafluoride 1 ppm 1 ppm [Unch] 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
TEPP 10 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 
Terphenyl (o, m, p isomers) Unknown 500 mg/m3 
1,1,1,2-Tetrachloro 2,2-difluoroethane 15,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloro 1,2-difluoroethane 15,000 ppm 2,000 ppm 
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane 150 ppm 100 ppm 
Tetrachloroethylene 500 ppm 150 ppm 
Tetrachloronaphthalene Unknown Unknown [Unch] 
Tetraethyl lead (as Pb) 40 mg Pb/m3 40 mg Pb/m3 [Unch] 
Tetrahydrofuran 20,000 ppm [LEL] 2,000 ppm [LEL] 
Tetramethyl lead (as Pb) 40 mg Pb/m3 40 mg Pb/m3 [Unch] 
Tetramethyl succinonitrile 5 ppm 5 ppm [Unch] 
Tetranitromethane 5 ppm 4 ppm 
Tetryl N.E. 750 mg/m3 
Thallium (soluble compounds, as Tl) 20 mg Tl/m3 15 mg Tl/m3 
Thiram 1,500 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Tin (inorganic compounds, as Sn) 400 mg Sn/m3 100 mg Sn/m3 
Tin (organic compounds, as Sn) Unknown 25 mg Sn/m3 
Titanium dioxide N.E. 5,000 mg/m3 
Toluene 2,000 ppm 500 ppm 
Toluene 2,4-diisocyanate 10 ppm 2.5 ppm 
o-Toluidine 100 ppm 50 ppm 
Tributyl phosphate 125 ppm 30 ppm 
1,1,2-Trichloroethane 500 ppm 100 ppm 
Trichloroethylene 1,000 ppm 1,000 ppm [Unch] 
Trichloronaphthalene Unknown Unknown [Unch] 
1,2,3-Trichloropropane 1,000 ppm 100 ppm 
1,1,2-Trichloro 1,2,2-trifluoroethane 4,500 ppm 2,000 ppm 
Triethylamine 1,000 ppm 200 ppm 
Trifluorobromomethane 50,000 ppm 40,000 ppm 
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene 1,000 mg/m3 500 mg/m3 
Triorthocresyl phosphate 40 mg/m3 40 mg/m3 [Unch] 
Triphenyl phosphate N.E. 1,000 mg/m3 
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Table A-II, continued. 
 
Substance Original IDLH Value 
Revised IDLH 
Value 
Turpentine 1,500 ppm 800 ppm 
Uranium (insoluble compounds, as U) 30 mg U/m3 10 mg U/m3 
Uranium (soluble compounds, as U) 20 mg U/m3 10 mg U/m3 
Vanadium dust 70 mg/m
3
 (as 
V2O5) 35 mg V/m
3
 
Vanadium fume 70 mg/m
3
 (as 
V2O5) 35 mg V/m
3
 
Vinyl toluene 5,000 ppm 400 ppm 
Warfarin 350 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 
Xylene (o, m, p isomers) 1,000 ppm 900 ppm 
Xylidine 150 ppm 50 ppm 
Yttrium compounds (as Y) N.E. 500 mg Y/m3 
Zinc chloride fume 4,800 mg/m3 50 mg/m3 
Zinc oxide 2,500 mg/m3 500 mg/m3 
Zirconium compounds (as Zr) 500 mg Zr/m3 25 mg Zr/m3 
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Table A-III 
TWA Chemical Concentrations in Air15 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
Acetaldehyde...........|    75-07-0 |   200    |  360     | 
Acetic acid............|    64-19-7 |    10    |   25     | 
Acetic anhydride.......|   108-24-7 |     5    |   20     | 
Acetone................|    67-64-1 |  1000    | 2400     | 
Acetonitrile...........|    75-05-8 |    40    |   70     | 
2-Acetylaminofluorene; |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1014........|    53-96-3 |          |          | 
Acetylene dichloride;  |            |          |          | 
  see                  |            |          |          | 
  1,2-Dichloroethylene.|            |          |          | 
Acetylene tetrabromide.|    79-27-6 |     1    |   14     | 
Acrolein...............|   107-02-8 |     0.1  |    0.25  | 
Acrylamide.............|    79-06-1 | ........ |    0.3   |  X 
Acrylonitrile;         |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1045........|   107-13-1 |          |          | 
Aldrin.................|   309-00-2 | ........ |    0.25  |  X 
Allyl alcohol..........|   107-18-6 |     2    |    5     |  X 
Allyl chloride.........|   107-05-1 |     1    |    3     | 
Allyl glycidyl ether...|            |          |          | 
  (AGE)................|   106-92-3 | (C)10    |(C)45     | 
Allyl propyl disulfide.|  2179-59-1 |     2    |   12     | 
alpha-Alumina..........|  1344-28-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Aluminum Metal (as Al).|  7429-90-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
4-Aminodiphenyl;       |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1011........|    92-67-1 |          |          | 
2-Aminoethanol;        |            |          |          | 
  see Ethanolamine.....|            |          |          | 
2-Aminopyridine........|   504-29-0 |     0.5  |    2     | 
Ammonia................|  7664-41-7 |    50    |   35     | 
Ammonium sulfamate.....|  7773-06-0 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
n-Amyl acetate.........|   628-63-7 |   100    |  525     | 
sec-Amyl acetate.......|   626-38-0 |   125    |  650     | 
Aniline and homologs...|    62-53-3 |     5    |   19     |  X 
Anisidine              |            |          |          | 
  (o-,p-isomers).......| 29191-52-4 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Antimony and compounds |            |          |          | 
  (as Sb)..............|  7440-36-0 | ........ |    0.5   |
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Table A-III, continued. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
ANTU (alpha            |            |          |          | 
  Naphthylthiourea)....|    86-88-4 | ........ |    0.3   | 
 
Arsenic, inorganic     |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as As);   |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1018........|  7440-38-2 |          |          | 
Arsenic, organic       |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as As)....|  7440-38-2 | ........ |    0.5   | 
Arsine.................|  7784-42-1 |     0.05 |    0.2   | 
Asbestos;              |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1001........|        (4) |          |          | 
Azinphos-methyl........|    86-50-0 | ........ |    0.2   |  X 
Barium, soluble        |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as Ba)....|  7440-39-3 | ........ |    0.5   | 
Barium sulfate.........|  7727-43-7 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Benomyl................| 17804-35-2 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Benzene; See 1910.1028.|    71-43-2 |          |          | 
  See Table Z-2 for    |            |          |          | 
   the limits          |            |          |          | 
   applicable in the   |            |          |          | 
   operations or       |            |          |          | 
   sectors excluded    |            |          |          | 
   in 1910.1028(d)     |            |          |          | 
Benzidine;             |            |          |          | 
  See 1910.1010........|    92-87-5 |          |          | 
p-Benzoquinone;        |            |          |          | 
  see Quinone.         |            |          |          | 
Benzo(a)pyrene; see    |            |          |          | 
  Coal tar pitch       |            |          |          | 
  volatiles............|            |          |          | 
Benzoyl peroxide.......|    94-36-0 | ........ |    5     | 
Benzyl chloride........|   100-44-7 |     1    |    5     | 
Beryllium and          |            |          |          | 
  beryllium compounds  |            |          |          | 
  (as Be)..............|  7440-41-7 |          |  (2)     | 
Biphenyl; see Diphenyl.|            |          |          | 
Bismuth telluride,     |            |          |          | 
  Undoped..............|  1304-82-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Boron oxide............|  1303-86-2 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
Boron trifluoride......|  7637-07-2 |  (C)1    | (C)3     | 
Bromine................|  7726-95-6 |     0.1  |    0.7   | 
Bromoform..............|    75-25-2 |     0.5  |    5     |  X 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Butadiene              |            |          |          | 
  (1,3-Butadiene); See |            |          |          | 
  29 CFR 1910.1051;    |   106-99-0 | 1 ppm/5  |          | 
  29 CFR 1910.19(1)....|            | ppm STEL |          | 
Butanethiol;           |            |          |          | 
  see Butyl mercaptan. |            |          |          | 
2-Butanone             |            |          |          | 
  (Methyl ethyl ketone)|    78-93-3 |   200    |  590     | 
2-Butoxyethanol........|   111-76-2 |    50    |  240     |  X 
n-Butyl-acetate........|   123-86-4 |   150    |  710     | 
sec-Butyl acetate......|   105-46-4 |   200    |  950     | 
tert-Butyl-acetate.....|   540-88-5 |   200    |  950     | 
n-Butyl alcohol........|    71-36-3 |   100    |  300     | 
sec-Butyl alcohol......|    78-92-2 |   150    |  450     | 
tert-Butyl alcohol.....|    75-65-0 |   100    |  300     | 
Butylamine.............|   109-73-9 |  (C)5    |(C)15     |  X 
tert-Butyl chromate    |  1189-85-1 |          |          | 
  (as CrO(3))..........|            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1026        |            |          |          | 
n-Butyl glycidyl ether |            |          |          | 
  (BGE)................|  2426-08-6 |    50    |  270     | 
Butyl mercaptan........|   109-79-5 |    10    |   35     | 
p-tert-Butyltoluene....|    98-51-1 |    10    |   60     | 
Cadmium (as Cd);       |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1027........|  7440-43-9 |          |          | 
Calcium Carbonate......|  1317-65-3 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Calcium hydroxide......|  1305-62-0 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Calcium oxide..........|  1305-78-8 | ........ |    5     | 
Calcium silicate.......|  1344-95-2 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Calcium sulfate........|  7778-18-9 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Camphor, synthetic.....|    76-22-2 | ........ |    2     | 
Carbaryl (Sevin).......|    63-25-2 | ........ |    5     | 
Carbon black...........|  1333-86-4 | ........ |    3.5   | 
Carbon dioxide.........|   124-38-9 |  5000    | 9000     | 
Carbon disulfide.......|    75-15-0 |          |  (2)     | 
Carbon monoxide........|   630-08-0 |    50    |   55     | 
Carbon tetrachloride...|    56-23-5 |          |  (2)     | 
Cellulose..............|  9004-34-6 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Chlordane..............|    57-74-9 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Chlorinated camphene...|  8001-35-2 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Chlorinated diphenyl   |            |          |          | 
  oxide................| 55720-99-5 | ........ |    0.5   | 
Chlorine...............|  7782-50-5 |  (C)1    | (C)3     | 
Chlorine dioxide.......| 10049-04-4 |     0.1  |    0.3   | 
Chlorine trifluoride...|  7790-91-2 |  (C)0.1  | (C)0.4   | 
Chloroacetaldehyde.....|   107-20-0 |  (C)1    | (C)3     | 
a-Chloroacetophenone   |            |          |          | 
  (Phenacyl chloride)..|   532-27-4 |     0.05 |    0.3   | 
Chlorobenzene..........|   108-90-7 |    75    |  350     | 
o-Chlorobenzylidene    |            |          |          | 
  malononitrile........|  2698-41-1 |     0.05 |    0.4   | 
Chlorobromomethane.....|    74-97-5 |   200    | 1050     | 
2-Chloro-1,3-butadiene;|            |          |          | 
  See beta-Chloroprene.|            |          |          | 
Chlorodiphenyl         |            |          |          | 
  (42% Chlorine)(PCB)..| 53469-21-9 | ........ |    1     |  X 
Chlorodiphenyl         |            |          |          | 
  (54% Chlorine)(PCB)..| 11097-69-1 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
1-Chloro-2,            |            |          |          | 
  3-epoxypropane;      |            |          |          | 
  See Epichlorohydrin. |            |          |          | 
2-Chloroethanol;  See  |            |          |          | 
  Ethylene chlorohydrin|            |          |          | 
Chloroethylene;        |            |          |          | 
  See Vinyl chloride.  |            |          |          | 
Chloroform             |            |          |          | 
  (Trichloromethane)...|    67-66-3 | (C)50    |(C)240    | 
bis(Chloromethyl)      |            |          |          | 
  ether; see 1910.1008.|   542-88-1 |          |          | 
Chloromethyl methyl    |            |          |          | 
  ether; see 1910.1006.|   107-30-2 |          |          | 
1-Chloro-1-nitropropane|   600-25-9 |    20    |  100     | 
Chloropicrin...........|    76-06-2 |     0.1  |    0.7   | 
beta-Chloroprene.......|   126-99-8 |    25    |   90     |  X 
2-Chloro-6             |            |          |          | 
  (trichloromethyl)    |            |          |          | 
  pyridine.............|  1929-82-4 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Chromic acid and       |            |          |          | 
  chromates (as CrO(3))|        (4) |          |  (2)     | 
Chromium (II) compounds|            |          |          | 
  (as Cr)..............|  7440-47-3 | ........ |    0.5   | 
Chromium (III)         |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as Cr)....|  7440-47-3 | ........ |    0.5   | 
Chromium (VI) compounds|            |          |          | 
  See 1910.1026(5)     |            |          |          | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Chromium metal and     |            |          |          | 
  insol. salts (as Cr).|  7440-47-3 | ........ |    1     | 
Chrysene; see Coal tar |            |          |          | 
  pitch volatiles......|            |          |          | 
Clopidol...............|  2971-90-6 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Coal dust (less than   |            |          |          | 
  5% SiO(2)),          |            |          |          | 
  respirable fraction..|            |          |  (3)     | 
Coal dust (greater than|            |          |          | 
  or equal to 5%       |            |          |          | 
  SiO(2)), respirable  |            |          |          | 
  fraction.............|            |          |  (3)     | 
Coal tar pitch         |            |          |          | 
  volatiles (benzene   |            |          |          | 
  soluble fraction),   |            |          |          | 
  anthracene, BaP,     |            |          |          | 
  phenanthrene,        |            |          |          | 
  acridine, chrysene,  |            |          |          | 
  pyrene...............| 65966-93-2 | ........ |    0.2   | 
Cobalt metal, dust,    |            |          |          | 
  and fume (as Co).....|  7440-48-4 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Coke oven emissions;   |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1029........|            |          |          | 
Copper.................|  7440-50-8 |          |          | 
  Fume (as Cu).........|            | ........ |    0.1   | 
  Dusts and mists      |            |          |          | 
  (as Cu)..............|            | ........ |    1     | 
Cotton dust (e),       |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1043........|            | ........ |    1     | 
Crag herbicide (Sesone)|   136-78-7 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Cresol, all isomers....|  1319-77-3 |     5    |   22     |  X 
Crotonaldehyde.........|   123-73-9 |     2    |    6     | 
                       |  4170-30-3 |          |          | 
Cumene.................|    98-82-8 |    50    |  245     |  X 
  Cyanides (as CN).....|        (4) | ........ |    5     |  X 
Cyclohexane............|   110-82-7 |   300    | 1050     | 
Cyclohexanol...........|   108-93-0 |    50    |  200     | 
Cyclohexanone..........|   108-94-1 |    50    |  200     | 
Cyclohexene............|   110-83-8 |   300    | 1015     | 
Cyclopentadiene........|   542-92-7 |    75    |  200     | 
2,4-D (Dichlorophen-   |            |          |          | 
  oxyacetic acid)......|    94-75-7 | ........ |   10     | 
Decaborane.............| 17702-41-9 |     0.05 |    0.3   |  X 
Demeton (Systox).......|  8065-48-3 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Diacetone alcohol      |            |          |          | 
  (4-Hydroxy-4-methyl- |            |          |          | 
  2-pentanone).........|   123-42-2 |    50    |  240     | 
1,2-Diaminoethane;     |            |          |          | 
  see Ethylenediamine..|            |          |          | 
Diazomethane...........|   334-88-3 |     0.2  |    0.4   | 
Diborane...............| 19287-45-7 |     0.1  |    0.1   | 
  1,2-Dibromo-3-       |            |          |          | 
  chloropropane (DBCP);|            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1044........|    96-12-8 |          |          | 
1,2-Dibromoethane; see |            |          |          | 
  Ethylene dibromide...|            |          |          | 
Dibutyl phosphate......|   107-66-4 |     1    |    5     | 
Dibutyl phthalate......|    84-74-2 | ........ |    5     | 
o-Dichlorobenzene......|    95-50-1 | (C)50    |(C)300    | 
p-Dichlorobenzene......|   106-46-7 |    75    |  450     | 
3,3'-Dichlorobenzidine;|            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1007........|    91-94-1 |          |          | 
Dichlorodifluoromethane|    75-71-8 |  1000    | 4950     | 
1,3-Dichloro-5,        |            |          |          | 
  5-dimethyl hydantoin.|   118-52-5 | ........ |    0.2   | 
Dichlorodiphenyltri-   |            |          |          | 
  chloroethane (DDT)...|    50-29-3 | ........ |    1     |  X 
1,1-Dichloroethane.....|    75-34-3 |   100    |  400     | 
1,2-Dichloroethane; see|            |          |          | 
  Ethylene dichloride..|            |          |          | 
1,2-Dichloroethylene...|   540-59-0 |   200    |  790     | 
Dichloroethyl ether....|   111-44-4 | (C)15    |(C)90     |  X 
Dichloromethane; see   |            |          |          | 
  Methylene chloride...|            |          |          | 
Dichloromonofluoro-    |            |          |          | 
  methane..............|    75-43-4 |  1000    | 4200     | 
1,1-Dichloro-1-        |            |          |          | 
  nitroethane..........|   594-72-9 | (C)10    |(C)60     | 
1,2-Dichloropropane;   |            |          |          | 
  see                  |            |          |          | 
  Propylene dichloride.|            |          |          | 
Dichlorotetrafluoro-   |            |          |          | 
  ethane...............|    76-14-2 |  1000    | 7000     | 
Dichlorvos (DDVP)......|    62-73-7 | ........ |    1     |  X 
Dicyclopentadienyl iron|   102-54-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Dieldrin...............|    60-57-1 | ........ |    0.25  |  X 
Diethylamine...........|   109-89-7 |    25    |   75     | 
2-Diethylaminoethanol..|   100-37-8 |    10    |   50     |  X 
Diethyl ether;         |            |          |          | 
  see Ethyl ether......|            |          |          | 
Difluorodibromomethane.|    75-61-6 |   100    |  860     | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Diglycidyl ether (DGE).|  2238-07-5 |  (C)0.5  | (C)2.8   | 
Dihydroxybenzene;      |            |          |          | 
  see Hydroquinone.....|            |          |          | 
Diisobutyl ketone......|   108-83-8 |    50    |  290     | 
Diisopropylamine.......|   108-18-9 |     5    |   20     |  X 
4-Dimethylaminoazo-    |            |          |          | 
  benzene;             |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1015........|    60-11-7 |          |          | 
Dimethoxymethane;      |            |          |          | 
  see Methylal.........|            |          |          | 
Dimethyl acetamide.....|   127-19-5 |    10    |   35     |  X 
Dimethylamine..........|   124-40-3 |    10    |   18     | 
Dimethylaminobenzene;  |            |          |          | 
  see Xylidine.........|            |          |          | 
Dimethylaniline        |            |          |          | 
  (N,N-Dimethylaniline)|   121-69-7 |     5    |   25     |  X 
Dimethylbenzene;       |            |          |          | 
  see Xylene...........|            |          |          | 
Dimethyl-1,2-dibromo-2,|            |          |          | 
  2-dichloroethyl      |            |          |          | 
  phosphate............|   300-76-5 | ........ |    3     | 
Dimethylformamide......|    68-12-2 |    10    |   30     |  X 
2,6-Dimethyl-4-        |            |          |          | 
  heptanone; see       |            |          |          | 
  Diisobutyl ketone....|            |          |          | 
1,1-Dimethylhydrazine..|    57-14-7 |     0.5  |    1     |  X 
Dimethylphthalate......|   131-11-3 | ........ |    5     | 
Dimethyl sulfate.......|    77-78-1 |     1    |    5     |  X 
Dinitrobenzene         |            |          |          | 
  (all isomers)........|            |          |    1     |  X 
  (ortho)..............|   528-29-0 |          |          | 
  (meta)...............|    99-65-0 |          |          | 
  (para)...............|   100-25-4 |          |          | 
Dinitro-o-cresol.......|   534-52-1 | ........ |    0.2   |  X 
Dinitrotoluene.........| 25321-14-6 | ........ |    1.5   |  X 
Dioxane                |            |          |          | 
  (Diethylene dioxide).|   123-91-1 |   100    |  360     |  X 
Diphenyl (Biphenyl)....|    92-52-4 |     0.2  |    1     | 
Diphenylmethane        |            |          |          | 
  diisocyanate; see    |            |          |          | 
  Methylene bisphenyl  |            |          |          | 
  isocyanate...........|            |          |          | 
Dipropylene glycol     |            |          |          | 
  methyl ether.........| 34590-94-8 |   100    |  600     |  X 
Di-sec octyl phthalate |            |          |          | 
  (Di-(2-ethylhexyl)   |            |          |          | 
  phthalate)...........|   117-81-7 | ........ |    5     | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Emery..................| 12415-34-8 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Endrin.................|    72-20-8 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
Epichlorohydrin........|   106-89-8 |     5    |   19     |  X 
EPN....................|  2104-64-5 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
1,2-Epoxypropane; see  |            |          |          | 
  Propylene oxide......|            |          |          | 
2,3-Epoxy-1-propanol;  |            |          |          | 
  see Glycidol.........|            |          |          | 
Ethanethiol;  see      |            |          |          | 
  Ethyl mercaptan......|            |          |          | 
Ethanolamine...........|   141-43-5 |     3    |    6     | 
2-Ethoxyethanol        |            |          |          | 
  (Cellosolve).........|   110-80-5 |   200    |  740     |  X 
2-Ethoxyethyl acetate  |            |          |          | 
  (Cellosolve acetate).|   111-15-9 |   100    |  540     |  X 
Ethyl acetate..........|   141-78-6 |   400    | 1400     | 
Ethyl acrylate.........|   140-88-5 |    25    |  100     |  X 
Ethyl alcohol (Ethanol)|    64-17-5 |  1000    | 1900     | 
Ethylamine.............|    75-04-7 |    10    |   18     | 
Ethyl amyl ketone      |            |          |          | 
  (5-Methyl-3-         |            |          |          | 
  heptanone)...........|   541-85-5 |    25    |  130     | 
Ethyl benzene..........|   100-41-4 |   100    |  435     | 
Ethyl bromide..........|    74-96-4 |   200    |  890     | 
Ethyl butyl ketone     |            |          |          | 
  (3-Heptanone)........|   106-35-4 |    50    |  230     | 
Ethyl chloride.........|    75-00-3 |  1000    | 2600     | 
Ethyl ether............|    60-29-7 |   400    | 1200     | 
Ethyl formate..........|   109-94-4 |   100    |  300     | 
Ethyl mercaptan........|    75-08-1 | (C)10    |(C)25     | 
Ethyl silicate.........|    78-10-4 |   100    |  850     | 
Ethylene chlorohydrin..|   107-07-3 |     5    |   16     |  X 
Ethylenediamine........|   107-15-3 |    10    |   25     | 
Ethylene dibromide.....|   106-93-4 |          |  (2)     | 
Ethylene dichloride    |            |          |          | 
  (1,2-Dichloroethane).|   107-06-2 |          |  (2)     | 
Ethylene glycol        |            |          |          | 
  dinitrate............|   628-96-6 |  (C)0.2  | (C)1     |  X 
Ethylene glycol methyl |            |          |          | 
  acetate; see Methyl  |            |          |          | 
  cellosolve acetate...|            |          |          | 
Ethyleneimine;         |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1012........|   151-56-4 |          |          | 
Ethylene oxide;        |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1047........|    75-21-8 |          |          | 
Ethylidene chloride;   |            |          |          | 
  see 1,1-Dichlorethane|            |          |          | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
N-Ethylmorpholine......|   100-74-3 |    20    |   94     |  X 
Ferbam.................| 14484-64-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
Ferrovanadium dust.....| 12604-58-9 | ........ |    1     | 
Fluorides (as F).......|        (4) | ........ |    2.5   | 
Fluorine...............|  7782-41-4 |     0.1  |    0.2   | 
Fluorotrichloromethane |            |          |          | 
  (Trichloro-          |            |          |          | 
  fluoromethane).......|    75-69-4 |  1000    | 5600     | 
Formaldehyde;          |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1048........|    50-00-0 |          |          | 
Formic acid............|    64-18-6 |     5    |    9     | 
Furfural...............|    98-01-1 |     5    |   20     |  X 
Furfuryl alcohol.......|    98-00-0 |    50    |  200     | 
Grain dust (oat, wheat |            |          |          | 
  barley)..............| .......... | ........ |   10     | 
Glycerin (mist)........|    56-81-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Glycidol...............|   556-52-5 |    50    |  150     | 
Glycol monoethyl ether;|            |          |          | 
  see 2-Ethoxyethanol..|            |          |          | 
Graphite, natural      |            |          |          | 
  respirable dust......|  7782-42-5 |          |  (3)     | 
Graphite, synthetic....|            |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable Fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Guthion;               |            |          |          | 
  see Azinphos methyl..|            |          |          | 
Gypsum.................| 13397-24-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Hafnium................|  7440-58-6 | ........ |    0.5   | 
Heptachlor.............|    76-44-8 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Heptane (n-Heptane)....|   142-82-5 |   500    | 2000     | 
Hexachloroethane.......|    67-72-1 |     1    |   10     |  X 
Hexachloronaphthalene..|  1335-87-1 | ........ |    0.2   |  X 
n-Hexane...............|   110-54-3 |   500    | 1800     | 
2-Hexanone (Methyl     |            |          |          | 
  n-butyl ketone)......|   591-78-6 |   100    |  410     | 
Hexone (Methyl         |            |          |          | 
  isobutyl ketone).....|   108-10-1 |   100    |  410     | 
sec-Hexyl acetate......|   108-84-9 |    50    |  300     | 
Hydrazine..............|   302-01-2 |     1    |    1.3   |  X 
Hydrogen bromide.......| 10035-10-6 |     3    |   10     | 
Hydrogen chloride......|  7647-01-0 |  (C)5    | (C)7     | 
Hydrogen cyanide.......|    74-90-8 |    10    |   11     |  X 
Hydrogen fluoride      |            |          |          | 
  (as F)...............|  7664-39-3 |          |  (2)     | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Hydrogen peroxide......|  7722-84-1 |     1    |    1.4   | 
Hydrogen selenide      |            |          |          | 
  (as Se)..............|  7783-07-5 |     0.05 |    0.2   | 
Hydrogen sulfide.......|  7783-06-4 |          |  (2)     | 
Hydroquinone...........|   123-31-9 | ........ |    2     | 
Iodine.................|  7553-56-2 |  (C)0.1  | (C)1     | 
Iron oxide fume........|  1309-37-1 | ........ |   10     | 
Isomyl acetate.........|   123-92-2 |   100    |  525     | 
Isomyl alcohol         |            |          |          | 
  (primary and         |            |          |          | 
  secondary)...........|   123-51-3 |   100    |  360     | 
Isobutyl acetate.......|   110-19-0 |   150    |  700     | 
Isobutyl alcohol.......|    78-83-1 |   100    |  300     | 
Isophorone.............|    78-59-1 |    25    |  140     | 
Isopropyl acetate......|   108-21-4 |   250    |  950     | 
Isopropyl alcohol......|    67-63-0 |   400    |  980     | 
Isopropylamine.........|    75-31-0 |     5    |   12     | 
Isopropyl ether........|   108-20-3 |   500    | 2100     | 
Isopropyl glycidyl     |            |          |          | 
  ether (IGE)..........|  4016-14-2 |    50    |  240     | 
Kaolin.................|  1332-58-7 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Ketene.................|   463-51-4 |     0.5  |    0.9   | 
Lead inorganic (as Pb);|            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1025........|  7439-92-1 |          |          | 
Limestone..............|  1317-65-3 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Lindane................|    58-89-9 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Lithium hydride........|  7580-67-8 | ........ |    0.025 | 
L.P.G. (Liquified      |            |          |          | 
  petroleum gas).......| 68476-85-7 |  1000    | 1800     | 
Magnesite..............|   546-93-0 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Magnesium oxide fume...|  1309-48-4 |          |          | 
  Total Particulate....|            | ........ |   15     | 
Malathion..............|   121-75-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     |  X 
Maleic anhydride.......|   108-31-6 |     0.25 |    1     | 
Manganese compounds    |            |          |          | 
  (as Mn)..............|  7439-96-5 | ........ | (C)5     | 
Manganese fume (as Mn).|  7439-96-5 | ........ | (C)5     | 
Marble.................|  1317-65-3 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Mercury (aryl and      |            |          |          | 
  inorganic)(as Hg)....|  7439-97-6 |          |  (2)     | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Mercury (organo) alkyl |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as Hg)....|  7439-97-6 |          |  (2)     | 
Mercury (vapor) (as Hg)|  7439-97-6 |          |  (2)     | 
Mesityl oxide..........|   141-79-7 |    25    |  100     | 
Methanethiol;          |            |          |          | 
  see Methyl mercaptan.|            |          |          | 
Methoxychlor...........|    72-43-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
2-Methoxyethanol;      |            |          |          | 
  (Methyl cellosolve)..|   109-86-4 |    25    |   80     |  X 
2-Methoxyethyl acetate |            |          |          | 
  (Methyl cellosolve   |            |          |          | 
  acetate).............|   110-49-6 |    25    |  120     |  X 
Methyl acetate.........|    79-20-9 |   200    |  610     | 
Methyl acetylene       |            |          |          | 
  (Propyne)............|    74-99-7 |  1000    | 1650     | 
Methyl acetylene       |            |          |          | 
  propadiene mixture   |            |          |          | 
  (MAPP)...............|            |  1000    | 1800     | 
Methyl acrylate........|    96-33-3 |    10    |   35     |  X 
Methylal               |            |          |          | 
  (Dimethoxy-methane)..|   109-87-5 |  1000    | 3100     | 
Methyl alcohol.........|    67-56-1 |   200    |  260     | 
Methylamine............|    74-89-5 |    10    |   12     | 
Methyl amyl alcohol;   |            |          |          | 
  see Methyl Isobutyl  |            |          |          | 
  carbinol.............|            |          |          | 
Methyl n-amyl ketone...|   110-43-0 |   100    |  465     | 
Methyl bromide.........|    74-83-9 | (C)20    |(C)80     |  X 
Methyl butyl ketone;   |            |          |          | 
  see 2-Hexanone.......|            |          |          | 
Methyl cellosolve;     |            |          |          | 
  see 2-Methoxyethanol.|            |          |          | 
Methyl cellosolve      |            |          |          | 
  acetate;             |            |          |          | 
  see 2-Methoxyethyl   |            |          |          | 
  acetate..............|            |          |          | 
Methyl chloride........|    74-87-3 |          |  (2)     | 
Methyl chloroform      |            |          |          | 
  (1,1,1-Trichloro-    |            |          |          | 
  ethane)..............|    71-55-6 |   350    | 1900     | 
Methylcyclohexane......|   108-87-2 |   500    | 2000     | 
Methylcyclohexanol.....| 25639-42-3 |   100    |  470     | 
o-Methylcyclohexanone..|   583-60-8 |   100    |  460     |  X 
Methylene chloride.....|    75-09-2 |          |  (2)     | 
Methyl ethyl ketone    |            |          |          | 
  (MEK); see 2-Butanone|            |          |          | 
Methyl formate.........|   107-31-3 |   100    |  250     | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Methyl hydrazine       |            |          |          | 
  (Monomethyl          |            |          |          | 
  hydrazine)...........|    60-34-4 |  (C)0.2  | (C)0.35  |  X 
Methyl iodide..........|    74-88-4 |     5    |   28     |  X 
Methyl isoamyl ketone..|   110-12-3 |   100    |  475     | 
Methyl isobutyl        |            |          |          | 
  carbinol.............|   108-11-2 |    25    |  100     |  X 
Methyl isobutyl ketone;|            |          |          | 
  see Hexone...........|            |          |          | 
Methyl isocyanate......|   624-83-9 |     0.02 |    0.05  |  X 
Methyl mercaptan.......|    74-93-1 | (C)10    |(C)20     | 
Methyl methacrylate....|    80-62-6 |   100    |  410     | 
Methyl propyl ketone;  |            |          |          | 
  see 2-Pentanone......|            |          |          | 
alpha-Methyl styrene...|    98-83-9 |(C)100    |(C)480    | 
Methylene bisphenyl    |            |          |          | 
  isocyanate (MDI).....|   101-68-8 |  (C)0.02 | (C)0.2   | 
Mica; see Silicates....|            |          |          | 
Molybdenum (as Mo).....|  7439-98-7 |          |          | 
  Soluble compounds....|            | ........ |    5     | 
  Insoluble Compounds  |            |          |          | 
    Total dust.........|            | ........ |   15     | 
Monomethyl aniline.....|   100-61-8 |     2    |    9     |  X 
Monomethyl hydrazine;  |            |          |          | 
  see Methyl hydrazine.|            |          |          | 
Morpholine.............|   110-91-8 |    20    |   70     |  X 
Naphtha (Coal tar).....|  8030-30-6 |   100    |  400     | 
Naphthalene............|    91-20-3 |    10    |   50     | 
alpha-Naphthylamine;   |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1004........|   134-32-7 |          |          | 
beta-Naphthylamine;    |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1009........|    91-59-8 |          |          | 
Nickel carbonyl (as Ni)| 13463-39-3 |     0.001|    0.007 | 
Nickel, metal and      |            |          |          | 
  insoluble compounds  |            |          |          | 
  (as Ni)..............|  7440-02-0 | ........ |    1     | 
Nickel, soluble        |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as Ni)....|  7440-02-0 | ........ |    1     | 
Nicotine...............|    54-11-5 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Nitric acid............|  7697-37-2 |     2    |    5     | 
Nitric oxide...........| 10102-43-9 |    25    |   30     | 
p-Nitroaniline.........|   100-01-6 |     1    |    6     |  X 
Nitrobenzene...........|    98-95-3 |     1    |    5     |  X 
p-Nitrochlorobenzene...|   100-00-5 | ........ |    1     |  X 
4-Nitrodiphenyl;       |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1003........|    92-93-3 |          |          | 
Nitroethane............|    79-24-3 |   100    |  310     | 
Nitrogen dioxide.......| 10102-44-0 |  (C)5    | (C)9     | 
Nitrogen trifluoride...|  7783-54-2 |    10    |   29     | 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Nitroglycerin..........|    55-63-0 |  (C)0.2  | (C)2     |  X 
Nitromethane...........|    75-52-5 |   100    |  250     | 
1-Nitropropane.........|   108-03-2 |    25    |   90     | 
2-Nitropropane.........|    79-46-9 |    25    |   90     | 
N-Nitrosodimethylamine;|            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1016        |            |          |          | 
Nitrotoluene           |            |          |          | 
  (all isomers)........|            |     5    |   30     |  X 
  o-isomer.............|    88-72-2 |          |          | 
  m-isomer.............|    99-08-1 |          |          | 
  p-isomer.............|    99-99-0 |          |          | 
Nitrotrichloromethane; |            |          |          | 
  see Chloropicrin.....|            |          |          | 
Octachloronaphthalene..|  2234-13-1 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
Octane.................|   111-65-9 |   500    | 2350     | 
Oil mist, mineral......|  8012-95-1 | ........ |    5     | 
Osmium tetroxide       |            |          |          | 
  (as Os)..............| 20816-12-0 | ........ |    0.002 | 
Oxalic acid............|   144-62-7 | ........ |    1     | 
Oxygen difluoride......|  7783-41-7 |     0.05 |    0.1   | 
Ozone..................| 10028-15-6 |     0.1  |    0.2   | 
Paraquat, respirable   |            |          |          | 
  dust.................|  4685-14-7 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
                       |  1910-42-5 |          |          | 
                       |  2074-50-2 |          |          | 
Parathion..............|    56-38-2 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
Particulates not       |            |          |          | 
  otherwise regulated  |            |          |          | 
  (PNOR)(f)............|            |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
PCB; see Chlorodiphenyl|            |          |          | 
  (42% and 54%         |            |          |          | 
  chlorine)............|            |          |          | 
Pentaborane............| 19624-22-7 |     0.005|    0.01  | 
Pentachloronaphthalene.|  1321-64-8 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Pentachlorophenol......|    87-86-5 | ........ |    0.5   |  X 
Pentaerythritol........|   115-77-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Pentane................|   109-66-0 |  1000    | 2950     | 
2-Pentanone (Methyl    |            |          |          | 
  propyl ketone).......|   107-87-9 |   200    |  700     | 
Perchloroethylene      |            |          |          | 
  (Tetrachloroethylene)|   127-18-4 |          |  (2)     | 
Perchloromethyl        |            |          |          | 
  mercaptan............|   594-42-3 |     0.1  |    0.8   | 
Perchloryl fluoride....|  7616-94-6 |     3    |   13.5   | 
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                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Petroleum distillates  |            |          |          | 
  (Naphtha)(Rubber     |            |          |          | 
  Solvent).............|            |   500    | 2000     | 
Phenol.................|   108-95-2 |     5    |   19     |  X 
p-Phenylene diamine....|   106-50-3 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
Phenyl ether, vapor....|   101-84-8 |     1    |    7     | 
Phenyl ether-biphenyl  |            |          |          | 
  mixture, vapor.......|            |     1    |    7     | 
Phenylethylene;        |            |          |          | 
  see Styrene..........|            |          |          | 
Phenyl glycidyl ether  |            |          |          | 
  (PGE)................|   122-60-1 |    10    |   60     | 
Phenylhydrazine........|   100-63-0 |     5    |   22     |  X 
Phosdrin (Mevinphos)...|  7786-34-7 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
Phosgene (Carbonyl     |            |          |          | 
  chloride)............|    75-44-5 |     0.1  |    0.4   | 
Phosphine..............|  7803-51-2 |     0.3  |    0.4   | 
Phosphoric acid........|  7664-38-2 | ........ |    1     | 
Phosphorus (yellow)....|  7723-14-0 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Phosphorus             |            |          |          | 
  pentachloride........| 10026-13-8 | ........ |    1     | 
Phosphorus pentasulfide|  1314-80-3 | ........ |    1     | 
Phosphorus trichloride.|  7719-12-2 |     0.5  |    3     | 
Phthalic anhydride.....|    85-44-9 |     2    |   12     | 
Picloram...............|  1918-02-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Picric acid............|    88-89-1 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
Pindone (2-Pivalyl-1,  |            |          |          | 
  3-indandione)........|    83-26-1 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Plaster of paris.......| 26499-65-0 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Platinum (as Pt).......|  7440-06-4 |          |          | 
  Metal................|            | ........ | ........ | 
  Soluble Salts........|            | ........ |    0.002 | 
Portland cement........| 65997-15-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Propane................|    74-98-6 |  1000    | 1800     | 
beta-Propriolactone;   |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1013........|    57-57-8 |          |          | 
n-Propyl acetate.......|   109-60-4 |   200    |  840     | 
n-Propyl alcohol.......|    71-23-8 |   200    |  500     | 
n-Propyl nitrate.......|   627-13-4 |    25    |  110     | 
Propylene dichloride...|    78-87-5 |    75    |  350     | 
Propylene imine........|    75-55-8 |     2    |    5     |  X 
Propylene oxide........|    75-56-9 |   100    |  240     | 
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                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Propyne; see Methyl    |            |          |          | 
  acetylene............|            |          |          | 
Pyrethrum..............|  8003-34-7 | ........ |    5     | 
Pyridine...............|   110-86-1 |     5    |   15     | 
Quinone................|   106-51-4 |     0.1  |    0.4   | 
RDX: see Cyclonite.....|            |          |          | 
Rhodium (as Rh), metal |            |          |          | 
  fume and insoluble   |            |          |          | 
  compounds............|  7440-16-6 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Rhodium (as Rh),       |            |          |          | 
  soluble compounds....|  7440-16-6 | ........ |    0.001 | 
Ronnel.................|   299-84-3 | ........ |   15     | 
Rotenone...............|    83-79-4 | ........ |    5     | 
Rouge..................|            |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Selenium compounds     |            |          |          | 
  (as Se)..............|  7782-49-2 | ........ |    0.2   | 
Selenium hexafluoride  |            |          |          | 
  (as Se)..............|  7783-79-1 |     0.05 |    0.4   | 
Silica, amorphous,     |            |          |          | 
  precipitated and gel.|112926-00-8 |          |  (3)     | 
Silica, amorphous,     |            |          |          | 
  diatomaceous earth,  |            |          |          | 
  containing less than |            |          |          | 
  1% crystalline silica| 61790-53-2 |          |  (3)     | 
Silica, crystalline    |            |          |          | 
  cristobalite,        |            |          |          | 
  respirable dust......| 14464-46-1 |          |  (3)     | 
Silica, crystalline    |            |          |          | 
  quartz, respirable   |            |          |          | 
  dust.................| 14808-60-7 |          |  (3)     | 
Silica, crystalline    |            |          |          | 
  tripoli (as quartz), |            |          |          | 
  respirable dust......|  1317-95-9 |          |  (3)     | 
Silica, crystalline    |            |          |          | 
  tridymite,           |            |          |          | 
  respirable dust......| 15468-32-3 |          |  (3)     | 
Silica, fused,         |            |          |          | 
  respirable dust......| 60676-86-0 |          |  (3)     | 
Silicates (less than 1%|            |          |          | 
  crystalline silica)  |            |          |          | 
  Mica (respirable     |            |          |          | 
  dust)................| 12001-26-2 |          |  (3)     | 
  Soapstone, total dust| .......... |          |  (3)     | 
  Soapstone, respirable|            |          |          | 
  dust.................| .......... |          |  (3)     | 
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                       |            |          |          | 
                       |            |          | mg/m(3)  |   Skin 
      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
  Talc (containing     |            |          |          | 
  asbestos): use       |            |          |          | 
  asbestos limit: see  |            |          |          | 
  29 CFR 1910.1001.....|            |          |  (3)     | 
Talc (containing no    |            |          |          | 
  asbestos),           |            |          |          | 
  respirable dust......| 14807-96-6 |          |  (3)     | 
  Tremolite,           |            |          |          | 
  asbestiform; see     |            |          |          | 
  1910.1001............|            |          |          | 
Silicon................|  7440-21-3 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Silicon carbide........|   409-21-2 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Silver, metal and      |            |          |          | 
  soluble compounds    |            |          |          | 
  (as Ag)..............|  7440-22-4 | ........ |    0.01  | 
Soapstone;             |            |          |          | 
  see Silicates........|            |          |          | 
Sodium fluoroacetate...|    62-74-8 | ........ |    0.05  |  X 
Sodium hydroxide.......|  1310-73-2 | ........ |    2     | 
Starch.................|  9005-25-8 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Stibine................|  7803-52-3 |     0.1  |    0.5   | 
Stoddard solvent.......|  8052-41-3 |   500    | 2900     | 
Strychnine.............|    57-24-9 | ........ |    0.15  | 
Styrene................|   100-42-5 |          |  (2)     | 
Sucrose................|    57-50-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Sulfur dioxide.........|  7446-09-5 |     5    |   13     | 
Sulfur hexafluoride....|  2551-62-4 |  1000    | 6000     | 
Sulfuric acid..........|  7664-93-9 | ........ |    1     | 
Sulfur monochloride....| 10025-67-9 |     1    |    6     | 
Sulfur pentafluoride...|  5714-22-7 |     0.025|    0.25  | 
Sulfuryl fluoride......|  2699-79-8 |     5    |   20     | 
Systox;  see Demeton...|            |          |          | 
2,4,5-T (2,4,5-tri-    |            |          |          | 
  chlorophenoxyacetic  |            |          |          | 
  acid)................|    93-76-5 | ........ |   10     | 
Talc;  see Silicates...|            |          |          | 
Tantalum, metal and    |            |          |          | 
  oxide dust...........|  7440-25-7 | ........ |    5     | 
TEDP (Sulfotep)........|  3689-24-5 | ........ |    0.2   |  X 
Tellurium and          |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as Te)....| 13494-80-9 | ........ |    0.1   | 
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                       |            |          |          | 
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      Substance        |CAS No. (c) |ppm (a)(1)| (b)(1)   |designation 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|___________ 
Tellurium hexafluoride |            |          |          | 
  (as Te)..............|  7783-80-4 |     0.02 |    0.2   | 
Temephos...............|  3383-96-8 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
TEPP (Tetraethyl       |            |          |          | 
  pyrophosphaate)......|   107-49-3 | ........ |    0.05  |  X 
Terphenylis............| 26140-60-3 |  (C)1    | (C)9     | 
1,1,1,2-Tetrachloro-2, |            |          |          | 
  2-difluoroethane.....|    76-11-9 |   500    | 4170     | 
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloro-1, |            |          |          | 
  2-difluoroethane.....|    76-12-0 |   500    | 4170     | 
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloro-   |            |          |          | 
  ethane...............|    79-34-5 |     5    |   35     |  X 
Tetrachoroethylene;    |            |          |          | 
  see Perchloroethylene|            |          |          | 
Tetrachloromethane; see|            |          |          | 
  Carbon tetrachloride.|            |          |          | 
Tetrachloronaphthalene.|  1335-88-2 | ........ |    2     |  X 
Tetraethyl lead (as Pb)|    78-00-2 | ........ |    0.075 |  X 
Tetrahydrofuran........|   109-99-9 |   200    |  590     | 
Tetramethyl lead,      |            |          |          | 
  (as Pb)..............|    75-74-1 | ........ |    0.075 |  X 
Tetramethyl            |            |          |          | 
  succinonitrile.......|  3333-52-6 |     0.5  |    3     |  X 
Tetranitromethane......|   509-14-8 |     1    |    8     | 
Tetryl (2,4,6-Trinitro-|            |          |          | 
  phenylmethyl-        |            |          |          | 
  nitramine)...........|   479-45-8 | ........ |    1.5   |  X 
Thallium, soluble      |            |          |          | 
  compounds (as Tl)....|  7440-28-0 | ........ |    0.1   |  X 
4,4'-Thiobis(6-tert,   |            |          |          | 
  Butyl-m-cresol)......|    96-69-5 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Thiram.................|   137-26-8 | ........ |    5     | 
Tin, inorganic         |            |          |          | 
  compounds (except    |            |          |          | 
  oxides) (as Sn)......|  7440-31-5 | ........ |    2     | 
Tin, organic compounds |            |          |          | 
  (as Sn)..............|  7440-31-5 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Titanium dioxide.......| 13463-67-7 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
Toluene................|   108-88-3 |          |  (2)     | 
Toluene-2,             |            |          |          | 
  4-diisocyanate (TDI).|   584-84-9 |  (C)0.02 | (C)0.14  | 
o-Toluidine............|    95-53-4 |     5    |   22     |  X 
Toxaphene;  see        |            |          |          | 
  Chlorinated camphene.|            |          |          | 
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Tremolite;             |            |          |          | 
  see Silicates........|            |          |          | 
Tributyl phosphate.....|   126-73-8 | ........ |    5     | 
1,1,1-Trichloroethane; |            |          |          | 
  see Methyl chloroform|            |          |          | 
1,1,2-Trichloroethane..|    79-00-5 |    10    |   45     |  X 
Trichloroethylene......|    79-01-6 |          |  (2)     | 
Trichloromethane;      |            |          |          | 
  see Chloroform       |            |          |          | 
Trichloronaphthalene...|  1321-65-9 | ........ |    5     |  X 
1,2,3-Trichloropropane.|    96-18-4 |    50    |  300     | 
1,1,2-Trichloro-1,2,   |            |          |          | 
  2-trifluoroethane....|    76-13-1 |  1000    | 7600     | 
Triethylamine..........|   121-44-8 |    25    |  100     | 
Trifluorobromomethane..|    75-63-8 |  1000    | 6100     | 
  2,4,6-Trinitrophenol;|            |          |          | 
  see Picric acid......|            |          |          | 
2,4,6-Trinitrophenyl-  |            |          |          | 
  methyl nitramine;    |            |          |          | 
  see Tetryl...........|            |          |          | 
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene  |            |          |          | 
  (TNT)................|   118-96-7 | ........ |    1.5   |  X 
Triorthocresyl         |            |          |          | 
  phosphate............|    78-30-8 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Triphenyl phosphate....|   115-86-6 | ........ |    3     | 
Turpentine.............|  8006-64-2 |   100    |  560     | 
Uranium (as U).........|  7440-61-1 |          |          | 
  Soluble compounds....|            | ........ |    0.05  | 
  Insoluble compounds..|            | ........ |    0.25  | 
Vanadium...............|  1314-62-1 |          |          | 
  Respirable dust      |            |          |          | 
  (as V(2)O(5))........|            | ........ | (C)0.5   | 
  Fume (as V(2)O(5))...|            | ........ | (C)0.1   | 
Vegetable oil mist.....|            |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Vinyl benzene;         |            |          |          | 
  see Styrene..........|            |          |          | 
Vinyl chloride;        |            |          |          | 
  see 1910.1017........|    75-01-4 |          |          | 
Vinyl cyanide;         |            |          |          | 
  see Acrylonitrile    |            |          |          | 
Vinyl toluene..........| 25013-15-4 |   100    |  480     | 
Warfarin...............|    81-81-2 | ........ |    0.1   | 
Xylenes                |            |          |          | 
  (o-, m-, p-isomers)..|  1330-20-7 |   100    |  435     | 
Xylidine...............|  1300-73-8 |     5    |   25     |  X 
Yttrium................|  7440-65-5 | ........ |    1     | 
Zinc chloride fume.....|  7646-85-7 | ........ |    1     | 
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Zinc oxide fume........|  1314-13-2 | ........ |    5     | 
Zinc oxide.............|  1314-13-2 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Zinc stearate..........|   557-05-1 |          |          | 
  Total dust...........|            | ........ |   15     | 
  Respirable fraction..|            | ........ |    5     | 
Zirconium compounds    |            |          |          | 
  (as Zr)..............|  7440-67-7 | ........ |    5     | 
_______________________|____________|__________|__________|_________ 
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Table A-IV 
Isotopes Classified by Radiotoxicity Levels16 
GROUP I 
Very High 
Hazard 
GROUP 2 
High 
Hazard 
GROUP 3 
Moderate 
Hazard 
GROUP 4 
Low  
Hazard 
227Ac 105Ag 254Fm 242Pu 238Am 132Im 80Sr 237Am 
237Am 110Agm 255Fm 226Ra 239Am 134I 83Sr 36Cl 
249Bk 111Ag 153Gd 86Rb 240Am 135I 91Sr 135Cs 
144Ce 243Am 181Hf 103Ru 244Amm 113Inm 92Sr 135Csm 
246Cf 244Am 203Hg 122Sb 245Am 115Inm 96Tc 129I 
248Cf 73As 166Ho 124Sb 246Am 42K 99Tcm 53Mn 
249Cf 74As 124I 125Sb 246Amm 43K 116Te 88Nb 
250Cf 76As 125I 46Sc 77As 177Lu 121Te 59Ni 
251Cf 211At 126I 48Sc 199Au 51Mn 127Te 193Pt 
252Cf 198Au 130I 75Se 7Be 56Mn 131Te 244Pu 
253Cf 140Ba 131I 113Sn 82Br 90Mo 133Tem 97Tc 
254Cf 206Bi 133I 125Sn 14C 93Mom 231Th 99Tc 
240Cm 207Bi 114Inm 85Sr 135Ce 101Mo 200Tl natTh 
242Cm 210Bi 190Ir 183Ta 137Cem 24Na 202Tl oreTh 
243Cm 212Bi 192Ir 160Tb 38Cl 89Nb 231U 232Th 
244Cm 250Bk 194Ir 121Tem 247Cm 89Nbm 236U natU 
245Cm 45Ca 140La 123Te 55Co 90Nb 240U oreU 
246Cm 47Ca 52Mn 123Tem 61Co 94Nb 187W 235U 
253Es 109Cd 54Mn 125Tem 51Cr 95Nbm 92Y 238U 
254Es 115Cd 93Mo 127Tem 132Cs 149Nd 93Y 93Zr 
254Esm 115Cdm 99Mo 129Tem 138Cs 237Np 86Zr  
257Fm 134Ce 22Na 131Tem 64Cu 191Osm 89Zr  
230Pa 139Ce 93Nbm 132Te 165Dy 193Os   
210Pb 141Ce 95Nb 226Th 169Er 33P   
210Po 143Ce 96Nb 234Th 171Er 203Pb   
236Pu 244Cf 147Nd 170Tm 152Eum 103Pd   
238Pu 238Cm 239Np 171Tm 18F 109Pd   
241Pu 241Cm 185Os 233U 52Fe 203Po   
223Ra 248Cm 191Os 234U 55Fe 191Pt   
224Ra 56Co 32P 237U 72Ga 193Ptm   
225Ra 57Co 231Pa 48V 159Gd 197Pt   
226Ra+d 58Co 233Pa 90Y 3H 237Pu   
228Ra 60Co 212Pb 91Y 197Hg 245Pu   
106Ru 134Cs 147Pm 65Zn 197Hgm 227Ra   
90Sr 136Cs 149Pm 88Zr 120I 105Rh   
90Y+90Sr 137Cs 142Pr 95Zr 120Im 97Ru   
227Th 166Dy 143Pr 97Zr 121I 35S   
228Th 152Eu 234Pu  123I 47Sc   
229Th 154Eu 239Pu  128I 151Sm   
230U 155Eu 240Pu  132I 153Sm   
232U 59Fe       
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